Friday, February 14, 2025

Anderson re Hansen

Has Global Warming Accelerated – a short response to Hansen et al. Kevin Anderson. February 13, 2025.

I was asked by Bob Berwyn of Inside Climate News for my thoughts on James Hansen and colleagues’ recent paper Global Warming Has Accelerated: Are the United Nations and the Public Well-Informed? Bob’s article is available at: New research led by James Hansen …

For those interested, a slightly modified version of my full quote is copied below:
Even with robust data, scientists can—and regularly do—arrive at slightly different conclusions. The differences often stem from the assumptions they choose to make, both explicitly and implicitly, as well as how they interpret incomplete or competing datasets. This is the essence of scientific inquiry: through open discussion and debate our understanding improves. For those who critically engage with science, additional factors such as risks and consequences come into play, especially on complex issues like climate change.

In this context, the policy process has abdicated its responsibilities, opting instead for short-term acquiescence with business as usual, rather than offering strong, transparent and cogent leadership. After decades of half-truths, delusion, and outright lies from those in positions of power—and often from their advisors as well—we now find ourselves facing severe risks of disastrous outcomes. Whether we align with the more conservative forecasts of the IPCC or the more challenging warnings of Jim Hansen, the policy implications are strikingly similar. We are rapidly blasting through the 1.5°C commitment, and even staying “well below 2°C” now demands global emission cuts of around 7% annually,☨ starting this year—a rate nearly 2 percentage points higher than we saw during the most stringent COVID lockdowns, and that was for just one year

From a policy perspective, and certainly from the viewpoint of anyone concerned about their family, community, or the future of humanity, the science in 2025 is unambiguous. Without abandoning failed incremental green policies in favour of swift, deep, and transformative emission reductions, we face a future fraught with dire consequences if the IPCC is correct, or catastrophic outcomes if Jim Hansen’s analysis proves accurate. His latest findings only underscore the shameful failure of many to engage honestly with physical reality and call for the radical, if not revolutionary, shifts now required if we’re to deliver on even a weak interpretation of Paris. We are not sleepwalking into the apocalypse—we’re charging toward it with full awareness of what’s at stake. Even more damning, we can already see the devastating effects of our actions tearing apart the livelihoods—and even the lives—of vulnerable, often poor, low-emitting communities, far from the high-emitting areas where we live, and frequently comprised of people of colour. These communities, along with our own children in the near future, are the canaries in the coal mine—and yet, we appear willing to sacrifice them without ever learning from their suffering.

Thursday, February 13, 2025

Hansen: Global Warming Has Accelerated. Why? What Are The Consequences?

Global Warming Has Accelerated. Why? What Are the Consequences? James Hansen and Pushker Kharecha. Feb. 12, 2025.

Once upon a time, Earth Sciences was blessed to have brilliant, articulate, scientific leaders, such as Jule Charney and Francis Bretherton, whose knowledge and overview of climate science commanded respect. And there were many other scientists with deep understanding of the scientific method, who helped spur progress in the field and assure that progress was recognized. Top science writers, such as Walter Sullivan, could rely on such scientific researchers for perceptive descriptions of the major issues and progress in addressing them. We recall fondly learning from Charney’s colleague at MIT, Peter Stone, who served as the principal adviser for climate research at NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, back in the days when Charney was trying to decide whether global equilibrium climate sensitivity to doubled atmospheric CO2 was more like 2°C or 4°C. The correct answer would have enormous practical implications.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), set up by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in 1988, and endorsed by the United Nations that year, produces comprehensive climate assessments about every six or seven years. The reports contain a large amount of useful information; the most recent report on the physical science basis of climate change, the Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC AR6), was published in August 2021. IPCC’s approach to climate analysis came to be dominated by use of global climate models (GCMs) for climate simulations of the past 1-2 centuries. We have taken a complementary approach, placing comparable emphasis on paleoclimate data, GCM modeling, and modern observations of climate processes, as described in our three main papers published in the past decade: (1) “Ice melt, sea level rise and superstorms,” (2) “Global warming in the pipeline,” and (3) “Global warming has accelerated.” The third of these, published last week, was long, as it tied all three together, especially via its Supplementary Material (SM), which usually houses only secondary material. Here is a link to the Abstract + Paper + SM as a single document. Below, we first provide a plain language summary of the three principal conclusions of this paper and then address questions raised in the media by kibitzers.

1. The leap of global temperature in 2023-2024 is explained; no new physics is required.
The 0.4°C increase of global temperature in 2023-24 was caused equally by increase of absorbed solar radiation and a weak El Nino. Increase of absorbed sunlight was mainly spurred by reduction of aerosols (tiny particles), especially those emitted by ships, as the International Maritime Organization imposed a strict limit on the sulfur content of ship fuels beginning in 2020. Aerosols serve as cloud formation nuclei; the induced clouds reflect sunlight and cause global cooling that offsets part of the global warming caused by increasing greenhouse gases. This cooling offset has long been described as a “Faustian bargain” because aerosols constitute particulate air pollution that kills millions of people every year. Our Faustian payments – an increase of global warming – come due when we reduce health-damaging air pollution and thus reduce aerosol cooling.

2. Climate sensitivity is 50 percent larger than the best estimate of IPCC.
We show that the climate sensitivity required to yield best agreement with observed global warming in the past century is 4.5°C for doubled CO2, which is 50% larger than IPCC’s best estimate of 3°C. Together, conclusions 1 and 2 imply that near-term global temperature will decrease very little: thus, averaged over the El Nino/La Nina cycle, the 1.5°C limit has been reached. IPCC’s estimate of climate sensitivity depended on the assumption that aerosol climate forcing was unchanging during the period 1970-2005, but we show that aerosol forcing increased (became more negative) during that period as aerosols spread more globally, including over pristine ocean areas where their effect is greater. If aerosols were fixed, greenhouse gases are the only forcing and the climate sensitivity required to match observed warming would be about 3°C for doubled CO2. But the net forcing was actually smaller during that period because the negative aerosol forcing was growing, so a larger climate sensitivity is required to match observed warming of the past century. Our estimated climate sensitivity coincides with the sensitivity derived from glacial-to-interglacial climate change, the portion of the paleoclimate record for which precise knowledge of greenhouse gases is available.

3. Accelerated warming increases ice melt and upper ocean warming, threatening to shut down North Atlantic overturning circulation by mid-century and cause large sea level rise.
We show that observed ice melt over the past 20 years was similar to assumed ice melt in climate simulations of “Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise, and Superstorms.” The rate of ice melt did not increase in the past decade, but, given the leap of global temperature to +1.5°C above preindustrial, we expect ice melt to accelerate, especially in regions such as southeast Greenland where ice melt is injected directly into the Irminger Sea, a region where deepwater forms. The North Atlantic is warming at depths beneath the surface wind-mixed ocean layer, with warmer water penetrating beneath the sea ice and ice shelves. Paleoclimate data suggest that such sub-ice warming can lead to sudden loss of regional sea ice and thus increased warming and summer rainfall on lower reaches of the Greenland ice sheet and increased freshwater injection into the ocean. Our climate simulations suggest that such increased ice melt and rapid surface warming can shut down the overturning ocean circulation by mid-century, which would be the “Point of No Return” because shutdown is irreversible in less than centuries. Large sea level rise would become inevitable, as heat normally transported into the North Atlantic would remain in the Southern Hemisphere and speed melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet. Global warming acceleration increases this danger because the increased heating both reduces the density of the upper layer of the ocean and increases the rate of ice melt.

Reactions. How would Charney, Bretherton and other scientific leaders of yore have responded to these papers and assertions, and how would the media have responded? It’s a pretty safe bet they would conclude that the papers are a serious analysis. They would think about what observations are needed to confirm and illuminate the issues that are raised. Instead, much reaction in the media seems closer to the continual squealing of farm animals. It is hard to fault the science writers; their stories reflect what they are told by the scientists who are willing or even eager to respond to their inquiries. We find many responses to be unscientific and surprising, given the intergenerational issues that are raised. An illuminating example is the response to Seth Borenstein, the climate science writer for the largest news organization in the world (Associated Press), who was told by 5 of his 6 go-to climate experts that he should not even write about our paper “Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise, and Superstorms;” thus he did not. The paper was also blackballed by the IPCC AR6 report; not a single mention in the several-thousand-page report. Below we speculate about reasons for this treatment, but first let’s respond to current reactions to our “Acceleration” paper.

