Saturday, December 6, 2025

John Bellamy Foster: Capitalist vs Socialist Eco-Modernism

Eco-Marxism and Prometheus Unbound: Capitalist vs Socialist Eco-Modernism. John Bellamy Foster, The Monthly Review. Nov. 1, 2025.

This article was prepared as a paper for presentation as a keynote address to the Fourth World Congress on Marxism, Beijing, October 11–12, 2025.


In the West, ecological modernization as a model for addressing environmental problems has long been the subject of critique by ecosocialists and by radical ecologists in general. In contrast, in China, ecological modernism as a way of redressing environmental problems has the strong backing of ecological Marxists. The primary reason for these differing approaches should be obvious. In the West, the notion of ecological modernization, while unobjectionable in itself as part of a comprehensive process of environmental change, has come to stand ideologically for the restrictive model of capitalist ecological modernization. Here it is suggested that environmental problems can be addressed by technological means alone within the established social relations of capitalism in a purely reformist context. Distinct from this, socialist ecological modernization, as envisioned in China and in a few other postrevolutionary states, is substantively different. It requires a break with the social relations of capital accumulation, facilitating changes in the human relation to nature that are of a revolutionary character, aimed at the creation of an ecological civilization geared to sustainable human development.

A parallel problem arises with respect to the notion of “Prometheanism,” an ambiguous term ostensibly based on the ancient Greek myth in which Prometheus, a Titan, gave fire to humanity. In the contemporary capitalist view, the Promethean myth has been transformed in such a way that it is seen as standing for technology and power, even for industrial revolutions. Yet, in the original Greek myth as presented by Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound and later adopted by Enlightenment thinkers, including Percy Bysshe Shelley and Karl Marx, Prometheus, chained to a rock by Hephaestus on the command of Zeus, stood for the revolutionary defiance of the gods, and was the source of human enlightenment and self-consciousness. Capitalist Prometheanism therefore is not the same as revolutionary humanist Prometheanism. The former is about technology and power and has little relation to the Greek myth itself; the latter is about revolutionary enlightenment, the development of social individuals, and the human accord with nature.

In the ruling capitalist ideology of the West/Global North, the issue of the impact of the capital accumulation process on the environment, including the Earth System crisis itself, is either avoided altogether or is seen as subject to pure technological solutions, with no need to alter class, property, capital, and consumption relations. Ecological modernization as a theory and a practice has thus come to stand principally for an anti-ecological stance in that it puts capitalist social relations before issues of humanity and nature, insisting that nothing needs to change but the machines, while the accumulation of capital remains the supreme object of the system. It is ecological modernization in this narrow ecotechnic sense that is meant when mention is made of the “greening of capitalism.” In its absolute rejection of ecological limits to unrestrained accumulation, capitalist ecological modernization is a manifestation of a fatal incapacity to address the needs of humanity and nature.

Within Chinese ecological Marxism, in contrast, ecological modernization is not about preserving capitalism and opposing environmentalism. Instead, it is conceived as socialist ecological modernization, part of the process of creating a new ecological civilization. This does not mean that the ecological contradictions of development and modernity magically disappear. But the task here is viewed differently, aimed at explicitly building a more environmental consciousness and reality. As Xi Jinping says, “clear waters and green mountains” are worth as much or more than “mountains of gold,” and ultimately this means that choices have to be made to sustain the former, even at the expense of the latter.

Ecosocialism and the Promethean Myth

What makes it so difficult to disentangle the ecological debate in the West is that the alienated, dualistic consciousness that has historically characterized the hegemonic ideology has penetrated the ecosocialist movement itself. This has generated all sorts of contradictions, arising not simply out of capitalism but also emanating from the legacy of the Cold War and its antisocialist ideology. Western Marxism often played an ambiguous role in the Cold War, critical of both capitalism and state socialism, while falling prey to the four retreats (from materialism, the dialectics of nature, class, and imperialism). Hence, it is not surprising that the rise of ecosocialism as a defining concept in the 1980s was closely tied to Cold War ideology. Leading ecosocialists of the period, such as Ted Benton in England and John P. Clark in the United States, took the position that Marx’s work and that of Marxism generally was “Promethean” in the hyperindustrialist sense and thus opposed to ecology. For Benton, writing in New Left Review, Marx stood accused of having a mechanistic “Promethean, ‘productivist’ view of history” that militated against an environmental perspective.

For Marx, Epicurus was “the true radical Enlightener of antiquity.” In his praise of Epicurus in his dissertation, Marx compared him to Prometheus (as depicted by Aeschylus)—the revolutionary Titan who had defied the gods of Olympus by bringing fire—standing for light and knowledge­—to humanity, and who was punished by being chained to a rock for eternity on the orders of Zeus. Here Marx replicated Lucretius’s famous eulogy to Epicurus in De rerum natura, which had formed the basis for Voltaire’s use of the term “Enlightenment” in eighteenth-century France. This, and a contemporary lithograph on the censorship of the Rheinische Zeitung, of which Marx was editor, depicting Prometheus chained to a printing press, engendered the common identification of Marx with Prometheus.

Breaking with the dominant millennia-long conception of Prometheus as a bringer of light/Enlightenment—though Joseph Pierre-Proudhon in the nineteenth century had promoted a mechanical Prometheanism and Mary Shelley had referred to “The Modern Prometheus” in the subtitle to her Frankenstein—Cold War warriors in the West, many of them disaffected leftists writing for CIA-funded publications like Encounter, began presenting Marx as an advocate of extreme Prometheanism. This was a code name for the advocacy of unlimited instrumentalism, as the chief aim of society, used to identify Marx with Russia under Joseph Stalin, with its rapid industrialization and seeming emphasis on gigantism. Biography after biography of Marx touted his reference to Prometheus in his dissertation, with no attempt to explain the context—that is, his praise of Epicurus as a Prometheus-like figure in the sense of Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound. Epicurus was known for being the leading materialist philosopher of the ancient Greek world and for his humanistic commitment to a self-conscious sustainable community, all of which led Marx to compare him to the Prometheus of myth, none of which had anything to do with instrumentalism, hyperindustrialism, or gigantism.

Notably, in his famous 1918 biography of Marx, Franz Mehring had characterized Marx as a “second Prometheus both in struggle and in suffering.” This was adopted and distorted early on by critics of Marx. In To the Finland Station (1940), Edmund Wilson presented Marx as a mechanistic Prometheus with production as his only object, behind whom stood the ominous shadow of Lucifer. One of the earliest and most influential Cold War works to portray Marx as a Promethean instrumentalist was Robert C. Tucker’s Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (1961), which saw both G. W. F. Hegel and Marx as promoting philosophies “whose very own confession was that of Prometheus.” This general view was taken over by Cold Warriors like Lewis Feuer in Marx and the Intellectuals (1969) and Daniel Bell in his The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976), with the former accusing Marx of a Promethean “mythopoeic compulsion” devoted to technological absolutism.

Cold War propagandists who attacked Marx and Marxism for its so-called mechanistic Prometheanism were mainly concerned with presenting Marxism as antihumanist, instrumentalist, and hyperindustrialist, in line with their conception of Soviet Communism. Yet, true to their capitalist vision, such critics of Marxism were neither enemies of productivism nor on the side of the environment. Thus, Bell, in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, was one of the chief critics of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth study (1972). He argued that ecological limits to growth simply did not exist and that resource scarcity was impossible in the new postindustrial world.

Although Cold War criticism of classical Marxism for its supposed mechanistic Prometheanism was thus originally aimed at claiming that Marxism was inherently antihumanistic, this was to metamorphose into the charge that historical materialism was anti-environmentalist through the work of figures like British sociologist Anthony Giddens, who contended in 1981 in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism that Marx had a “Promethean attitude” in which nature was reduced to instrumental terms. This was seconded by a number of prominent ecosocialists, who claimed that Marx was a “Promethean” productivist, and thus an anti-environmentalist, thinker. What is now commonly referred to as first-stage ecosocialism, in the 1980s and ’90s, thus came to stand mainly for a view that represented a break with classical Marxism on environmental grounds, often comparing Marx unfavorably to Thomas Malthus and modern neo-Malthusianism in this respect.

In the late 1990s, however, a second-stage ecological Marxism emerged, beginning with the work of the present author and Paul Burkett. Here the object was to uncover Marx’s own ecological critique, while countering charges that Marx had advocated a so-called hyperindustrialist “Prometheanism.” Emphasis was placed on Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism in his theory of metabolic rift and his conception of sustainable human development. This led to the rapid development of Marxian ecology or of second-stage ecosocialism, fully integrated with the critique of capitalism as a whole and with Marxian dialectics. A very substantial body of work, consisting of hundreds and hundreds of books and articles, has been published, utilizing the general metabolic rift analysis arising from Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism to address nearly every aspect of the modern planetary ecological crisis, historically and in the present.

Marx and ecological Marxism can be accurately viewed as Promethean only in the sense of the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus itself, as described, in particular, in Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound, as this had been understood for millennia. Marx depicted Epicurus via Prometheus as a protorevolutionary figure who brought Enlightenment to antiquity while defying the whole “pack of gods.” It was in this very same spirit that Rachel Carson, in the modern environmental movement, was to defy what she called “the gods of profit and production.”

Capitalist Ecological Modernization as Ideology

If numerous first-stage ecosocialists in the 1980s accused Marx and Frederick Engels of mechanistic Prometheanism or hyperindustrialism, and thus branded historical materialism as productivist and anti-ecological, the reality was that many of the most radical struggles over the environment from the 1950s on were led or inspired by socialist ecologists, including figures like Scott Nearing, Barry Commoner, Virginia Brodine, Shigeto Tsuru, K. William Kapp, Raymond Williams, Charles H. Anderson, Murray Bookchin, Allan Schnaiberg, Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, Nancy Krieger, and Rudolf Bahro. In the 1970s, socialist ecology was already a potent force at the movement level, particularly in the United States. Socialist environmentalists were particularly noteworthy for their rejection of neo-Malthusianism, or the notion that ecological problems could be traced principally to population rather than the system of production.

The broad socialist ecological critique was heavily influenced by Marx’s historical materialism and Engels’s Dialectics of Nature. It arose first in the natural sciences, beginning in the 1950s, in response to nuclear weapons testing, in the work of critical scientists like Commoner, and gained further impetus in the United States in the late 1960s and early ’70s, in response to a host of problems, manifested in Science for the People (both the publication and the organization).

Within the social sciences, radical and Marxist ecological analysis predominated in the Environmental Sociology section of the America Sociological Association (ASA), which first emerged in the early 1970s. Among the leading figures in environmental sociology were radicals William Catton, author of Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (1982), and Riley Dunlap, who, in the context of the limits to growth debate being waged then mainly by economists, introduced (together with Catton) the distinction between the human exemptionalist paradigm and the new ecological paradigm. The human exemptionalist paradigm, as critically defined by Catton and Dunlap, stood for the hegemonic perspective of capitalist modernity. It was the view that humanity was largely exempt from natural constraints, and that there were ultimately no natural or ecological limits to human advance, which was seen as reliant simply on human ingenuity and technology.

The foremost representatives of human exemptionalism in the debates over the limits to growth in the 1970s and ’80s were resource economist Julian Simon, author of The Ultimate Resource, and economic growth theorist Robert Solow, winner of the (so-called) Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Simon, denying all ecological constraints on capital accumulation, pronounced that “there is no meaningful physical limit [or limits]…to our capacity to keep growing [the economy] forever” within the earth environment. Solow wrote: “If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is in principle no ‘problem.’ The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe.” It was this dominant exemptionalist paradigm that had been challenged by Limits to Growth, which pointed to growing environmental (mainly resource) constraints as the world economy expanded and passed critical thresholds—a perspective that was later extended to address both the problem of increased natural resource constraints or the “tap” and the problem of overflowing ecological wastes or the “sink.”

The new ecological paradigm was closely linked to the limits to growth perspective, and thus represented a frontal attack on the human exemptionalist paradigm. It formed the initial common ground of the Section on Environmental Sociology of the ASA. Originally articulated by Catton and Dunlap, it was later codified in terms of five tenets: (1) limits to growth, (2) non-anthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s “balance,” (4) untenability of human exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis. While the new ecological paradigm was in many ways the starting point, this came to be integrated by the late 1970s and early ’80s in the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA, with Marxist critiques of monopoly capitalism, the treadmill of production/accumulation, and ecological waste, which joined in the critique of the human exemptionalist paradigm. Theoretically, environmental sociology in the United States prior to the second decade of the present century was dominated by the Marxian critique of capitalism and its ecological degradation. This included not only those, like Schnaiberg, who subscribed to the treadmill of production framework, but also those associated with second-stage ecosocialism, many of whom were identified with the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA.

However, the strong critique of capitalism that formed the basis of the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA began to break down in 2003. In October–November 2003, a conference was organized at the University of Wisconsin in honor of Schnaiberg and the treadmill of production perspective, constituting a neo-Marxist tradition central to U.S. environmental sociology that depicted the conflict between capitalism’s accumulation tendencies and the environment. Yet, the conference as it turned out had a dual agenda, since Dutch ecomodernists Arthur P. J. Mol and Gert Spaargaren were also invited. These thinkers set about criticizing neo-Marxist approaches to the environment and defending capitalism’s ability to solve environmental problems simply by technological means—in effect offering a new, more nuanced human exemptionalism, which had emerged out of the environmental reform movement in Europe. The debate persisted for years. Ecological modernization—though widely recognized as theoretically and empirically weak compared to radical ecological and ecosocialist analyses—eventually gained considerable prominence due to its greater conformity to the system, with the official prestige and support that this provided. For Mol and Spaargaren, it was necessary to move away from “the ecologically inspired strand of environmental sociology.” The new ecological paradigm was accused of “coquetting with ecology,” representing an unacceptable “hybrid of sociology and ecology.” Mol and Spaargaren contended that there was no “key obstruction” to environmental reform under capitalist relations of production.

At their best, capitalist ecological modernists advanced the notion that technology and markets could meet environmental challenges within the capitalist system through mild, light-green reforms without changes in social relations; at their worst, they denied all need for radical ecological strategies and movements. In 2010, Mol, the leading representative of ecological modernization theory, was given the Distinguished Contribution (or lifetime) Award from the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA, indicating that ecological modernization theory, despite its opposition to the radical ecological critique, and its general anti-environmentalist stance, was now considered within the proper purview of the discipline. This reflected a general growth of anti-environmentalism, with the percentage of Americans who considered themselves environmentalists dropping from 76 percent in 1989 to 41 percent in 2021.

Academic ecological modernization theory had its roots in Cold War modernization theory. In attacking the red-green theories of thinkers like Bahro and Commoner, Spaargaren argued that they were wrongly opposed to the “industrial society theory” developed by “Daniel Bell and others,” celebrating capitalist modernization and industrialization. Modernization, in this sense, was associated with conservative sociologist Talcott Parsons’s structural functionalism, and even more with a conception that identified modernity with the West, which was characterized as constituting the “universal” culture in the Weberian sense. As leading Cold War sociologist and anti-Marxist Edward Shils argued, modernization meant the West. In his own words, “‘Modern’ means being western without the onus of following the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus.” Naturally, “the West” in this sense also stood for capitalism, which was seen as uniquely Western.

Western ecological modernization theory is thus procapitalist and Eurocentric. Nevertheless, a key proposition of both Spaargaren and Mol was that ecological modernization is entirely independent of social and economic relations. As Mol put it, “the ideology of ecological modernisation” consisted of the view that “an environmentally sound society” could be created without reference to “a variety of other social criteria and goals such as the scale of production, the capitalistic mode of production, workers’ influence, equal allocation of economic goods, gender criteria, and so on. Including the latter set of criteria might result in a more radical programme (in the sense of moving further away from the present social order), but not necessarily a more ecological radical programme.” The implication was that the advent of socialism would not materially improve matters ecologically. Or, as he wrote elsewhere, “ecological modernisation theorists believe…that the environment can be protected within the logic and rationality of capitalism….’Green’ capitalism is seen as possible, and in some respects even desirable.” This means “redirecting and transforming ‘free market Capitalism’ in such a way that it less and less obstructs, and increasingly contributes, to the preservation of society’s sustenance base.” More broadly, he stated, ecological modernization means “the incorporation of nature as a third force of production [after labor and capital] in the capitalist economic process.” For the ecological modernist Maarten Hajer, it was possible to see “ecological modernisation as the perception of nature as a new and essential subsystem” of industrial capitalism. How the entire Earth System could become a “subsystem” of industrial society in spatial and temporal terms was not explained.

Capitalist Ecological Modernization and the Western Left

In 2007, ecomodernists Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, who in 2004 published the essay “The Death of Environmentalism,” brought out their book Breakthrough: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, launching at the same time the Breakthrough Institute, a procorporate, procapitalist, ecomodernist, and anti-environmentalist think tank. Constituting an attempt to bring ecomodernism into the limelight, the Breakthrough Institute stands for a program of supposedly solving ecological problems via market-based technology, subsidized by the capitalist state, while keeping existing social relations intact. This approach is anti-environmentalist in the sense of rejecting the environmental movement and promoting the myth of the greening of capitalism. In 2015, the Breakthrough Institute initiated An Ecomodernist Manifesto: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Birth of Ecomodernism, which argued that the only solution to environmental challenges was “accelerated decoupling” of the economy from the environment by more intensive forms of production requiring “accelerated technological progress.” Although arguing that their approach could not be reduced to the system of capital accumulation or free market conservatism, it went against any changes in existing social relations. The best answer to climate change, the Ecomodernist Manifesto affirmed, was nuclear power, billed as “the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy.”

In its many accounts of ecomodernism, the Breakthrough Institute presents capitalism as the only pathway to a green solution. In his book Green Delusions (1992), attacking radical environmentalism and ecosocialism, Breakthrough senior fellow Martin Lewis advocated a mechanistic “Promethean environmentalism,” which he identified with the human-exemptionalist, “technocratic” approach of Simon in The Ultimate Resource. Breakthrough senior fellow Patrick Brown has argued against all logic and evidence that “climate adaptation has been a resounding success in the modern era of rapid capitalistic economic growth.” According to Brown there is “no coherent trend in global floods” or global droughts or global wildfires. The “carbon budget” has not been “breached.” He flatly denies the criticism that capitalism is changing the climate “much faster than we are adapting to it.” Breakthrough Institute senior fellows Nordhaus and Alex Smith, writing for the “democratic socialist” journal Jacobin, argue that corporate-style agribusiness is the most efficient way in which to address agriculture ecologically, and is the model for a decoupling ecomodernism.