Reaction 1. Feedbacks. It is claimed that we neglect climate feedbacks, which cause most of the warming and cause the largest warming to be in the Southern Hemisphere, not the Northern Hemisphere, where the ship aerosol effect is largest. In fact (see our Fig. 10), the largest sea surface warming is at latitudes 30-50N in the Northern Hemisphere, where ship aerosol forcing is largest. The total ocean heat content gain may be larger in the more massive Southern Hemisphere ocean, but that supports our interpretation. Most increased energy flux into the planet is from climate feedbacks. We evaluated the contributions of forcings and feedbacks that affect Earth’s albedo (Fig. SM15, in the Supplementary Material of our current paper) and energy imbalance. Over the period (since 2000) of precise satellite measurements of Earth’s albedo (reflectivity), Earth has darkened by 1.7 W/m2. Based on the geographical and temporal distribution of the darkening, we infer that about 0.5 W/m2 of this darkening is the ship aerosol forcing. About 0.15 W/m2 is ice/snow albedo feedback, due to reduced sea ice area, which is well-defined. Thus, by subtraction, most of Earth’s darkening must be the cloud feedback that is expected with global warming. It is a huge feedback for the 20-year period with satellite data. If we over-estimated the aerosol forcing, the cloud feedback is even larger.

This simple bar graph (Fig. SM15) has another story to tell, which Charney and Bretherton would have recognized instantly: the large cloud feedback in a brief period implies that climate sensitivity is much higher than 3°C for doubled CO2. Charney’s comparison of climate models with 2°C and 4°C sensitivity revealed that a 2°C response is provided by doubled CO2 forcing plus water vapor feedback and small sea ice feedback. Addition of only modest cloud feedback raises the sensitivity to 3°C, as an amplifying feedback enhances all other amplifying feedbacks. Thus, the large cloud feedback in the past two decades provides independent confirmation of high climate sensitivity.

Reaction 2. IPCC AR6 models yield realistic global warming acceleration without a ship aerosol effect. The person making this claim – and asserting that it contradicts our conclusions – apparently does not realize that there is a big difference between IPCC’s best estimate for aerosol forcing history and the aerosol forcing in GCMs participating in CMIP6 and IPCC AR6 climate simulations. The IPCC best estimate aerosol forcing is shown in our paper in Fig. 3 and in Figs. 13 and SM1 as updated by Forster et al. (2024). This IPCC aerosol forcing includes the direct aerosol forcing and the larger indirect effect on clouds. This IPCC aerosol forcing is used in the literature for various purposes, e.g., in derivation of an “emergent constraint” on climate sensitivity; these authors assume, consistent with the IPCC aerosol forcing estimate, that aerosol forcing is nearly unchanging over the period 1970-2005. Then, based on observed global warming and assuming that greenhouse gases are the only significant changing forcing in that period, they infer an “emergent constraint” on climate sensitivity: specifically, sensitivity must be close to 3°C for doubled CO2.

However, if they allowed the aerosol forcing to change during that period, they would have found quite different results. We showed that there is a one-to-one relation between the climate sensitivity that gives best fit to observed warming and the trend of aerosol forcing in the period 1970-2005: if the aerosol forcing is constant, the sensitivity is ~3°C; if the aerosol forcing increases as in Bauer’s Matrix aerosol model (almost 0.5 W/m2), the sensitivity is ~4.5°C; if the aerosol forcing increases as in Bauer’s OMA aerosol model, the sensitivity is ~6°C (see Figs. 17 and 18). Given this one-to-one relation between climate sensitivity and the aerosol forcing change during 1970-2005, the “emergent constraint” that climate sensitivity is near 3°C amounts to the following: “if we assume that climate sensitivity is near 3°C, we find that climate sensitivity is near 3°C.”

For the sake of estimating climate sensitivity, we made climate simulations for 1850-2024 with two free parameters (climate sensitivity and the change of aerosol forcing during 1970-2005) and two constraints (1.6°C global warming between 1850 and 2024, and 0.18°C/decade warming during 1970-2005). The best fit was obtained with sensitivity ~4.5°C for doubled CO2 and an increase of aerosol forcing during 1970-2005 similar to that in Bauer’s Matrix model.

After all this explanation, what is wrong with the assertion that CMIP/IPCC models already yield recent acceleration of global warming? Answer: many of the models in the CMIP/IPCC ensemble are not using the IPCC aerosol forcing history. The ensemble includes models that use the Bauer aerosol forcings, e.g., which were steeply increasing during 1970-2005 before stopping growth entirely or even switching to change of the opposite sign. Thus, the average of IPCC models yields global warming acceleration, but it cannot match observed acceleration and the results certainly do not support IPCC’s best estimate for aerosol forcing.

Reaction 3. Range of model fog. Another reaction is that observed rapid warming falls in the range of all CMIP/IPCC climate simulations, so there is no basis to question IPCC assumptions. CMIP/IPCC models include the good, the bad, and the ugly. Yet IPCC takes the distribution of model results as a probability distribution for the real world, using this distribution for mathematical analyses that separate IPCC from the possibility of widespread public understanding, much like the Wizard of Oz tried to overpower Dorothy and her friends. For their purpose, a “merit” of the huge range of this model fog is that IPCC will always be “right,” the real world will fall somewhere within that huge fog. Oops! Maybe not. In a paper that perhaps provided the “rationale” for IPCC to blackball our “Ice Melt” paper, 15 authors, representing leading GCM groups, used 21 climate projections from eight “…state-of-the-science, IPCC class…” GCMs to conclude that “…the probability of an AMOC collapse is negligible. This is contrary to a recent modeling study [Hansen et al., 2016] that used a much larger, and in our assessment unrealistic, Northern Hemisphere freshwater forcing… According to our probabilistic assessment, the likelihood of an AMOC collapse remains very small (<1% probability) if global warming is below ~5K… ”. Here, even the range of model results does not seem to encompass all realistic possibilities: few climate experts would assert that 5°C global warming, sufficient to melt most of the ice on the planet, would be unlikely to shut down AMOC (Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation). Their models likely obtain AMOC stability only because injection of cold freshwater into the polar oceans in the models is underestimated or based on too-lethargic ice sheet models.

Models are essential for understanding ongoing climate change and projections for the future, but by themselves they are inadequate and unable to provide an adequate assessment. The models will be a much more powerful tool, if they are used along with an equally heavy emphasis on paleoclimate data and observations of ongoing climate processes, and the information from all of these combined with mindfulness of climate physics.

Reaction 4. We overlooked the role of decreased aerosols from China. The direct radiative effect of aerosol change is shown in clear-sky measurements of the global increase of absorbed solar radiation (Fig. SM8). The global effect of aerosol change in 2020-2023 relative to 2000-2010 is less than 0.1 W/m2, after the effect of changes in sea ice is removed. China may provide a large fraction of that flux change, but even in total this is a small effect. Change of all-sky absorbed solar radiation (Fig.9) is an order of magnitude larger and the temporal and spatial footprint coincides with the ship aerosol change, and clearly not with change of emissions from China, where the largest decrease was in 2005-2015. The spatial and temporal pattern of SST change (Figure 10) further support the dominance of ship aerosols. It is not surprising that the ship aerosols are much more effective; they are emitted into the lower part of the atmosphere in unpolluted ocean skies, where they have the most effect on clouds.

Bretherton and Charney would not have been confused about the role of Chinese aerosols, which they would recognize has no effect on our three main conclusions above. (1) most aerosol change in China occurred prior to 2020-2023 (Fig. 13), with negligible effect on the sudden global warming in 2023. (2) Our inference of an increasing global aerosol forcing during 1970-2005 and derivation of 4.5°C climate sensitivity are independent of the source of increased aerosol forcing. (3) Our conclusion that the danger of passing the “point of no return” (AMOC shutdown and large sea level rise) is increased by the accelerated North Atlantic warming is straightforward: the increased heating reduces the density of the upper layer of the ocean and increases the rate of ice melt – conclusions that do not depend on uncertainties about aerosols from China.

Reaction 5. Our results are an outlier. When we have answered all the questions, the critics always resort to “they are an outlier,” with results outside those of the “mainstream” climate research community. This is stated in a way that makes it seem that we are unlikely to be right, even when the real world offers ample evidence in support of our conclusions. The media is then forced to go along with the critics because they outnumber us (there are exceptions, e.g., the comprehensive article by Carrington in the Guardian). However, that’s not the way science works. Science does advance as data become available. Eventually this leads to corrections of the mainstream view – some minor, some major. The difficulty in the case of climate change is that slowness to recognize reality is particularly harmful to young people and future generations because of climate’s delayed response and the danger of passing the point of no return, as we emphasized in the video introduction to our paper.