Ecomodernist strategy is often presented as “progressive” and has increasingly been openly celebrated by liberal and social democratic thinkers as “Promethean” in the hyperindustrialist sense. Here “Prometheanism” as a propagandistic Cold War term introduced to characterize Marxism as a form of instrumentalism and extreme productivism, and, thus, antihumanist—and then later adopted by first-stage ecosocialists to criticize Marx as anti-environmentalist—has been turned into a badge of honor in social democratic circles. Thus, so-called “democratic socialist” ecomodernists Matt Huber and Leigh Phillips, writing for Jacobin, proudly present themselves as belonging to a long tradition of mechanistic “‘Promethean’ Marxists.” Consistent with the hegemonic notion that the ecological problem is manageable without fundamental changes in social relations, they reject Marx’s metabolic rift theory. Following Simon’s human exemptionalism, Huber and Phillips insist that the only truly “insuperable limits” to economic expansion are “the laws of logic and physics.” In Phillip’s words, mimicking Simon’s anti-environmental human exemptionalism, which he praises, “you can have infinite [economic] growth in a finite planet.” He goes on: “The Socialist…must defend economic growth, productivism, [hyperindustrial] Prometheanism.” The planet we are told has a carrying capacity that can support “282 billion” people—or more. “Energy is freedom. Growth is freedom.” The goal of society is “more stuff.”

Economic expansion, in this view, comes first, humanity and the planet last. The ecological program of such thinkers, ostensibly on the left, does not differ materially from that of the neoliberals of the Breakthrough Institute, with whom they are closely aligned.

Huber and Phillips do not entirely ignore social relations. Yet, they refrain from challenging unlimited capital accumulation or infinite exponential economic growth. All that is needed to address climate change, we are told, is “socialist” (that is, social democratic) planning based on organized labor, particularly electrical workers. Huber strongly opposes what he calls the “anti-system environmental radical” and offers as his solution an “anti-carbon democracy.” In line with erstwhile leftist Christian Parenti, he argues that an ecosocialist “revolutionary overthrow of capitalism” is not a viable option on a reasonable timescale. Hence, the strategy adopted must conform to the internal logic of the capitalist system itself. If capitalism were “decarbonized” and the fossil fuel industry were “euthanized” as part of a capitalist Green New Deal, Huber contends, anthropogenic climate change would simply cease to exist and there would be no need for “aggregate reductions in energy consumption” or reductions in capital accumulation, even in the developed capitalist countries. Accumulation of capital could presumably go on as before, reaching ever greater heights, but on a decarbonized basis.

The argument that conceives endless economic growth/accumulation as the driving force in a Green capitalist solution to climate change is tied to the reduction of the Earth System emergency to climate change alone. This is backed up by Huber and Phillips’s remarkable assertion, in defiance of all contemporary Earth System science, that the other eight planetary boundaries represent no obstacle to human advancement. Such planetary boundaries as the loss of biological integrity (including mass species extinction), the rift in the biogeochemical flows (disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles), land-system change (including deforestation), freshwater loss, novel entities (chemical, radionuclide, and plastic pollution), and ocean acidification—all of which natural scientists say have now been crossed—are simply wished out of existence. Democratic socialist (or social democratic) ecomodernism, conceived in this way, “attains adequate expression when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech,” belying any rational relation to ecology.

What is clear in all of this is that a socialist approach to the planetary ecological emergency is either revolutionary in scope, or it is a contradiction in terms: at best a strategy of making the current accumulative society work better, while denying the dialectical totality of the Earth System crisis.

It is worth emphasizing that there are virtually no ecological thinkers on the left who actually oppose a process of ecological modernization altogether when conceived as part of a comprehensive strategy of promoting ecological sustainability, including changes in both social relations and productive forces. Ecosocialist opposition rather is directed at capitalist ecological modernization as a theory and practice that includes such regressive views as: (1) the refusal to recognize that the fundamental ecological problem is related to capitalism and requires revolutionary changes in social relations; (2) the irrational human-exemptionalist postulate that technology—in accord with the so-called “free market” and the “environmental state”—constitutes the total solution to environmental contradictions, irrespective of prevailing social relations; (3) the belief that exclusive reliance on machine technology makes a purely reformist approach to ecological crises possible; and (4) the denial of critical planetary boundaries and critical ecological limits, the crossing of which creates rifts in the biogeochemical cycles of the planet, endangering humanity and innumerable other species.

China and Socialist Ecological Modernization

The concept of modernity in bourgeois ideology in the West has always stood for the broad economic, political, and cultural developments of capitalism and the West, often equated with one another. The roots of modernity, for Max Weber, lay in the formal rationality that established “Western civilization and…Western civilization only” as the “universal” culture, represented by its science, technology, religion, historical method, music, art, architecture, law, politics, and above all capitalism. In David Landes’s The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (1969), Western capitalism and the Industrial Revolution were simply seen as products of a larger process of modernization in which the West had excelled. Modernization, in the Eurocentric conception, ultimately has no meaning other than the domination of nature and of the global periphery via institutions, particularly of a technological and economic nature, supposedly originating (and culminating) in the West. As Latin American thinker Enrique Dussel wrote, “‘Modernity’ [or at least the European conception of modernity] appears when Europe affirms itself as the ‘center’ of a World History that it inaugurates; ‘the periphery’ that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition.” Ecological modernization is viewed in the Western imperial core of the world system, as simply a further addition to this conception, a technocapitalist, modernist, reformist solution to environmental problems, seen as reflecting another stage of the Western imperial core’s rich maturity. It denies what Marx saw as the metabolic rift inherent in the capitalist accumulation process.

But if in Western ideology it is held that there is only one modernity, based in European culture and capitalism, the actual historical origins of modernity, as a break with more traditional views of the human relation to the world, it can be argued, went much further back, arising in the recognition that humanity was homo faber. The view that human beings were capable of changing the world and thus makers of their own history, independently of the “pack of gods,” was never—as Marxist critics of Eurocentrism such as Joseph Needham and Samir Amin declared—a unique innovation of the Western Enlightenment. Rather it was a product of worldwide cultural development arising during the long Axial Age, in which a similar centering of human self-development could be seen as emerging in many different civilizations. This was evident in Epicurus’s materialist philosophy in the Hellenistic world, and in the emergence of Daoism (and Confucianism) in the Warring States period in China. Modernity, viewed in this deeper historical sense, becomes a product of universal civilization tendencies operating globally with the emergence of human self-consciousness in the Hegelian sense. Socialist, as opposed to capitalist, conceptions of modernity are a product of this more worldwide conception, extending back over millennia, where the object, as in Marx’s analysis, is sustainable human development and the full realization of elemental human needs.

It is here that socialist modernization, and specifically socialist ecological modernism, has to be considered, particularly in relation to its development in China. China is a 5,000-year-old civilization, with a strong traditional ecological heritage stemming from Daoism and Confucianism, but that now, under “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” is introducing a revolutionary ecological modernism tied to its concept of ecological civilization that transcends anything envisioned in the West. Socialist ecological modernization, despite the familiarity of some of its basic forms—for example, the attempt to develop green technology and its concern with economic welfare—is best conceived as the inverse of capitalist ecological modernization in its underlying logic. As Chen Yiwen wrote in “The Dialectics of Ecology and Ecological Civilization“:

Modernization in harmony with nature is part of the overall conception of Chinese modernization, which means that it requires: (1) prioritizing the coordination of the population with the resources and carrying capacity of the environment; (2) ensuring public ownership of natural resources and social sharing of ecological welfare in the process of advancing common prosperity; (3) producing ecological products and cultivating ecological culture in the context of pursuing coordination between material and cultural-ethical advancement; (4) opposing any form of ecological imperialism and extractivism; and (5) promoting the creation of a clean and beautiful world while adhering to the path of peaceful development.

Nothing could be more opposed to the conception of capitalist ecological modernization in the West, which has its roots in the expropriation of nature. Ecological modernization is generally seen in Europe and the United States as an extension of the technological domination of nature aimed at ensuring human exemptionalism. It envisions a world of unlimited capitalist accumulation that by virtue of technology is free from environmental constraints, with the economy simply decoupled from the biogeochemical processes and elemental conditions of the Earth System. In contrast, as Xi explains regarding China’s ecological civilization, “Nature provides the basic conditions for human survival and development. Respecting, adapting to, and protecting nature is essential for building China into a modern socialist country in all respects,” one synonymous with ecological civilization. He writes: “To fundamentally improve our ecosystems, we must abandon the model based on an increase in material resource consumption, extensive development, high energy consumption, and high emissions.”

Socialist ecological modernization, which avoids the delusions of “green capitalism,” makes the building of an ecological civilization a direct object. This is counterposed to capitalist ecomodernism, which is intended to maintain the dominant social relations and the anti-ecological logic of the unrestrained capital-accumulation system, while simply attempting to ameliorate some of its worst effects—in the midst of a planetary ecological emergency!—via second-order regulations and new technology. In U.S. monopoly capitalism, for example, the development of solar technology has always been hindered by the threat it poses to the dominant fossil fuel system, and therefore is intended, at best, to supplement the latter. Here ecological modernization means the continued subordination of environmental to economic goals.