One clarification is needed: our statement that “2°C is dead” was qualified with the phrase “unless a miracle occurs.” It is true that we do not expect a miracle, but the qualification should be included. It is also true that 2°C could be avoided via temporary purposeful cooling to reduce the massive geoengineering (geotransformation, if you prefer) that humanity is presently inflicting upon our home planet – but we do not have the knowledge to recommend such action and the public is nowhere near a point of endorsing such action. The closest thing to a miracle that is conceivable soon would be adoption of cost-free carbon fee-and-dividend policy that we have advocated for almost two decades, as required to underlie and unleash the millions of changes needed to move the world as rapidly as practical to carbon-free energy and a declining level of atmospheric greenhouse gases. Presidents Obama and Biden each had the opportunity to initiate such a revenue-neutral action as part of economic actions required to address economic crises early in their administrations. Instead, Obama did little for climate and Biden borrowed massive amounts of money from future generations (via deficit funding) to subsidize already mature (solar and wind) technologies, an approach that spurred inflation and invited a whiplash energy policy response from the competing political party.

Summary. How is it that we can be cast as “outliers,” if the real world supports our interpretation of ongoing climate change? In part, we suspect, it is because of the “cottage” industry (quotation marks because it is not a small industry) that has built up in support of IPCC. It’s easy to understand how IPCC went down the track of low climate sensitivity, as early climate models had simple cloud treatments that produced only modest climate feedback. For those low-sensitivity climate models to match observed global warming during the several decades of steady warming since 1970, they required that (unmeasured) aerosol forcing remain almost unchanging in that period. We now have evidence that aerosol forcing was actually increasing (becoming more negative) during that period, which is consistent with paleoclimate evidence that climate sensitivity is high. It is difficult for such a huge industry to change its position, but in the end physics will rule.


On a programmatic note: We have long realized that our conclusion that modern nuclear power needs to play an important role in decarbonizing global energy systems limits our ability to obtain public and philanthropic support for CSAS. Now, it seems, this situation is much aggravated by any open discussion that purposeful global cooling may eventually be needed. It’s reminiscent of an analysis once made by JEH’s oldest grandson at age 10: “If we keep doing what we are doing now then the environment will be ruined when the people who are kids now are grownups. And unless we can figure out how to make a time machine that actually works, there will be no way to go back in time to fix it. It’s not fair that the grownups now are ruining the atmosphere for the grownup in the future. Grownups now are scared of nuclear power but they should be scared of what will happen if they keep doing what they’re doing now because we know the ways to use nuclear power safe and we know that using fossil fuels is not safe. It’s very dangerous.” It seems that “grownups,” have now decided that, after tying one arm behind the back of young people (by setting back nuclear R&D several decades; nuclear power has the potential to be our least expensive 24/7 power source, as well as having the smallest environmental footprint), they should also tie their other arm behind their back by prohibiting research on purposeful cooling, in case the grownups screwed up again and did not leave a time machine.

The tactics of the kibitzers seem to work on most of the media and some of our prior supporters. Apparently, the kibitzers have learned from politicians that it doesn’t matter if what you say is true or not, and even ad hominem attacks are allowed – if enough people repeat the arguments often enough, they are accepted. Our attitude has usually been that we don’t have time to deal with all the disinformation and also focus on our scientific research – because eventually the truth will come out. The problem with this assumption is that continuation of the United Nations approach is dangerous. The current policy approach, and belief that it can lead to climate stabilization and cooling by mid-century, is inexorably putting young people into an untenable position. We believe that it is important, despite the advice the UN gets from their massive scientific support group, to clarify where the approach of the United Nations Conferences of the Parties is taking young people.


We are very grateful to those people who continue to support Climate Science, Awareness and Solutions.



Hansen has made his 2010 book Storms of My Grandchildren available here.

Saturday, February 8, 2025

Prologue: The Biospheric Reckoning

Prologue: The Biospheric Reckoning

I. Gaia’s Unruly Children: Hubris of Man

The Earth, in her ancient and indifferent wisdom, had always known how to heal herself. She had endured ice ages carving continents into jagged sculptures, volcanic eruptions wiping out the sky, and celestial bombardments scorching her skin into craters. But never before had she borne a parasite quite like humanity—a species so adept at consumption, so skilled in the art of forgetting its place.

Earth patiently tolerated the antics of this novel species: the atom-splitting, the deep-sea trawling, the ceaseless hunger to bend organic matter into profit. Despite the warnings of shrinking ice caps, coral reefs bleached white, and heatwaves in the dead of winter, corporate boardrooms still buzzed about “market corrections” and “energy transitions,” as if the laws of thermodynamics could be lobbied. Humans, mere tenants on a planet whose existence spanned billions of years before their unruly ascent, were oblivious to the existential threats mounting against them. They were about to be evicted…

II. The Fever: Antibodies of the Anthropocene

It began not with a scream, but with the silence of ice surrendering to the Age of Fire unleashed by Homo sapiens—a crack in the world’s oldest vault, exhaling a breath that had been held for millennia.

The virus did not emerge. It uncoiled.

Locked in the permafrost of Siberia, a sarcophagus of ice had preserved it like a forbidden psalm, a hymn from an epoch when the Earth was young and humanity did not yet exist to defile it. This was no ordinary pathogen. It was an archaeon of annihilation, a sleeper agent from the Pleistocene, its genetic code etched in the language of extinction. When the frost finally relinquished its grip, the virus rose—not from the steaming jungles humanity had plundered, nor the gristle-packed markets where species were stacked in cages—but from the pristine, white throat of the Arctic. Scientists dubbed it Morbus glacies, a clinical epithet for what survivors would later scream as The Thawed God.

Its method was poetry written in frost. Microscopic spores, delicate as diamond dust, rode the jet stream like nomadic assassins. They infiltrated lungs not with the violence of a blade, but the kiss of a snowflake—soft, inevitable. Within weeks, humanity choked with the sound of coughing—a grim chorus echoing through streets and skyscrapers. Cities transformed into galleries of the damned. The infected didn’t scream or bleed. They burned.

It began with a low-grade fever—99°F, then 100°, dismissed as seasonal flu. But by day three, temperatures spiked to 107°, defying ice baths and antipyretics. Skin flushed not with rosy heat, but a mottled crimson, as if capillaries were bursting beneath the surface. Autopsies would later reveal the truth: the virus hijacked the hypothalamus, overriding thermal regulation, turning the human body into a runaway furnace.

Muscles melted into lactic acid. Organs cooked in their own fluids. Brains, sweltering in their skulls, left victims in a permanent hallucinogenic state. Death came when the fever burned through cellular proteins, collapsing the body like a gutted star.

Scientists named it hyperpyretic encephalitis. Survivors called it The Ember Plague. But the most chilling detail wasn’t the heat—it was the vector. The virus thrived in mosquitoes that now bred year-round in Europe’s sweltering cities, in ticks creeping north as winters warmed. Humanity had engineered the perfect incubator: a planet feverish with heat, sweating out pathogens evolved to feast on overheated flesh.

But the Thawed God was no solitary deity. It was a prophet, a herald of the microbial pantheon awakening beneath humanity’s boot.

Its emergence triggered a cascade. Diseases once confined to the tropics flourished in a climate run amok. Mosquitoes carrying dengue and malaria infested European cities, thriving in summers that now steamed like saunas. In America’s heartland, farmers collapsed in their fields, lungs riddled with fungal spores that sprouted grotesque tendrils through their flesh. Labs scrambled to engineer vaccines, but the viruses mutated faster than science could chase them. By the time a cure was bottled, the target had already evolved.

Humanity’s response was defiance, not wisdom.

They continued torching forests to clear land for hamburger meat and palm oil. They continued draining ancient aquifers to cool the power plants fueling their industrial agriculture and industry. Their mantra of “green growth” masked a refusal to abandon exponential consumption. They clung to buzzwords like “resilience” and “innovation,” treating the Earth as a malfunctioning machine to be debugged rather than a living system they’d broken. Every solution was a stopgap, every strategy a gamble. And still, they refused to admit the truth: they were not fighting a disaster.

They were facing an immune response.

III. The Storm: Sky’s Retribution

Then came the hurricanes—not the familiar, seasonal tempests, but leviathans baptized in the feverish waters of a boiling ocean. They began as statistical outliers, then evolved into a pattern no model could dismiss.

The first to rewrite the rules was Hurricane Lachesis, initially classified as Category 6, a designation created for storms that laughed at old scales. It drifted toward the Gulf Coast with the patience of a predator, its winds peeling roofs from hospitals and shifting foundations in Houston’s industrial corridors. Storm surges, supercharged by thermal expansion, seeped into Miami’s aquifers, contaminating freshwater reserves with a saline rot that would linger for decades. Lachesis was not an exception; it was a recalibration. Cyclones began stalling—over Dubai, over Shanghai—their paths warped by weakened jet streams. The one that parked itself over the Emirates for nine days did not shatter towers but drowned them from within, overloading drainage systems never designed for desert monsoons. In the South China Sea, a typhoon veered north, dumping rain on the Gobi until temporary lakes swallowed mining towns and their fossil fuel machinery whole.