Under its socialist ecological modernization China has surpassed the West in nearly every category of renewable energy development. In 2023, China accounted for 83 percent of world solar panel production, while the United States accounted for only 2 percent. China’s high-speed rail system is larger, faster, and more efficient than that of Europe, and China also accounts for 90 percent of the world bus market. Electric vehicles sales in China now exceed those of internal combustion engines. Within the next three years, according to the Financial Times, China will be obtaining more than half its energy from low-carbon sources, and “is on its way to becoming the world’s first ‘electrostate,'” with a growing portion of its economy supported by electricity and clean energy. As a result, China’s carbon emissions have begun to fall, even with strong economic growth and its continuing heavy, if diminishing, reliance on coal-fired plants. China is the leader in increase in forests globally, with forest coverage nearly doubling since the 1980s.

Yet, it would be a mistake, based on such achievements, to see Chinese ecological modernization as simply entailing a kind of green productivism, which is the meaning of capitalist ecological modernization in the West. Rather, socialist ecological modernization aimed at building an ecological civilization is, in Xi’s words, “the modernization of harmony between humanity and nature.”

Crucial to the Sinicization of Marxism is the goal of the formation of a “community of life” in all of its dimensions, from ecosystems to human-nature relations to the human metabolism with the Earth System itself. “It is essential to differentiate,” Chen has written, socialist ecological modernization in China “from the notion of ‘ecological modernization’ that emerged in Europe in the mid- to late 1980s…prevalent in developed capitalist nations, [which] seeks to enhance gradually environmental quality through economic and technological improvements and public administration adjustments (including the increasing application of market instruments) often without challenging the fundamental tenets of capitalism.” Instead, the emphasis of socialist ecological modernization is on “the socialist reconstruction of social relations alongside a fundamental ecological transformation of humanity’s existing methods of production.” In this, “the ultimate goal is the realization of communism, which entails the liberation of both humanity and nature.”

Unbound Nature and Humanity

We only have fragments from Aeschylus’s lost play Prometheus Unbound on Prometheus’s liberation from his chains. Percy Bysshe Shelley, in his own work, Prometheus Unbound, written in the early nineteenth century, ends his epic poem with the reunification of Prometheus with nature. Mary Shelley observed in her notes on his poem: “When the benefactor of man is liberated, Nature resumes the beauty of her prime.” As ecosocialist Walt Sheasby wrote, “There could scarcely be a more dynamic image of the romantic [revolutionary] celebration of nature and freedom as intertwined.”

The Cold War manipulation of the ancient Greek Promethean myth, appropriating out of context Marx’s quotation from Aeschylus in the foreword of his dissertation, was a device used to disparage Marxism, characterizing it as a philosophy of instrumentalism, extreme productivism, and anti-humanism. What has been called “first-stage ecosocialism” turned the Cold War myth of an instrumentalist, mechanistic Prometheanism supposedly embedded in classical historical materialism, into a charge of anti-environmentalism, while ignoring or downplaying Marx’s own ecological critique. Second-stage ecosocialism demonstrated that this characterization of classical Marxism as a instrumentalist, mechanistic Prometheanism was false in every respect—both with regard to the ancient Greek Promethean myth, and the classical historical-materialist relation to the environment. Meanwhile, capitalist ecological modernization theory, in its polemic against radical environmentalism and ecological Marxism, was itself openly to embrace an instrumentalist/mechanistic Prometheanism as a symbol of its own outlook. The full irony was evident in the reemergence in social-democratic circles of a supposedly left ecomodernism under the false flag of Promethean Marxism, wrongly claiming that for classical Marxism, the object was simply economic growth, rather than sustainable human development.

The inverted, alienated world of capitalist ecomodernism with its mechanistic “Prometheanism” is a flight from the possibility of socialist ecomodernism and a revolutionary humanist-ecological Prometheanism. Capitalist ecological modernism, with its distorted, mechanistic version of the Prometheus myth, vainly seeks to change the productive forces while keeping existing social relations of accumulation and expropriation of nature intact. In contrast, socialist ecomodernism, or humanist-ecological Prometheanism, as developed in Chinese ecological Marxism today, in line with China’s own humanist-environmental traditions, represents a revolutionary stance. Here the object is to change social, productive, and environmental relations in such a way that acquisitive society is abandoned and both nature and humanity are unbound and in mutual accord—as envisioned, in different ways, by such humanistic thinkers as Laozi, Aeschylus, Epicurus, Shelley, and Marx. As Marx states in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, communism is at one and the same time “the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.”

Tuesday, November 4, 2025

Welsh: State of Play

The State Of Play In Late 2025. Ian Welsh, Nov 3, 2025.

Let’s run thru the important points:

Domestically in the US the only issue that really matters is affordability. Food, housing and medicine. This will dominate the next few years, maybe even the next decade. Mamdani will win, he will be blocked from doing much of he wants by courts and the the State and federal government, and his future will depend on him making those who stop him the villains. The mid-terms and the next election will be fought in bread and butter issues.

China is going to win the AI race, as predicted.

This is, again, because Chinese models are at least 90% cheaper to run, and mostly open source. Only a complete and utter moron would run their business using proprietary models where OpenAI or Anthropic can jack up the price any time they want or depreciate the model you actually needed. Even US startups agree, 70 to 80% of them are using Chinese open models.

American AI either bursts or causes a great depression. Or perhaps bursts and causes a depression. There isn’t any other possibility. They’re spending trillions so American business can mass replace their workers. If it works, it causes a demand depression, a great depression like the Great Depression of the 30s. Who the hell do they think will buy their products? People can barely afford food and rent, let alone fancy AI crap. When they’re homeless they aren’t going to be customers. Meanwhile the rest of the world won’t be buying US AI crap either, they’ll be buying Chinese open source AI crap.

The War of attrition is nearly won by Russia. Ukraine just doesn’t have enough men and drones, it’s that simple. Next year, absent a peace deal, the big arrow moves everyone was wondering about will happen and Ukraine will be forced into unconditional surrender.

Europe is done. They’re losing their industrial base and their tech base. The people are unhappy and turning to populist opposition, either left or right. The Eurocrats are using lawfare to make outsider parties illegal if they look likely to win. This will take some time to play out. There will be changes in government away from neoliberalism, and if they can’t be achieved peacefully there will be a lot of violence. The EUs only play here is to try and gin up a war against Russia, but if they succeed, they’ll lose the war.

China and the US are now co-equal powers but that won’t last. China is on the rise, America is gutting its own science, arts and intellectual base while immiserating its own people and keeping smart foreigners out. (Or throwing them out.) All the big spend isn’t on re-industrializing, it’s on an AI moonshot which probably won’t succeed and will burst, or which if it does succeed will cause a Great Depression.

I will remind you that rich people have limited real power. They can buy a lot of influence, but if government turns on them they are done, because they do not have private armies capable of standing up to the State’s military and paramilitary forces. If the political zeitgeist turns against them, the government can make any changes it wants. Ask various Chinese billionaires how things worked out for them when the CPC decided they were too big for their britches.

One way they lose their influence is simply by having a real, undeniable depression. They’re doing everything they can to create one. If the Fed can’t bail them out, they’re done. The Fed’s ability to print dollars is going away, they have at most one large bailout left in them. After that, they can’t, because if the dollar isn’t the unit of trade for the world, over-printing will be catastrophic. Dozens of countries have found this out, again and again. Money can’t buy what your country can’t actually do, and the US can do less and less—the rich people sold America’s ability to do things to China to get three generations of fake wealth.

We are moving towards the end-game. It will take ten to fifteen years to play out. The West will be immiserated, neo-liberalism will end, US power and Empire will collapse. There will be wars and revolutions around the globe, because the force holding the world in its post-war, post-Soviet collapse state, including such things as borders, is going away. China is not likely to engage in massive military operations thousands of miles from its border and has shown itself uninterested in what happens in other countries domestically, unless they’re countries very close to it geographically.

Covid remains a thing, more specifically long Covid. We don’t measure it much any more, since governments don’t want to know, but there are multiple data points indicating its still disabling people. (I’ll do a proper article on this at some point.)

Likewise climate change and environmental collapse are real and so are resource issues. Farmland continues to lose fertility, the food-web is collapsing, the insects and fish and bird and everything else are dying and species are going extinct. This is going to cause huge problem. 1.4 billion Chinese cannot have a Western lifestyle without catastrophic environmental issues. If this is not dealt with (and it takes more than some orbital spraying to do so), the era of Chinese supremacy is not likely to last.

China will take the complete tech lead in essentially everything and they will also become the premier space-going nation. They have actually reduced carbon emissions, a good sign, and are massively planting forests. It’s not enough, but they are the only major nation taking these issues at all seriously. They look likely to start moving industry and power generation to space over the next 20 years and if they can get space mining and refining going, that offers some hope. (This is not space colonization, and the idea is to make it self-sustaining off world minus biologicals. Dropping resources from space is easy, getting resources into space is hard.)