The weather grew spiteful in its precision. Lightning storms, turbocharged by atmospheric instability, ignited tinder-dry boreal forests from Alberta to Siberia. Tornadoes materialized in clusters, chewing through midwestern wind farms and trailer parks with impartial efficiency. The rain, warmer and heavier now, fell in relentless waves, leaching heavy metals from soil into reservoirs, creating a toxic brew.

Still, the architects of resilience doubled down. They raised seawalls lined with osmotic membranes, built AI-piloted drone fleets to inject cooling aerosols into the stratosphere, and sunk billions into carbon capture vaults buried beneath the tundra. Each solution bred new consequences. Expensive seawalls accelerated erosion in the neighboring coastlines; aerosol injections changed global rainfall patterns, diverting rains from agricultural zones and sparking famines; the tundra projects triggered methane leaks from thawing permafrost. Engineers spoke of “managed decline” and “adaptive thresholds,” sterile phrases that masked the truth: every intervention tugged at a thread in what remained of the ecosystem’s fabric.

By the time the North Atlantic Current faltered, stalling nutrient cycles and collapsing fisheries from Newfoundland to Norway, it was too late to parse cause from effect. The climate had become a hall of mirrors, humanity’s reflection warped by every desperate correction. The storms, though, remained crystalline in their intent—not wrath, but equilibrium, attempting to restore balance through a language of floods and fire whose lesson we had refused to learn.

The message was clear: nature’s ledger always collects.

IV. The Burn: Earth’s Purification

Megafires raced across continents, a billion amber teeth devouring vineyards, suburbs, and entire ecosystems. They weren’t just fires—they were Earth’s fever burning through the kindling of human denial.

The Amazon, its canopy stripped and soil desiccated, ceased to breathe. Conflagrations gnawed through the “lungs of the planet”, reducing it to a blackened trachea. The Australian outback became a crematorium for a billion creatures, their screams lost in the roar of a red horizon.

In every country, infernos towered like skyscrapers, devouring entire towns in minutes. Highways choked with fleeing cars became graveyards of melted steel. Embers were lofted miles ahead of the main blaze, seeding destruction in neighborhoods still clinging to the illusion of safety. Survivors wore gas masks to filter ash that fell like gray snow, their eyes fixed on horizons where the sun glowed an apocalyptic orange through a perpetual toxic haze. What the flames didn’t claim, the aftermath did: charred hillsides shed into mudslides, rivers ran black with debris, and once-lush landscapes became smoldering patchworks of new deserts.

In the thawing Arctic and Siberia, ancient methane reserves escaped into the atmosphere to create a vicious feedback loop of wildfires raging with a ferocity beyond containment. Their acrid smoke blotted out the sun and cloaked the northern hemisphere in an eternal twilight. The once-frozen tundra had become a cracked, smoldering wasteland, where flames devoured skeletal forests.

Every flame laid bare the delusions of control, the hubris of containment algorithms, the rot of economies built to monetize extinction. The economy, now a doomsday cult, demanded infinite growth from a finite system. The wealthy fled to sealed arks of concrete and filtered air, sipping champagne as they watched the world burning on their flat screens. The poor burned quietly, their ashes blending with the soil they’d once tilled.

V. The Final Paroxysm: Oppenheimer’s Legacy

The biosphere had already unsheathed its claws: pestilence had decimated human populations, storms had scoured the coasts and erased cities, and wildfires had reduced entire nations to charcoal sketches. But it was not enough. The architects of the Anthropocene, those apes who had tamed fire and selfishly reshaped the entire planet in their image, would not go quietly in the night. No—they would burn the house down with them.

In the end, humanity’s epitaph was written in fission and fallout. Nations were fractured by dwindling resources and their military’s chain of command had been frayed by famine and flight. Leaders, cloistered in bunkers lit by the glow of missile consoles, gnawed on paranoia. Screens flickered with maps flashing red—cities quarantined, farmlands desiccated, reservoirs empty and crumbling. A button pressed in desperation, a missile launched in error—the pretext mattered little. ICBMs arced through the stratosphere, their contrails like the talons of some vengeful raptor.

New York’s skyline melted into a silhouette of shadow, its millions vaporized mid-breath. Beijing’s Forbidden City became a glass plain. Paris, the City of Light, ignited into a funeral pyre that rivaled the dawn. The bombs did not discriminate. Despot and democrat, saint and sinner, the elderly and the newly born—all were reduced to isotopes.

Others, too impoverished for ICBMs, resorted to cruder blasphemies; dirty bombs salted the earth with radioactivity. In Karachi, a jihadist cell detonated a cobalt-60 “dirty bomb” in a sewage canal. The radiation clung to the water, turning the Indus into a serpent of gamma rays. In Nashville, a doomsday cult wired a reactor core to propane tanks, their leader screaming about “the Rapture’s glow.” It scarcely mattered who had “won”; nuclear winter descended like a shroud, a twilight that stretched for years. The lucky died instantly. The rest perished from famine, cannibalism, and disease…until only one walked the Earth.

Hansen: Global Warming Has Accelerated: Are the United Nations and the Public Well-Informed?

Global Warming Has Accelerated: Are the United Nations and the Public Well-Informed? Hansen et al. Feb. 3, 2025.


Abstract


Global temperature leaped more than 0.4°C (0.7°F) during the past two years, the 12-month average peaking in August 2024 at +1.6°C relative to the temperature at the beginning of last century (the 1880-1920 average). This temperature jump was spurred by one of the periodic tropical El Niño warming events, but many Earth scientists were baffled by the magnitude of the global warming, which was twice as large as expected for the weak 2023-2024 El Niño. We find that most of the other half of the warming was caused by a restriction on aerosol emissions by ships, which was imposed in 2020 by the International Maritime Organization to combat the effect of aerosol pollutants on human health. Aerosols are small particles that serve as cloud formation nuclei. Their most important effect is to increase the extent and brightness of clouds, which reflect sunlight and have a cooling effect on Earth. When aerosols – and thus clouds – are reduced, Earth is darker and absorbs more sunlight, thus enhancing global warming. Ships are the main aerosol source in the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans. We quantify the aerosol effect from the geographical distribution of sunlight reflected by Earth as measured by satellites, with the largest expected and observed effects in the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans. We find that aerosol cooling, and thus climate sensitivity, are understated in the best estimate of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Global warming caused by reduced ship aerosols will not go away as tropical climate moves into its cool La Niña phase. Therefore, we expect that global temperature will not fall much below +1.5°C level, instead oscillating near or above that level for the next few years, which will help confirm our interpretation of the sudden global warming. High sea surface temperatures and increasing ocean hotspots will continue, with harmful effects on coral reefs and other ocean life. The largest practical effect on humans today is increase of the frequency and severity of climate extremes. More powerful tropical storms, tornadoes, and thunderstorms, and thus more extreme floods, are driven by high sea surface temperature and a warmer atmosphere that holds more water vapor. Higher global temperature also increases the intensity of heat waves and – at the times and places of dry weather – high temperature increases drought intensity, including “flash droughts” that develop rapidly, even in regions with adequate average rainfall.

Polar climate change has the greatest long-term effect on humanity, with impacts accelerated by the jump in global temperature. We find that polar ice melt and freshwater injection onto the North Atlantic Ocean exceed prior estimates and, because of accelerated global warming, the melt will increase. As a result, shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) is likely within the next 20-30 years, unless actions are taken to reduce global warming – in contradiction to conclusions of IPCC. If AMOC is allowed to shut down, it will lock in major problems including sea level rise of several meters – thus, we describe AMOC shutdown as the “point of no return.”

We suggest that an alternative perspective – a complement to the IPCC approach – is needed to assess these issues and actions that are needed to avoid handing young people a dire situation that is out of their control. This alternative approach will make more use of ongoing observations to drive modeling and more use of paleoclimate to test modeling and test our understanding. As of today, the threats of AMOC shutdown and sea level rise are poorly understood, but better observations of polar ocean and ice changes in response to the present accelerated global warming have the potential to greatly improve our understanding.

Sunday, October 27, 2024

Curtin: Soul Murder in the Ballot Box

Soul Murder in the Ballot Box as Palestinians Are Butchered. Edward Curtin. Oct 24, 2024.

It’s been a long time but worth remembering, if you can, that when the Twin Towers and Building 7 at the World Trade Center collapsed on September 11, 2001, the whole world watched in horror. The events of that day were repeated on television over and over and over again, to the point where they became afterimages lodged in people’s minds.