The major geopolitical and economic issues I have been writing about for over 20 years are coming to fruition now and will play out over the next ten years. End of Empire. End of Neoliberalism. End of dollar hegemony. End of Europe. Western economic collapse. It’s all happening, exactly on schedule.

The glimmer of hope for Westerners is that political change is also coming. Put crudely, there are three possibilities: authoritarian corporatism wins thru a nasty surveillance and police state; right wing populists take charge and go nasty and mean, or left wing populists take charge and actually try to help people.

The third world will find a great deal more freedom than they’ve had for a long time. China will be the superpower, but at least for the first while seems likely to be fairly laid back about it. These countries, if they cooperate with China intelligently, will have a chance to really develop, in most cases an opportunity to make it to middle income status, since they will no longer be forbidden from the policies required to actually develop, as was the case under the IMF/World Bank “development” duopoly.

This is where we are, and where we’re going. Tighten those seatbelts and make what preparations you can. Remember that things like power and water and food will become more and more unreliable. It’s been a long time since the West and westerners had to deal with such issues, but they will be on the plate for at least thirty to forty percent of Westerners within fifteen years in nations which do not make the turn correctly, which seems likely to be the majority.

Monday, October 13, 2025

Morgan on Order

#312: A stroll along Revolution Street. Tim Morgan, SEEDS. October 11, 2025

CAN WEALTH AND ORDER SURVIVE?

Foreword

According to a recent BBC report, some of America’s wealthiest men are, or might be, investing in bunkers, or, as the article’s headline puts it, “doom prepping”. Author Zoe Kleinman goes on to mention just one of the many reasons why bunkers may be an impractical idea:
“I once met a former bodyguard of one billionaire with his own “bunker”, who told me his security team’s first priority, if this really did happen, would be to eliminate said boss and get in the bunker themselves. And he didn’t seem to be joking”.
What’s much more interesting, though, is why anyone might seek the dubious safety of underground self-incarceration. Fears of nuclear conflagration, or of environmental catastrophe, might, perhaps, answer this question. The worry emphasised in Kleinman’s article is the potential advance of artificial general intelligence (AGI) or artificial super intelligence (ASI).

The real motives for “doom-prepping”, though, have nothing to do with conflict, climate or a takeover by autonomous technologies. The wealthiest must know that today’s extremes of wealth are abnormal, and might know, too, that the unfolding ending and reversal of material economic growth further stacks the odds against the continuation of this anomaly.

They might be uncomfortably aware, as well, that there is no form of wealth that can be guaranteed to survive extremes of economic, social and political turbulence.

As the economy contracts and the financial system fractures, any wealth contained in stocks, bonds, real estate or even money itself is at existential risk. The merit of gold is limited to being ‘less bad than’ other forms of wealth storage, whilst the energy-aware will be fully conversant with the frailties of crypto.

1

Even if you studied it at university – which very few of us have – the word “revolution” is likely to evoke passé images of beret-wearing Che posters on students’ walls, re-runs of Citizen Smith or Monty Python’s Life of Brian, and the endless tedium of debates about the minutiae of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Gramsci and Mao.

In short, the very idea of “revolution” has come to seem, not just outdated, but positively outlandish.

But conditions are, in reality, increasingly trending towards the breakdown of the established order.
Inequalities of wealth and incomes, already extreme, are being leveraged by economic contraction into matters of growing importance, and the essential, if vague, concepts of “merit” and “fairness” are very much in play.

Contemporary radicals might not be following any old-style Marxist-Leninist play-book, but anger with “the powers that be” is undoubtedly intensifying.

Whilst today’s highest-profile challenges to the status quo are essentially counter-revolutionary – even nostalgic – in character, we cannot expect this situation to continue, as hardship widens, and anger and cynicism deepen.

The redistribution of wealth from a minority to the majority has played little role in the Western political discourse over many decades, but conditions suggest that this contentious topic may soon return to a leading place in the debate.

Revolution – meaning ‘the rapid replacement of one regime with another’ – requires a combination, not just of unstable social and economic conditions, but of revolutionary ideas as well. In the absence of such ideas, revolution, thus defined, may seem unlikely.

But a chaotic collapse of order is all too possible. The guiding ideal of Western economies – an ideal not shared by China or Russia – is the sanctity of private profit. But the logic of profit may be a growth-dependent concept, and wholly unsuited to a post-growth economy.

The best ideas on offer might be those of “reform”, involving a voluntary retreat from extremes of inequality. This would be a retreat motivated, not by altruism, but by “fear of something worse”. Economic contraction will involve the redundancy of the big and centralised, and a revitalisation of the small and local, a context potentially favourable for reform.

The clincher, though, might be the impossibility of maintaining any form of concentrated wealth amidst the financial consequences of involuntary and unpreventable economic contraction.

2

There are, broadly, three courses that the development of society might follow. These can be called “reform”, “revolution” and “autocracy”, though these labels cover a mass of interconnected complexities.

“Reform” references a managed retreat towards lower levels of inequality. “Revolution” might mean the forcible replacement of one regime by another, or it might mean a less formal descent into disorder.

“Autocracy” might be invoked to head off revolution, or it might be imposed after the established order has collapsed into chaos.

3

Rebel forces, landing in the “soldier’s hour” before the dawn, were divided into three task-groups. The first took the presidential palace (and the adjacent guards’ barracks) entirely by surprise. The second seized the treasury with equal ease. Only at the radio station was anything more than purely token resistance encountered. By 9 am, the republic had a new government.

This, of course, is the stuff of a thousand thrillers, and the reference to the radio station places it in the middle years of the twentieth century.

But it does define the three things that any insurgency must seize, and over which any incumbency must retain control. These are executive power (including the security forces), money and information, the latter obviously including technology as well as the conventional media.

It seems unlikely, under current conditions, that any – say – Marxist-Leninist insurgency could seize control over these three critical levers of power.

But this isn’t to say that the incumbency couldn’t lose these critical levers in conditions of generalized disorder.

4

What this means is that we need to draw a clear distinction between “revolution” and chaos. The former seems an unlikely occurrence, but the latter outcome is all too plausible.

Chaos occurs where instability of conditions is abundant, but a nucleus of progressive ideas is absent.

Policing by consent has long been the preferred Western model for the maintenance of order, because policing by coercion is vastly more difficult, and drastically more resource-absorbing.

Likewise, the West has, hitherto, largely managed to combine government by consent with the preservation of wide differentials of wealth and income.

The prevalent logic has been that of merit – those who, gifted with greater abilities and greater energies, have accumulated wealth should be entitled to retain, and to pass on to their successors, the benefits of their own efforts.

The problems now arising include a delegitimization of wealth. In past times, wealth could be credited to the efforts of its possessors, but this connection is ceasing to persuade.

Policies have been adopted which, whether intentionally or not, are perceived to have severed the connection between affluence and merit.

5


What needs to be understood here is that, for reasons connected to energy and resource depletion, economic growth started to decelerate at least as far back as the “secular stagnation” of the 1990s.

The favoured tool for combatting this deceleration was credit expansion. This led, inevitably and in relatively short order, to the global financial crisis of 2008-09.


This was a moment at which a critical choice needed to be made. If the authorities had maintained a commitment to the principles of the free market, the over-extended (and the simply unfortunate) would have been wiped out. Opportunities would have opened up for new (and predominantly younger) economic entrants, with new ideas.

Instead, the decision was taken to prop up the system with the “monetary adventurism” of QE, NIRP and ZIRP, and to continue with these policies long after some form of stability had been restored.

The statistical effect has been to create an enormous bubble across multiple asset classes, but the social effect has been extraordinarily divisive.

Anyone who already owned assets in 2008 – or who worked in one of those sectors, mostly financial, in which incomes are linked directly to asset prices – has profited mightily from these policy choices.

But many others have suffered from rising rents, the insecurities of the casualised (“gig”) workplace, increases in the costs of necessities, and incomes that haven’t kept up with the broad level of systemic inflation.

6

In essence, a wedge has been driven between wealth and the nebulous (but powerful) concept of “fairness”.

It can be argued, in their defence, that decision-makers have been tied to an arc of inevitability – economic deceleration drove a recourse to “credit adventurism”, which led on to the GFC, and hence to the adoption of the “monetary adventurism” of those ultra-loose policies which in turn created a socially-divisive shift in the relationship between asset prices and incomes.

This, though, doesn’t give us much guidance on what happens next. When asset prices start to correct back towards a material economic floor far below current levels, do the authorities try to intervene – yet again – to prop up existing wealth-versus-income differentials?

Do they seriously believe that technological advances and monetary innovation can, together, hold back the tide of post-fossil economic contraction?

Or can a system that has already ceased to be “market capitalist” – and has become instead a post-capitalist expediency (PCE) – try to find new ways of defying the forces of economic and financial gravity?

7

Here’s a question for any historically-minded person reading this article:

Was Nicholas II overthrown in 1917 because Russians had been reading Marx, or because hardship and injustice had reached extremes at which the monarchy was no longer sustainable in the face of widespread popular discontent?

This poses a critical question in revolutionary theory, which is the comparative importance of ideas, and of material economic and social conditions, in the making of a revolution.

Lenin, of course, had clear views on this question. The first was that, whilst the rural oppressed (the “peasantry”) cannot make a successful revolution, the urban discontented (the “proletariat”) most certainly can. The second was that a revolution depends on the guiding hand of a “party”, a condition which presupposes a nucleus of ideas.

What Lenin was describing, though, was “revolution”, defined as the relatively rapid replacement of one regime by another. Though outside interference dragged things out until 1923, the Bolsheviks secured effective control of Russia itself within months of the downfall of the Romanovs.

Events were far more chaotic in France. Order was not restored until Napoleon took power in 1799, fully ten years after the revolution itself. Again, foreign interference played a major role, with counter-revolutionary and counter-imperial wars lasting from 1792 until 1815.

The French Revolution also reinforces Lenin’s emphasis on the “proletariat”. The only spontaneous revolt of the “peasantry” was the counter-revolutionary rebellion in the Vendée. No dominant party had an effective blueprint for a post-monarchical state at the time when the Ancien Regime was overthrown.

8

Though such assertions are all too often dismissed as propaganda, the Chinese authorities do remain wholly committed to Marxist-Leninist precepts, as modified for local conditions by Mao.

The Deng reforms did not, in any meaningful way, convert China to Western ideas. Behind Deng’s “two cats” allegory was a clear determination that, whilst capitalism might be allowed to serve China, China would never serve capitalism.

Beijing’s highest priority is the maintenance of high levels of urban employment, a challenge intensified by mass migration from the countryside to the cities.

Private profit is barely a consideration at all for the Chinese authorities. If losses and subsidies are required for the attainment of important national objectives, so be it.

Something not too dissimilar can be observed in Russia. The rise of the “oligarchs” was a feature of the country’s grim experiences in the 1990s. With those experiences confined to the past, billionaires are not required for the ongoing economic resilience of modern Russia.

The very different attitudes to private profit – largely disregarded in China, almost worshipped in the West – are critical to competition between the two leading economic powers. It’s at least arguable that the pursuit of profit is only possible under conditions of economic expansion.

The West in general – and the United States in particular – may be entering a profoundly different era with exactly the wrong set of ideas.

9

In its determination to maintain the central role of private profit, then, the West may be trying to board a train that has already left the station.

SEEDS analysis indicates that material economic prosperity – for which money is no more than an operating proxy and a symbol – is likely to be about 14% lower in 2050 than it is today. Based on current population trends, this would make the World’s average person about 31% poorer than he or she is now.

This average person’s woes will be greatly exacerbated by continuing rises in the real costs of necessities, and by soaring indebtedness, as and if the authorities continue with futile efforts to stave off material economic contraction using monetary tools.

But this “average” person is something of a statistical fiction, because dividing the numerator of aggregate prosperity by the population denominator takes no account of inequalities of incomes and wealth, inequalities which are extreme in the contemporary West.

At the more meaningful level of the median, huge numbers could be condemned to the desperation of destitution were current levels of inequality to be maintained under conditions of severe economic contraction.

Whilst it cannot necessarily be said that the Western authorities set out to create today’s extremes of inequality, these extremes are, as we have seen, products of long-standing policy choices, and inequality remains an issue that few Western leaders are minded to identify and address.

10

It would be relatively easy to reach depressing conclusions after this brief canter over the social, economic and political turf.

In essence, conditions are becoming conducive to a collapse of the existing order, whilst no intellectual blueprint yet exists for the channelling of discontent into the kind of ordered change-of-the-guard described, by Lenin and others, as “revolution”.

But the possibility of “reform” does exist. The template for this is the Britain of 1832, a society in which fewer than 180 people effectively controlled a country in which barely 4% of the English and the Welsh – and just 0.2% of Scots – were entitled to vote.

Though its passage was only enabled by proximity to “the verge of revolution”, the Reform Act of that year put the United Kingdom on a course which steered the country clear of the revolutionary ferment that plagued much of the rest of Europe during the following hundred years.

Essentially, Britain’s leaders opted for reform when the only alternative seemed to be the guillotines and the Phrygian caps of 1789.

Such an outcome might seem hopelessly optimistic until we recognise that economic forces are pushing towards a choice between chaos and managed change.

Centralised organisations are likely to be succeeded by localist alternatives as the burdens of central overheads become ever more unsustainable.

There is no form of stored wealth that can be relied upon to survive economic contraction.

The myth of a technological “rescue” from economic contraction might not long retain its plausibility.

Perhaps most importantly, a West which retains the ideal of personal profit is already being out-prepared by countries which do not.

Sunday, September 21, 2025

Murphy on 6th mass extinction

Is the 6ME Hyperbole? Tom Murphy, Do the Math. Sept. 16, 2025.

go to link to see source article with links and charts, etc


Many of the stark conclusions I offer on Do the Math and in conversations with others rest on the equally stark premise that we have initiated a sixth mass extinction (6ME). Other self-defeating factors also loom large in establishing modernity as a temporary stunt, including resource depletion, aquifer exhaustion, desertification and salination of agricultural fields, climate change, microplastics, waste streams, “forever” toxins, and plenty more. People do call it a poly-crisis, after all (I prefer meta-crisis as most symptoms trace to the same root mindset of separateness and conquest).

Yet, towering over these concerns is a sixth mass extinction. Mass extinctions are defined as brief periods during which over 75% of species go extinct. I take it as given that large, hungry, high-maintenance mammals like humans won’t be among the lucky survivors—who are more likely to hail from families like microbes, mollusks, arthropods, or otherwise small, scrappy critters. In any case, it’s bad…very bad.

Invocation of the 6ME serves as a final nail in the coffin…end of story…to be avoided at all costs. All the aspects we like about modernity lose appeal when held up against the 6ME as a direct consequence. Even though the other challenges listed above can carry the argument as well, they generally must do so as a set, and we’re not so talented at apprehending parallel concerns—imagining each to be surmountable in isolation (pointlessly; it’s whack-a-mole). The 6ME delivers a single, inarguable, fatal blow to modernity, which is why I have taken to invoking it as a heavy-handed “nuclear option” straight away. No point playing around. While it may seem extreme, extreme circumstances justify extreme responses.

But is the threat real, or rhetorical? Basing arguments against modernity largely—though not entirely—on the 6ME could amount to overblown doomerism. In this post, I challenge myself on the veracity of 6ME claims. Have I fallen into a false sense of the urgency of this moment? Do I really believe a 6ME is going to play out?


Evidence

Okay, we can’t truly know the future—yet some developments are reasonably certain: like continued expansion of the universe (apparently to a cold “heat death“); the sun entering red-giant senescence in 5 billion years; oceans evaporating in something like a billion years due to increasing solar intensity; our own deaths; continued cycles of years, seasons, days; rocks tumbling downhill rather than up, etc. Likewise, only a small fraction of the species alive today will evade extinction for 100 million years, even in the absence of a 6ME crisis. Climate will change as it always has—independent of the recent anthropogenic slap—and species will adapt, disappear, or emerge as a result. Aversion to a 6ME is not the same as assuming everything is otherwise static or perfect (which I am often assumed to imply, even though I don’t say/think anything as simplistic as that).

Current trends are rather clear, and ominous (see hockey stick and ecological nosedive posts, and this Guardian article). Extinction rates are up 100–1,000 times the background rate—and possibly higher; estimates err on the conservative side. Even at the low end, we are currently witnessing the highest extinction rate since the Chicxulub impact that took out dinosaurs 65 million years ago. Serious stuff.

Relatedly, the count of living beings is falling fast. Annual population declines tend to be in the 1–2% range among mammals, birds, fish, and insects, accumulating to average declines of more than half in less than half-a-century. The road to extinction necessarily travels through population decline. Ecological interdependencies translate to collateral damage: insect loss means bird loss, for instance. At some point, the Web of Life crafted over many millions of years becomes too damaged to repair itself or hold its integrity, resulting in a cascade of failures at all trophic levels.

The Wikipedia page on the 6ME provides a thorough background and copious citations from the scientific literature that I won’t try to replicate here. I encourage reading or skimming the page, which among other things conveys an overwhelming consensus on the reality of the phenomenon. The exceedingly high extinction rate is not at all a fringe belief among those who have done the legwork. I would label the deniers as “fringe,” except they are essentially extinct themselves, among the professionals.


Causes

This one isn’t hard, and I won’t belabor the point. In a nutshell, it’s human activity and consumption. It’s 8 billion people, most of whom strive within the market system of modernity, placing back-breaking and unprecedented demands on Earth and on the Community of Life. The encroachment by and for agriculture, extraction, development, and disposal is a dominant phenomenon across the planet, leaving precious little wild space (especially contiguous) for biodiversity to remain intact. And what remains is shrinking fast—cut off and cut down.

This Nature article includes an informative graphic ordering and breaking down the ten largest contributors to extinction threats. Climate change is seventh on the list, following over-exploitation, agricultural activity, urban development, invasion/disease, pollution, and environmental modification.

What this means is that the push to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy (itself a conjectural fantasy) would do precious little to address the 6ME threat. In many ways, it makes the situation worse by increasing materials extraction (a very materials-heavy enterprise due to diffuse energy density), co-opting more land for energy capture, and most importantly keeping modernity’s pedal to the metal on the most substantial causes of species loss (e.g., the six items in front of climate change on the list referenced above). Full steam ahead, just without as much actual steam!