As a result, although the buildings were not brought down by the impact of planes (no plane hit Building 7) but by explosives planted in the buildings (see this and this, among extensive evidence), most people thought otherwise, just as they thought that the subsequent linked anthrax attacks were directed by Osama bin Laden when they were eventually proven to have originated from a U.S. military lab (thus an inside job), and, as a result of a massive Bush administration/corporate media propaganda campaign, most Americans supported the invasion of Afghanistan, the subsequent invasion of Iraq, and decades of endless wars that continue to this day, bringing us to the edge of nuclear war with Iran and Russia.

It is impossible to understand the United States’ full-fledged support today for Israel’s genocide in the Middle East without understanding this history. Israel’s genocide is the United States’ genocide; they cannot be separated.

All these wars involve the machinations of the neo-conservative clique that in 1997 formed the Project for the New American Century that ran George W. Bush’s administration and whose protégées have come to exert great control of the foreign policies of Democratic and Republican administrations since. It is not that they lacked power before this, as a study of American foreign policy as far back as the Lyndon Johnson administration and its non-response to Israel’s 1967 attack on the U.S. Liberty confirms.

Contrary to the widespread claims that Israel runs U.S. Middle East foreign policy, I think it is important to emphasize that the reverse is true.

It is convenient to claim the tail wags the dog, but it is false.

Israel’s war crimes are U.S. war crimes
. If the U.S. wanted to stop Israel’s genocide and expansion of war throughout the region, it could do so immediately, for Israel is totally reliant on U.S. support for its existence – as they like to say, “It’s existential.”

All the news to the contrary is propaganda. It is a sly game of responsibility ping-pong: shift the blame, keep the audience guessing as they hit their little hollow ball back and forth.

Control of the Middle East’s oil supplies and travel routes has been key to American foreign policy for a very long time. Such geo-political control is linked to the United States’ endless war on Russia and the control of natural resources throughout the vast region (a look at a map is requisite), stretching from the Middle East to southwest Asia up through the Black and Caspian Seas through Ukraine into Russia.

In both cases, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and Israel’s genocide of Palestinians whose ultimate target is Iran (America’s key enemy in the region as far back as the CIA’s 1953 coup d’état against Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh), savage wars of extermination have been promoted through decades of carefully orchestrated propaganda. In the former case, through the mainstream corporate media’s magic of repetitive cinematic images, and in the latter, through their absence. To be shown photos of many thousands of dead and mutilated Palestinian children does not serve the U.S./Zionist’s interests. Propaganda’s methods must be flexible. Show, conceal.

The September 11th attacks and the current genocide, each in its own way, have been justified and paid for with similar but different credit cards without spending limits, the so-called wars on terror waged on the visual credit card of planes hitting buildings preceded and followed by endless pictures of Osama bin Laden, and the genocide of Palestinians on the holocaust credit card minus images of slaughtered Palestinians or any awareness of the terrorist history of the Zionist’s century-long racial nationalist settler movement of “ethnically cleansing” Palestinians from their land.

To know this, one has to read books, but they have been replaced by cell phones, functional illiteracy being the norm, even for college graduates who are treated to four years of wokeness education and anti-intellectualism that reduces their thinking to mush and graduates them with sciolistic minds at best. I am being kind.

The eradication of historical knowledge and the devaluation of the written word are key to ignorance of both issues. Digital media and cell phones are the new books, all few hundred words on an issue conveying information that conveys ignorance. Guy DeBord put it succinctly: “That which the spectacle ceases to speak of for three days no longer exists.” Amnesia is the norm.

To which I might add: that which the mass media spectacle continues to speak of or show images of for many days exists, even if it doesn’t. It exists in the minds of virtual people for whom images and headlines create reality. The electronic media is not only addictive but hypnotically effective, producing cyber people divorced from the material world. News and information have become a form of terrorism used to implode all mental defenses, similar to the floors at the World Trade Center that went down boom, boom, boom.

The war crimes of US/Israel are readily available for viewing outside the coverage of the corporate mainstream media. Most of the world views them, but these are the unreal people, the ones who don’t count as human beings. These war crimes are massive, ruthless, and committed proudly and without an ounce of shame. To face this fact is not acceptable.

Those who pretend ignorance of them are guilty of bad faith.

Those who support either Harris or Trump are guilty of bad faith twice over, acting as if either one does not support genocide or that genocide is a minor matter in the larger scheme of things.

Choosing “the lesser of two evils” is therefore an act of radical evil hiding behind the mask of civic duty.

That it is commonplace only confirms these words from the English playwright Harold Pinter’s extraordinary Nobel Address in 2005:
The United States supported and in many cases engendered every right wing military dictatorship in the world after the end of the Second World War. I refer to Indonesia, Greece, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Haiti, Turkey, the Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador, and, of course, Chile. The horror the United States inflicted upon Chile in 1973 can never be purged and can never be forgiven.

Hundreds of thousands of deaths took place throughout these countries. Did they take place? And are they in all cases attributable to US foreign policy? The answer is yes they did take place and they are attributable to American foreign policy. But you wouldn’t know it.

It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn’t happening. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest. The crimes of the United States have been systematic, constant, vicious, remorseless, but very few people have actually talked about them. You have to hand it to America. It has exercised a quite clinical manipulation of power worldwide while masquerading as a force for universal good. It’s a brilliant, even witty, highly successful act of hypnosis.
Little has changed since 2005, except that these crimes have increased along with the propaganda denying them, together with vastly increased censorship – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Russia via Ukraine, etc. – all targets of U.S. bombs, just like Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, etc. Now the U.S. has brought the world to the brink of nuclear war and the voting public is all worked up over choosing between candidates supporting genocide and the massively expanded Israel attack on neighboring countries. It is a frightening spectacle of moral indifference and stupidity as we await the Israel/U.S. bombing of Iran and Iran’s response.

Yet I ask myself and I ask you: Is there a connection between the voting public’s support for these war criminals and attention deficit disorder, amnesia, and dementia?

Or is this embrace of the demonic twins’ – US/Israel – foreign policy a sign of something far worse? A death wish?

Soul death?

Saturday, October 12, 2024

Sentinel Intelligence

You're Not a Fearmonger. You Have Sentinel Intelligence. Jessica. Sep 23, 2024.
Some of us can hear the future.


You’ve probably heard about Helen of Troy. She’s blamed for starting the Trojan War. Not many people remember Cassandra.

She predicted it.

In Aeschylus’s tragedy Agamemnon, you get Cassandra’s full story. In some ways, the Trojan War is really about a bunch of dudes who don’t listen to a woman, and it leads straight to the collapse of their civilization.

In later retellings, they ignore her twice.

Surprised?

Cassandra doesn’t exactly ask for the gift of prophecy. The Greek god Apollo falls in love with her. He puts her under a spell in one of his temples. Then he tells his pet snakes to go lick her ears. When she wakes up, she can hear the future. Apollo tries to seduce Cassandra, but she’s just not that into him. He has a meltdown. Zeus tells him no backsies on divine gifts, so he finds a loophole.

He curses her.

Now when Cassandra hears the future, nobody believes her. If you want to drive someone insane, that’s a good start.

Now get this:

Not only does Cassandra predict the Trojan war, but she also warns everyone about the Trojan Horse. Once again, nobody listens. They start calling her names. She tries to smash the horse open with an axe and gets dragged away screaming.

You know the rest.

Many of us have been identifying strongly with Cassandra over the last few years. We watch the media downplay and dismiss one threat after another. We endure endless opinion pieces about everything from climate alarmism to coronaphobia. Influencers accuse us of hurting everyone’s mental health. Strangers call us doomers and fearmongers. Our friends and family treat us like we’re paranoid. When we share dozens or even hundreds of studies, they refuse to look at them. They say, “I don’t want to read anything that’ll bring me down.”

“I’m trying to stay positive.”

Americans and Westerners in general are suffering from a pandemic of denial, wishful thinking, and toxic positivity. It impedes us at every turn, on almost every serious issue. It exacerbates our existing anxiety and contributes to our sense of despair about the future of the planet. Here’s the thing:

You’re not a fearmonger.

You have sentinel intelligence.

Sentinel intelligence refers to a special cognitive ability that allows someone to detect threats before anyone else. Richard A. Clarke and R.P. Eddy talk about this trait in their book, Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes. They review a number of natural and economic disasters throughout history. As they write, “in each instance a Cassandra was pounding the table and warning us precisely about the disasters that came as promised.” Not only were they ignored, but “the people with the power to respond often put more effort into discounting the Cassandra than saving lives and resources.”

It just keeps happening.

If you have sentinel intelligence, your brain can aggregate and sift through extraordinary amounts of information in a very short period of time, especially when it comes to seeing latent or hidden dangers. You don’t get stymied by what Clarke and Eddy call the “magnitude of overload.”

In some ways, it’s a superpower.

Research on sensitive individuals confirms how sentinels and Cassandras think. Social psychologist Tsachi Ein-Dor writes that some of us "are chronically hypervigilant and constantly alert to potential threats and dangers. Other individuals, once alerted to a threat, are self-reliant and likely to take protective actions rapidly and effectively." In other words, we're hardwired alarm systems. Groups are more likely to survive when they have a mix of people who are skilled at detecting, communicating, and acting on threats to their survival.

Some of us can identify threats just by knowing that something's off. One study in Nature Scientific Reports describes this ability as scene gist. As they explain, "Scene gist extracted rapidly from the environment may help people detect threats." The shapes and contours of a landscape can trigger our threat brains even before we know the details of what we're looking at.

The findings suggest that scene gist extends beyond scanning your surroundings for patterns. It could apply to evaluating other types of input, like data. If you have sentinel intelligence, you know what it feels like to always have your threat brain on. You know how it feels when you're assessing and analyzing information and something feels odd, even before you can articulate what.

That's scene gist.

There's an avenue of research in psychology called threat sensitivity theory, where researchers study how individuals identify and respond to danger. As Samantha Denefrio explains, some individuals show an "exaggerated threat sensitivity." On the one hand, it can be maladaptive. On the other, it could save you from a deadly virus or a climate disaster.

Threat sensitivity lives on a spectrum.

As Stephen Ristvedt writes in Heliyon, "People on one end... are dispositionally hypersensitive to possible threat and thus more prone to anxiety and avoidance. Those on the other end... are relatively insensitive to threats and thus more likely... to take unnecessary risks."

Some research describes sentinels as flowers. A study in Translational Psychiatry looked at how college students respond to their environment. They found that around 30 percent react strongly to external stimuli, 40 percent show a moderate reaction, and about 30 percent show a weak reaction. They describe the low-sensitivity group as dandelions and the moderate-sensitivity group as tulips.

They call the high-sensitivity group orchids.

Orchids experience more intense reactions to art and music. They pay more attention to detail. They feel more overwhelmed by too much stimulus, but they simultaneously hyperfocus for long periods of time. They also tend to be quiet introverts. They’re more likely to feel self-conscious, and they’re more vulnerable to anxiety and depression.

It all fits.


These terms like orchid and sentinel describe the same overall group, and we find them throughout history. Psychologists sometimes describe them as highly sensitive. They’re often ignored, even persecuted for speaking truth to power. Our culture dumps a lot of judgment on them, along with anyone who falls somewhere on the neurodivergence spectrum. We’re called weak and emotional, and we’re attacked for feeling too much. The actual data suggests that it’s not a weakness at all.

It’s a strength.

It’s not easy to convince someone to take a threat seriously when you’re the only one who sees it. Your mind has pieced together hundreds or even thousands of different data points from research, but also from prior experience and observations. You’ll have trouble unpacking all of that. According to Clarke and Eddy, someone with sentinel intelligence “may at times appear obsessive and even socially abrasive.”

We’ve seen a lot of that lately.

This research also explains why so many people wait until there’s an overwhelming amount of evidence indicating a threat before doing anything. Dandelions and tulips don’t respond as strongly to their environments.

They miss the warning signs.

If you have sentinel intelligence, it probably bewilders you how the vast majority of people can’t or won’t connect all the dots and threads. It’s why you’re often confused with your arch-enemy, the conspiracy theorist.

There’s a big difference.

Sentinels care about people and want to keep them safe, even strangers. They’re inclined to think about the greater good, and they’re more willing to put up with inconveniences for the sake of protecting their group. They’re also more willing to risk the alienation and sometimes embarrassment of being wrong. They would rather be wrong than risk someone else’s life.

Conspiracy theorists do the opposite.

If sentinels display more compassion, conspiracy theorists show higher levels of narcissism and psychopathy. They’re less in tune with their surroundings. They show much less compassion. They place a great deal of importance on their own personal rights and freedoms. They give themselves a special role in revealing the truth. While they portray themselves as highly-informed and rational, they tend to string together random facts and observations into narratives with no internal consistency. These narratives often arrive at violence toward institutions and marginalized groups.

Sentinels usually advocate for simple measures, while conspiracy theorists push for violent interventions or radical solutions, like suspending the constitution or kidnapping governors.

Finally, conspiracy theorists are prone to trivialize and dismiss actual threats like corporate monopolies and disaster capitalism. When the Trojans ignored Cassandra, they indulged in a range of fallacies.

Here’s how Trojan brains think:

That will never happen.
Okay, it’s happening.
It’s not that bad.
Okay, it’s bad.
It won’t last long.
Okay, it will never end.
What’s your solution?
That won’t work.
It’s too late to do anything.
Everyone’s worn out.
There’s no way we could’ve known.
We should just let it happen.
Everyone’s on their own.
Everything’s fine.
I’m trying to stay positive.
It’s not my fault.
It’s yours.

Psychologists also have a name for the tendency to shrug off warnings. It’s called reactance. Paul Ratner talks about it in Big Think. As he writes, “not many are big fans of being told what to do.” On the other hand, “persisting in your obstinance can feel pretty satisfying.”

Jack W. Brehm introduced this idea in his 1966 book, A Theory of Psychological Reactance. His work inspired nearly 60 years of research on how individuals and groups shrug off warnings until it's too late.

Then they panic.

So, look:

Our survival depends on our ability to overcome these psychological hangups. We also have to get better at listening to sentinels instead of pathologizing them and talking about their social anxiety.

If you’re a sentinel, it often feels like the slightest suggestion of a threat sets off a cascade of denial and wishful thinking.

Now we know why.

Combine all of these psychological hazards, and you arrive at the current state of affairs, a Western society that remains largely unwilling to recognize threats and face them with simple solutions.

I don’t think the answer lies in softening our words or coddling fragile egos. That never helps. We just need a little confidence and reassurance that we’re doing the right thing. When minimizers call us hysterical doomers, we can lean on the psychology that says otherwise.

If you see a threat, there’s nothing wrong with speaking up. Someone’s always going to feed their own self-esteem by dismissing you.

Focus on the ones in the middle who might listen.

With enough effort, we can get through to the 40 percent of people out there who show some willingness to pay attention. They can fall prey to Trojan brain, but they’ll listen to sentinels. It’s worth trying.

Maybe this last part sounds optimistic.

If you have sentinel intelligence, maybe it takes all you’ve got just to protect yourself and endure everyone’s ridicule. Some of us are tired, and we need a break from the role of Cassandra. That’s fine.

Just remember, you’re not a fearmonger.

You have a gift from the gods.

You can hear the future.

Monday, October 7, 2024

Murphy, doing the math

Your Order, Please? Murphy, Do the Math. Oct. 8, 2024.


This may come as a surprise, but people are capable of holding unsupported notions…unexamined beliefs and expectations. A common default assumption—often quite reasonable—is that conditions will continue in a fashion that is recognizably similar to the way they have been during one’s lifetime. Suggestions to the contrary tend to be met with suspicion—or even hostility in the case that the suggested outcome is less than rosy.

What if we presented possible options for future human developments—let’s say human population as a solid example—and pretend it’s a menu from which we get to choose. What outcome would most people see as the desired goal? What would make them happy, or satisfied? Which population curve below do you think most would select?

I present the following options:



A: Indefinite exponential rise. This implies no biophysical limits, ultimately demanding expansion to space (as if possible).

B: Moderation into a linear rising state, allowing continued growth but not in crazy-pants fashion.

C: Logistic leveling: no drama: we found our place and aimed right for it with no corrections—like it was meant to be and we knew what we were doing all along.

D: Peak and modest decline to some medium and stable value, indicating a slight boo-boo (overshoot) in our trajectory.

E: Peak and substantial fall to a vastly smaller population before stabilizing. In this case, we had it dramatically wrong in a massive overshoot.

F: A post-peak crash to zero (i.e., extinction; could be due to ecological collapse, nuclear annihilation, sex robots, or classic evolutionary failure of our species).

Now picture yourself and a bunch of others sitting around a table at a restaurant holding this menu and trying to decide on the future. What are you having?


Process of Elimination?

Ha! I tricked you all! I would claim it’s not an open choice! It will be no surprise that I rule out option A. Exponentials fail, and juvenile space fantasies aren’t coming to the rescue. Even then, good luck maintaining an exponential against the cruel realities of expansive space! “I’m sorry sir, the kitchen informs me that this option is not available (and never has been).”

Option B also ignores biophysical limits, in that growth of any form is not a long-term realistic prospect, even if not disastrously exponential. Also unavailable from the kitchen.