But is it Mass Extinction?

While extinction rates are through the roof, and wild population declines aim the barrel straight toward extinction of an enormous number of species, we certainly cannot claim to have carried out a sixth mass extinction…yet. By various estimates, we may have already lost something like 1–10% of species—predicted to climb up to 13–27% by 2100. While this (highly uncertain) estimate falls short of the 75% mass extinction level, three big points: 1) beware cascading failures (domino effect); 2) the year 2100 is not the end of time, as so many projections unintentionally imply, and just an instant from now on relevant timescales; and 3) these numbers are already tragically huge, when you think about what it means—millions of species, gone forever!

In any case, if one is to be accused of hyperbole, it is on these grounds: we have decidedly not yet carried out a 6ME. Two seconds into a jump off a skyscraper, some may object that it’s premature to talk about a sidewalk splat that hasn’t happened yet. It’s therefore unfair to say we’ve caused a mass extinction, even if we are certainly causing a phenomenon that has all the hallmarks of early-onset extinction. That said, splat-objectors had better propose a realistic prevention strategy—and fast—rather than simply pointing out that the splat hasn’t happened yet. Not bloody useful!

The question I have is: what possible reversal would accompany modernity’s continuation, given the overwhelming balance of loss and decline? It’s hard to look at the graph above and be glib about a sudden reversal of the nosedive—without a single credible plan or even much discussion at all about the decline itself, much less what it would take to effect such a reversal.

The stakes are too high to tolerate “what-about-ism,” pointing to isolated counterexamples of recovery. Nice try, but the totality of the matter is clear. One comprehensive study of over 70,000 vertebrate species finds that the “losers” outnumber the “winners” by 16 to 1. I mean, even mass extinctions have their winners, right? So, pointing them out accomplishes nothing other than addling our meat-brain simplification circuits—such an easy thing to do! When modernity’s root practices (agriculture, extraction, development) directly destroy habitats, one has to invoke magical thinking to believe that biodiversity could recover without a serious contraction of modernity’s scale and practices, which I assure you is not a seriously-entertained proposal on the table—putting us all at dire risk.

So: it is too soon to assert as proven fact that we are experiencing a mass extinction presently. But it’s not unreasonable to speak in such terms when extinction rates are orders-of-magnitude higher than normal—at their highest point since the last mass extinction—while the present and projected trajectory promises to accumulate more damage unless the situation changes radically.


Dismissals and Timescales

A common reaction to bad news that hasn’t yet fully developed to the point of being “clear-and-present” is to dismiss it—especially if operating at an incomprehensible scale (parodied well in the movie Don’t Look Up). The reflex is easy to understand: Earth is so inconceivably large that surely we can’t budge it, meaningfully. A casual glance (in select luckier places) reveals unimaginably large tracts of forest and an abundance of life. Whether about pollution, waste (plastics, for instance), climate change, or a 6ME, knee-jerk common sense says that such an immense substrate as Earth can tolerate anything we throw at it. Left out of this impulsive mental equation is 8 billion people advancing ever-expanding ecological challenges in every corner of the globe. Think again. It needn’t “compute” in our heads to still be true.

Part of the difficulty lies in timescales. A forest might look healthy to our naïve eyes: it’s got trees for god’s sake! What more could be relevant? But superficial appearances can be deceiving. Take the Elwha River, for example. About 100 years ago, dams were erected for hydroelectric power, cutting salmon off from the interior forest of the Olympic mountains. Gone was a counter-current conveyor belt of nutrients from the ocean that had been in place for countless millennia and that was vital to long-term health of flora and fauna. The damage won’t be apparent immediately, but gradually nutrients wash out and are not replaced, starving the forest of essential building blocks. Centuries later, the forest could be gone (which is why the S’Klallam people pushed—successfully—for the dams to be removed). Much like the skyscraper analog above, it’s like putting a plastic bag over someone’s head and commenting after 5 seconds that their oxygen levels are still fine, so what’s all the fuss about plastic bags? They’re not dangerous, see! Wait for it…

I had a similar realization on a lovely hike east of San Diego in 2023. It was a warm, sunny morning in early April and the ceanothus (California lilac) was in splendid bloom. A vast area was decked out in lavender-colored florets. Despite the lovely impression it formed on the retina, the eardrums revealed a more sinister story. It was dead silent. No bees. Given the ideal conditions, the buzz of bees should have been almost deafening: bumble bees in particular love ceanothus flowers. But pollinators—not just domesticated honeybees—are in serious trouble in the last decade or so. Without sufficient pollination, no new (or too few) seeds will form, and the next generation of ceanothus will fail to materialize. Come back in 50 years and this wild garden could be wiped clean of ceanothus, forever. What looks pretty today may be already effectively a form of walking-dead. It’s far too soon to have experienced the myriad rippling consequences of our recent fever-pitch assault on natural systems. The show is just getting started, and natural resilience can put on a brave face for a time. Life will struggle to do its thing right up until it no longer can, easily fooling our ignorant eyes.


Resilience?

Wait: is Life fragile, or robust? It’s both, of course, depending on context (a single logical label seldom suffices when complexity reigns). Anyone who has waged war on flora or fauna designated as weeds or pests will attest that Life fights back. It must be so, or Life would not have survived both chronic and acute hammerings over billions of years. Climate has changed many times; continents merged and separated; volcanoes and even asteroids took aim at life. Some species always go by the wayside in such events, to varying degrees, while others survive and expand.

As a thought experiment, if humans were suddenly removed from Earth, would the 6ME proceed on its own momentum, in reaction to the habitat destruction and “forever” toxins spread across the globe? We don’t know, of course. It might. I tend to doubt so, but can’t really defend that gut sense. I look at abandoned places like Chernobyl—where Life has sprung back to create a forested ruin full of wildlife—and think it can all be okay-ish. It may take millions of years to shed the severe perturbations of modernity, as we’ve essentially shaken the etch-a-sketch and distributed non-native species around the globe in a madcap game of forced reconciliation. Picture the cages of a zoo suddenly evaporating: the mayhem will continue for a while before settling down to a slowly-evolving quasi-equilibrium. On the other hand, ocean acidification from CO2 absorption might put an end to the foundation of life in the oceans, impoverishing the land as well. And climate change—while seventh on the list presently—may stomp entire regions and relegate much of the present biodiversity to the dust bin (e.g., tropical rainforests turned to deserts). So, it may very well be too late to stop a 6ME.

On the other extreme, what seems reasonably clear is that keeping the gas pedal engaged on modernity’s engine will continue to perpetuate population declines and extinctions until the job is complete and ecological collapse—thus our own—is effectively assured. So, let’s not do that. Let’s recognize modernity as a poison pill that is killing the planet, and begin shifting to a radically different way.

But, what about the middle case, where modernity self-terminates—as I believe it will—over the next century or two—possibly driven by demographic decline? Is the 6ME crisis averted? Because this scenario sits between the “disappearance” and “continuation” scenarios, my answer must also lie between, meaning that it could go either way, but has a lower chance of rebounding than in the “sudden disappearance” scenario. In fact, failure of institutions and global supply could make billions of humans desperate for food, in which case anything larger than a mouse may be in real trouble—further advancing the extinction drive. It’s even possible that modernity self-terminates because of ecological collapse as the 6ME gathers steam, becoming its own cascading contribution to the phenomenon. Have we already passed a tipping point? We don’t know. We’re in uncharted territory, which at least ought to make us sit up straight and question our ways.


Overreaction and Asymmetric Risk

Because we have no crystal ball, and can’t peer into the far future, we simply can’t know how serious the present extinction surge will turn out to be. Given the inherent resiliency of Life, am I overreacting by taking the alarming trends seriously? Might I just chill out?

Obviously, no one can say with any certainty. But let’s contrast two statements that can definitely be differentiated on the grounds of veracity.
  1. Everything is actually fine: no credible cause for alarm.
  2. Unprecedented alarm bells are going off, and could plausibly portend our doom.
These are not equally defensible. Extinction is dead-serious, and is unquestionably proceeding at rates not encountered since the last mass extinction 65 Myr ago. I doubt most of us would consider that to be “fine,” or non-threatening. We have zero evidence that such a dramatic (and rapid) development constitutes no cause for alarm. Ironically, the so-called “conservative” members of our society are the most likely to dismiss such threats in the least conservative (i.e., low-risk) approach imaginable. One ought not be surprised to get burned while playing fast-and-loose with fire.

The extreme downside for humans if the 6ME assessment is correct would appear to me to completely overwhelm the speculation that maybe somehow—against all current evidence—Earth’s Community of Life can tolerate this unprecedented shock. That’s classic asymmetric risk. The precautionary principle strongly suggests we not be dismissive of 6ME warnings.

Thus, I would not call talk of a 6ME hyperbole. It has a very real and serious basis, whose plausible consequences are rather severe for humans. Waving it off would seem to be the height of irresponsibility and hubris. If I owned and edited a newspaper, the 300-point font headline would read, every day:
SIXTH MASS EXTINCTION STILL UNDERWAY
I’m not clear what other headline would possibly merit displacing this one. It’s a message that bears repeating—never deserving the label “old news.” Ironically, as long as there are newspapers, the headline will likely remain true.