I suspect many people in our society would pick option C. Looks tasty. This is the dream scenario: we figure out how to live on the planet and smoothly cruise into stability without any obvious sacrifice, then hold it there indefinitely as human civilization flourishes. Except: the scale of today’s activity on the planet far exceeds the community of life’s capacity to survive. Not only would the sixth mass extinction stay on track, but we have zero realistic all-things-considered plans for maintaining high-throughput modernity at the ten-billion person scale. From agriculture to energy to materials (upon which which energy conversion depends), we don’t know how this could possibly work for centuries or millennia. There’s no credible plan. Another note is that real populations seldom follow the no-drama logistic curve. Treat it as a fantasy, and try to ignore the appeal. You’re probably beginning to dislike this restaurant, for its lack of actual choice.

Option D is the first to acknowledge overshoot. I suspect the chef will get a smattering of orders from this category, just like the gluten-free, dairy-free “pizza” that’s on the menu for the rare bird who needs to go that way. This option admits defeat, of sorts. It acknowledges that we’ve gone too far already and need to dial things back in order to carry on. In spirit, I am on board. But if our current attack on the planet is at the level of rapidly initiating a sixth mass extinction, is a factor-of-two moderation nearly enough to tip the scales? “I’ll check with the kitchen—I’m uncertain whether this dish is available today.”

Option E is qualitatively similar to Option D, but quantitatively differs in that the ultimate steady-state level is vastly lower than the peak. This is not a small factor-of-two correction, but an order-of-magnitude or more. It’s the shoe leather option on the menu. Why would anyone ever pick this one? Well, if the other items are truly unavailable… This might be the only way to survive, by the dictates of evolution, ecology, and biophysics. The kitchen can probably oblige and rustle something up. Why is the chef now walking around bare-footed? Serving suggestion: goes down better with ketchup.

Option F is implicitly on the menu, folks. Dismayed by the lack of acceptable choices, we could refuse to order any of the unsavory options, insist on “living large,” and consequently end up starving ourselves in pointless protest.


Grade Analogy

I also like a grade parallel here. Students might desire an A or B, but can live with a C as a passing grade. D is effectively failure, and F is unambiguous failure. That leaves E: an obscure grade that is off our radar (outside Hogwarts). But we need to think out of the box here and accept that we are heading toward uncharted territory, for which we do not yet have set associations. If my choices are E or F, I might as well try this E-thing, which might turn out to exceed expectations.


Happiness?

This post was motivated by a discussion I had with a sharp friend about the path of humanity. I was making the point, unsurprisingly, that modernity is a temporary aberration that will not be ecologically supported for very long. He rejected the idea of any future path that had even a whiff of hunter-gatherer lifestyles, adding something to this effect:

Look: all you have to know to appreciate that human life was miserable in the distant past is that population was held down by external factors. Life was tough [nasty, brutish, short was the gist].

This is very illuminating. When I responded: “Ah, so the only mode of existence compatible with human happiness is unbounded, exponential growth?” it was immediately clear to him the pile he had just stepped in.

But this is the crux of the matter, and worthy of serious consideration. If the only way for humans to be happy (not miserable) is in a world without limits…well then we’ve come to the wrong shop, folks. If defiance of biophysical reality is necessary for us to be the transcendent, liberated former-animals we think ourselves to be, then I’ve got some bad news. Pinocchio will never be a real boy. Translation: our artificial construct of modernity will never have a permanent, integrated place within an ecological context.


Back to the Menu

Now let’s return to our menu. When presented in this way, I think logic circuits kick in so that most people—I hope—would recognize option A (indefinite exponential growth) as not being possible (otherwise it might seem the happiest choice). Once in this mindset, option B might also be apparent as untenable, and that’s certainly progress. If I am correct to suspect that option C would be most popular, aren’t we back to the “miserable” state of imposed limits?

I think the difference is that to most people, the target steady-state population is our choice—not nature’s choice—in which we have two kids on average, medically-enabled longevity, technological goodies, and opera. This is the “arrived” notion: under our control. What seems to be objectionable is when ecological realities are dictating the terms. Two things: first, ecological realities probably remove option C as being unsupportable to begin with; second, even option C is ultimately limited by biophysical reality, in that births are still constrained (restricted, independent of happiness/desire) and deaths still motor on. Population trajectories are all about biophysical realities of birth and death, so that any steady solution goes hand-in-hand with limits on the biophysical front. To maintain steady state, increasing longevity would have to be accompanied by a reduction in births. We can’t just do whatever we want.

I’ll make one other point with regard to my friend’s “misery” statement. It implies that every other species on the planet—constrained as they are by external factors beyond their control—must lead miserable lives, and that happiness rests on control. What a depressing mindset to hold about our glorious planet of life! I reject the notion that squirrels are miserable, or that early humans were miserable—and frightened—much of the time (see next week’s post). I take that attitude to be projection of our own unfamiliarity and fear over the prospect of losing the infantilizing influence of modernity. I have enough respect for early humans to believe that they faced challenges with grit and equanimity, while finding it within themselves to laugh, joke, tease, sing, and dance.


Overall Lesson

The point of this exercise is that not every drawing we could slap on paper is biophysically, ecologically supportable. In fact, the vast majority are not. It is probably approximately true that the area under the curve—above a certain threshold of sustainable population—is limited, as excess/overshoot leads to accumulating ecological damage, and an initially-healthy Earth can only take so much. This precludes, for instance, the pleasant notion of an arbitrarily gradual decline toward sustainable levels. Gotta keep the area below the breaking point. We can’t just do anything we wish. Does that lack of control commit us to misery? Careful: this is a tantrum-free zone.

Even in a deterministic mindset, where the ultimate answer is inevitable, the result is utterly unpredictable to us. Options E and F, for instance, both seem to be on the table, and I would rather that our species survives beyond the modernity episode than execute its extinction as a result of clinging to the colossal mistake of modernity for too long.

That means, if option F is to be avoided, steps must be taken to set us on the path of option E. Efforts in that direction come with no guarantees, but failure to make the attempt is far less likely to end up there.

Saturday, October 5, 2024

Aurelien: against recentism

Things Don't Always Get Better. Aurelien, Trying to Understand the World. Oct. 2, 2024.
And "Against Recentism," while we're at it.


When I was young, there was a general belief that the world had been getting better for a while, and would continue to do so.

This wasn’t an ideology, more of a commonplace, everyday assumption. It wasn’t forced on a sceptical population by the political power, as accounts of endless progress were forced on the population of the Soviet Union. It had little to do with visions of futuristic utopias held by scientists and intellectuals. Indeed, it was something that seemed so mundanely obvious as scarcely to be worth mentioning. When the Conservative Party leader Harold Macmillan claimed in a 1957 speech that “we have never had it so good,” he was expressing a widely, almost universally, held belief. Opponents might grumble about the decline in traditional social standards and the burgeoning problem of rebellious youth, but that was about it. Macmillan himself had made his political reputation as Housing Minister (how quaint the very idea seems now) keeping his promise to build one hundred thousand new houses a year, to replace war damage and the slums of the major cities. And this was what people saw and experienced.

It’s almost impossible now to understand the significance of the transformation in daily life that came over most of the western world between the middle of the nineteenth and the middle of the twentieth centuries. Again, it was mostly mundane, everyday things. If one of my distant ancestors—a farm labourer perhaps or a small shopkeeper—had been told in the 1850s or 1860s that century later their descendants would live in new houses with indoor toilets, electric lights and running water, that machines would be available to wash clothes and keep food fresh, that education and health care would be free, that infant mortality would be reduced radically as vaccinations and a healthier environment vanquished the terrors of smallpox, whooping cough and polio whose shadows still disturbed my childhood, that unemployment would be a thing of the past, that poverty had largely been conquered … well, they would have laughed and muttered about utopias, if indeed they even knew the word.

Security in many forms was largely taken for granted then, from well-lit public spaces to security of employment: there were often labour shortages, and trades unions were strong. Life was simpler all round: public utilities were government-run and existed to serve the public, and if you had an unresolved problem with the sewage you could write to your MP who would write to a Minister to try to get something done about it.

Now none of this—extraordinary as it now sounds—is really utopian, nor was it seen as such at the time. Governments were elected to get things done, to steer the economy so as to minimise unemployment, to provide the services and to develop the country. That was just their job. When Harold Wilson, the Labour Party leader, successfully campaigned against the Tories in the 1964 election, his main complaint was that the government had done too little of this, too slowly. (Nor was this mentality confined to Britain, by the way, the French still talk of the “thirty glorious years” after World War 2, when successive governments did much the same thing.)