Last Ditch Effort

Before letting it rest, let me take one final crack at the validity of invoking the 6ME. Whether it is appropriate to speak as if the 6ME is essentially baked-in depends—as so much does—on context.

The present context is that the vast majority of people in our culture assume that modernity continues. In that mental space, a 6ME is essentially guaranteed to play out, and therefore constitutes a fair tool to employ for dislodging ubiquitous faith in modernity.

Whether I personally believe the 6ME will play out to true mass-extinction levels in the fullness of time is essentially irrelevant, as my faith in modernity is already shattered, so that I can imagine (hope for) modernity’s disappearance well before the situation is irreversible. Still, it’s completely fair to point out that the price of prioritizing modernity (over humanity and the rest of Life) leads to colossal failure. To the extent that modernity remains “real,” so does a 6ME: they go together. Maybe, then, it’s modernity that’s hyperbole. It still rhymes.

Sunday, May 4, 2025

Magical Thinking

Magical Thinking. Dave Pollard, How to Save the World. May 3, 2025

Every few years I read an essay that is so well-written and so pertinent to the subjects of this blog that I just want to copy and paste it into my blog (with attribution of course) so it stays as a permanent part of my 22-year-long chronicle of civilization’s demise.

The latest from British historian-diplomat Aurélien, entitled Do You Believe In Magic, is just such an essay.

In it, he resummarizes what I’ve described as the five underlying causes of, and contributors to, the polycrisis that has given rise to the current collapse of the systems constituting our civilization. They are (in my own words):
  1. The staggering complexity and interdependency of the now-global systems on which our civilization now rests and depends;
  2. The ever-growing size and scale of the human population and its activities, infrastructure, and artifacts;
  3. The increasing incompetence of all of us, but especially those with wealth and power, to cope with the predicaments that collapse presents. This incompetence (an objective statement of fact, not a dismissive judgement) has been more than a century in the making, and would take decades to rectify. It has four aspects:
    • Insufficient cognitive capacity to navigate our complex world safely and effectively (we have not been taught how to think for ourselves, nor given enough practice using our critical, creative and imaginative thinking skills);
    • Insufficient information and knowledge (and too much misinformation) to have an adequate context for forming coherent and useful beliefs and taking appropriate action;
    • Insufficient technical and ‘soft’ skills and experience to be able to understand what needs to be done and to carry out appropriate and necessary actions (and even to do our day-to-day jobs) capably, especially collaboratively with others;
    • Insufficient mental health to be able to think coherently and act in a reasoned and effective manner;
  4. A lack of appreciation of how things actually get done (from lack of knowledge of history and lack of practical experience), and a commensurate incapacity to practically intervene in our failing systems in useful and productive ways; and
  5. The inherent fragility and lack of resilience in these systems caused by the pursuit of profit and short-term thinking instead of effectiveness and sustainability.
As a result, he argues, we are going into a period of unprecedented collapse that we don’t understand, and can’t effectively deal with, and which will be even worse because the collapsing systems are built on such shaky ground to begin with.

In short, this is why (I believe) collapse is occurring, and why it will inevitably be a complete collapse, rendering life in future centuries unrecognizably different from how we live today.

Enough words from me. Please read his whole (long — 5500 words) article, linked above. Here are some of what I thought were the most cogent passages:

Visions are easy, but the West has progressively lost the capacity to formulate and operate mechanisms for putting them into practice. In part, this is because there is very little inherited understanding left of the necessary practical steps. For example, re-shoring manufacture of some pharmaceuticals would involve activities that most politicians and pundits have never heard of, let alone be able to describe. Finding and importing supplies of chemicals, designing and building factories, recruiting and training skilled technicians and graduates in chemical engineering (having set up the necessary courses first, naturally), dealing with all the various health and safety hazards, setting up a distribution system for the products … I doubt if much of our current ruling class and its parasites has any idea even of the steps involved, let alone how to sequence them. By contrast, there’s a great deal of experience in closing factories, making workforces redundant and tying yourself to overseas suppliers. But unfortunately, that’s not much use here…

The Anglo-Saxon (now more broadly Western) fixation with archetypal heroic entrepreneurs and university dropouts has obscured the historical fact that no significant industry, and no key technology, has ever been developed without some level of planning and government encouragement

[The recent Western government approach to crises has been] to create the right “magical” environment (low taxes, few regulations) and then the “animal spirits” of entrepreneurs would spontaneously do the rest, through the “magic” of the “market.” The magician, however, having summoned up these powers, should make sure to stay well away from the working… Instead of doing things, governments “create the conditions” for others to do things, and sit back in hopeful anticipation. Serial failures, in true New Age fashion, meant that the spell was not right, or more usually that it was not used with enough will and conviction. The idea that governments should actually do things is considered a quaint anachronism…

As a result, where governments actually did have to do things, there was no tradition or capacity in planning and implementation to fall back on. Covid demonstrated this, in the search for some magical gizmo that would solve the problem without the large-scale government programmes that were no longer possible. Vaccines, for all their questionable efficacy, could be presented as “creating the conditions” for people to return to work, so enabling the government to declare the problem solved. The incoherence of Mr Trump’s attempts to rebuild US industry through tariffs, and the ignominious retreat this seems to have provoked, are simply the latest example of the magical thinking that says vague aspirations can be converted into specific results through willpower and the creation of the right “conditions.” In reality, it seems unlikely that anyone in Mr Trump’s confidence has the remotest idea of what would be practically involved in rebuilding US Industry. Likewise, the incoherence between ambitious, high-level American plans in Ukraine, in Gaza and in the Middle East more generally, and their desultory and amateurish execution, has been much noticed…

Thus, whatever may be the incoherent strategic objectives western governments set themselves in trying to navigate the appalling challenges of the future, and even regain lost ground if possible, they are highly unlikely to be achieved. Not only is the technical capability lacking, but the very thought-processes are absent as well Inevitably, as the capability for holistic thought and planning has been lost, governments and others have found themselves adopting little ad hoc measures which they delude themselves, when aggregated, can collectively be passed off as a “strategy.”Naturally, then, governments don’t really have strategies for dealing with the massive environmental and climate challenges of today and the near future, for example: they just have sets of disconnected initiatives from brainstorming sessions organised by management consultants, many at cross-purposes with each other…

The result is that the machinery and the competence, and even more the capacity for strategic thought and planning, do not exist at anything like the level required to tackle the really major problems discussed in my previous essay. To take a simple example, the price of gas in Europe is likely to rise very sharply in the next few years, and there may be actual shortages if the Russians decide to be awkward. There will be electricity outages in the winter and people will be without heat and power because they can’t afford it, or it simply isn’t available. The last time anything similar happened was the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted in well-organised countries such as France and Japan turning to crash nuclear programmes. The thought of any western country having the imagination or the resources to mount any programme of such ambition these days is laughable. We can imagine a procession of politicians telling people to buy warm clothes, run around to keep warm and invest in solar panels, which if you are an unemployed single mother living on the fourth floor of a tower block isn’t particularly helpful.

Yet in a way this minimalist, short-term approach is understandable, even if it’s not very attractive. The combination of really large and potentially insoluble problems, and a radically reduced capability to deal with problems of any kind, virtually dictates that governments will at best be reduced to merely fiddling with things, and at worst just spend their time arguing about whose fault it is…

[When it comes to programs like recycling and waste management, for example], the total size of the problem is immeasurably larger than the sum total of the initiatives that individuals can take to deal with it… The result is that, because the size of the problems we face in many areas is overwhelming, critics, activists and others fasten on to anything that can be done quickly, whatever its real impact, just because it can be done, and also because often it will not affect them… The discrepancy between the sheer magnitude of upcoming problems and the sum total of the ideas for dealing with them, no matter how individually well-founded, is partly because few of us are capable of comprehending what really large numbers mean

Effectively, therefore, we have built highly complex, extremely fragile, urban systems that will collapse, perhaps terminally, after relatively little stress, and which depend absolutely on the continuity of power and fresh water supplies for ever and ever. Because there is no reversionary mode, and no Plan B if anything goes wrong, we rely absolutely on the favour of the gods for our survival… [As an example], over the last generation, food distribution chains, which used to be quite simple, have taken on a hallucinatory complexity, not least as sub-contractors and sub-sub contractors have become the norm. The resulting system seems supernaturally complex, especially since its main purpose, after all, should be to make sure we have enough to eat. Yet in fact, the actual purpose of the system is to make as much money as possible for shareholders and managers. Western states thus depend for their very survival on elaborate and complex food distribution chains that are designed to reduce costs to the bare minimum, and have little or no redundancy in them. All we can do is pray that they are not greatly disrupted…

Now, few of us wanted this situation, and even the glassy-eyed utopian ideologues of the 1980s didn’t actually think it would turn out this way. But the combination of immensely complex and fragile systems with the ever-decreasing capability to manage them, or even stop them disintegrating, is lethal, if only our rulers realised it. After all, ask them how the population and industry of Europe is going to manage in an era of massively more expensive natural gas, and they have no idea, other than that some magical solution will pop out of a Powerpoint presentation. As Leonard Cohen said, we have seen The Future, and it’s murder. All our rulers can do is wait for a miracle.

Maybe I like this essay so much because it is so consonant with my own thoughts. But whatever the reason: What he said.