So I have always thought that it is legitimate to look back at the past, and identify cases where things were better then than they are now, and could have developed very differently. The alternative view—everything is infinitely better in every way than it used to be—is so absurd that few people ever defend it in those terms. Rather, the Professional and Managerial Caste (PMC) whose ultimate origins lie in these Years of Plenty, dismisses their memory with accusations of excessive nostalgia, of overlooking the asserted horrors of the era, or indeed of outright reactionary politics (“I suppose you think that women should stay at home and do the housework!). Most of these people, in my experience, weren’t even alive in the 1960s and 1970s, and few of them can explain in what the superiority of the present moment consists, other than through IdiotPol rants. It is perhaps emblematic that, unlike Harold Wilson sixty years ago, when Keir Starmer took over as Prime Minister after fourteen years of Tory rule, all he could offer was gloom, doom and more of the same. (I am increasingly wondering what the point of Starmer actually is.)

Something very interesting and largely unnoticed has taken place in the last fifty years. Up until the nineteenth century, western populations were largely conservative in mentality. (And again, I’m talking about ordinary people here.) The world around them changed slowly, economic growth was scarcely noticeable, and in general ordinary people were concerned with hanging on to what they had. Most social unrest, even violent revolts, was essentially conservative: the restoration of traditional privileges, the abolition of hated new taxes, the dismissal of corrupt or incompetent servants of the monarch. Popular feeling was largely against social and economic change (understandably, in the case of the factory system and the clearance of the countryside) and for a return to a better past. The few genuinely revolutionary or millennial movements of the time are sufficiently unusual that historians write books about them.

Urbanisation, minimal education and the destruction of old social systems changed this to a degree: it was the common people of Paris not the intellectuals, who triggered the Revolution, after all. Equally, the common people of the countryside reacted in horror to the Revolution and some rose in rebellion against it. But slowly, the idea got around that there was actually the possibility of progress. Workers in a factory who clubbed together could form a Union to demand better pay and conditions. Pressure could be put on governments to enlarge the franchise, or improve the generally terrible working conditions of ordinary people. And governments in Europe actually did respond: the nineteenth century was the Age of Reform, as schools were opened, sanitation was introduced, cities were cleaned up, more of the population was given the vote, and ordinary individuals acquired more rights at work, among many other things.

All these changes were welcomed by, and some were inspired by, the Left. In 1970, I remember the Trades Union Congress celebrated its centenary by putting out an illustrated book of its struggles and achievements. Many of the latter have since been undone, and the TUC is no longer a political force. But at that time, and for some years afterwards, left-wing parties were assumed to have history on their side, and it was taken for granted that as time went by, the agenda of the Left would be implemented more and more. The prevailing tendency of the Left at the time was the Social Democratic one; a kind of gradualism which thought that countries could be moved slowly and by persuasion in the direction of a more and more socialist system, and that existing power structures would eventually come round to the idea. This was no doubt why the novelist Evelyn Waugh complained that the British Conservative Party in his lifetime had not put the clock back even five minutes. For much of the twentieth century, this leftward drift seemed to be at least an arguable hypothesis.

Thus, looking back to the past was seen as an essentially right-wing, reactionary activity. True, there were maverick socialists, from William Morris to George Orwell, who believed that some traditions were important, but most had their eyes firmly fixed on the future, as their opponents had them firmly fixed on the past. Inevitably, the same qualified optimism found its way into popular culture, with its stories of space exploration, flying cars and time travel. But the writers and readers (of whom I was one) were not reading them as prophecy: I doubt if more than a handful of people really believed that they would live to take holidays on the moon, but of course that was not the point. Stories of space exploration were the mythology and legends of the technological era, expressing its dreams and fears in symbolic form, and novels of space exploration were no more prophecies of the future than the Odyssey is a reliable guide to visiting the islands of the Aegean.

Some time in the 1980s, this started to change. Ironically, though, the new political forces that slowly came to dominate the scene in different countries did not offer a return to an imagined past, but rather the way to a better future, by a different route. No right-wing party actually promised mass unemployment and poverty, the destruction of social systems, the offshoring of industry and the decline of public services. Rather, they promised that people could keep everything they had, and that the “greater efficiency” of “the market” would give them more than any left-wing government could.

And this argument was successful to a degree. The Conservative victory in 1979 was largely due to the defection of part of the younger working class, seduced by the idea of becoming property owners, and so acquiring, they thought, their own money machine. At that stage, the inevitable problems—such as houses rapidly becoming unaffordable for young people—were warned about, but not taken seriously, in the general excitement about new and wonderful ways of running the economy. The results of this new policy were so catastrophic —unemployment doubled in a year, for example—that the Conservatives would have been thrown out of office had the Labour Party not thoughtfully saved the situation by first disintegrating into internal warfare, and then splitting into two competing factions. The result was an unbroken series of Conservative governments for eighteen years. Yet it was clear there was no master-plan at work: privatisation, for example, which went on to conquer the world, was originally just a quick fix to raise some money; only later was a theoretical justification erected around it. This illustrates rather well a point that will recur in this essay: the conceptual framework of the last two hundred years is of change and advancement, and the assumption is that new ideas are always better and more effective than old ones.

Here, of course, the boot moved to the other foot, and began to generate a momentum of its own. New governments in power looked around and saw that other countries were shrinking the state, selling public assets etc. and moved along with the tide. (Politics is far more a reflection of fashion than most people realise.) Conversely, resisting change (how many of you have heard some dimwit management consultant intone “there’s always resistance to change”?) is always negatively encoded, and people don’t like being called “old-fashioned” or even “reactionary.” Because no system is ever perfect, those advocating change of any kind always have a rhetorical advantage, since, after all, what they are suggesting might make things better. At least, there’s no definite proof that it won’t. By contrast, defending the status quo, let alone the status quo ante, is much more rhetorically difficult.

Yet it seems to me that this is logically absurd. Until perhaps the 1980s, the changes that the Left was proposing—-widening the electoral franchise, for example, or increasing free access to education and healthcare—came out of a clear egalitarian and progressive project.. Not everybody supported these ideas, of course, but the arguments were at least relatively clear. As you would expect from the fussy, fiddly, process- and detail-obsessed Liberal ideology, though, most of the changes of the last thirty or forty years have been Bright Ideas, untestable or at least untested in advance, and which have wreaked havoc generally.

In the circumstances, it is entirely reasonable for the Left to be reactionary, in the sense that it reacts negatively to proposals or measures that will make life worse for ordinary people. It is also reasonable for the Left to be conservative, in the sense that it wishes to conserve the gains that ordinary people made in most countries between the 1940s and the 1980s. For that matter, it is entirely reasonable for the Left to look back with affection to a time when life for ordinary people was easier, and it was assumed this would continue. Of course it is fair to argue that this curious state of affairs only arose because the Left abandoned the interests of ordinary people, but that’s a different subject.

If I may be permitted a personal example, I was fortunate enough to benefit, from ten years’ more full-time, free education than my parents did. For some of the time I was even paid to study. I thought, and I still think, that such a system should have been conserved. (Today, I probably would have finished my education at eighteen.) It’s not hard to react negatively against the grotesque shambles that university education has now become, and to look back with, yes, a degree of nostalgia, on a system that functioned much better. Yet the neoliberal Party which dominates politics in most western countries, has taken over and adopted the discourse of continuous change, and uses it to disarm and neuter its critics. I can’t help recalling, to strike a frequent note once more, that the Party in 1984 had abolished history, apart from a highly distorted cartoon like series of received ideas that enabled the present situation, and any variant, of it, to be presented always as superior to the past. Indeed, Winston Smith wonders sometimes if his own memories of better times in his youth may actually be imaginary. (I’ll return to this point later.)

The Party’s policy takes a number of forms, all based around the curious proposition that any resistance of any kind to Change is at best reactionary and right-wing, at worse proof of actual or incipient fascism. (Bizarre when you consider that fascism called for radical change, and indeed practised it when in power.) In true Liberal fashion we are advancing towards an ever-better future, even if this advance may not be evident to everyone, and most of all we are advancing forward from the darkness and intolerance of the past. Now there is very seldom any attempt by the Party to support this argument by facts or statistics. Whereas governments in the past would boast about building houses, motorways, train lines or nuclear power stations, and whereas the level of unemployment, the rate of inflation or the strength of one’s national currency were discussed endlessly in the media, today’s governments say little about any of these things. Figures for unemployment and inflation have been so heavily massaged and so much revised downwards for decades now that I don’t think even most western governments take them seriously any more. Insofar as there is a debate at all, it’s over which programmes impacting ordinary people it will be necessary to cut to satisfy those who believe, against all the evidence, that the economics of a country and the economics of a family are identical to each other.

Thus, looking back at any evidence of a better past is coded as coming from the “Right” or even the “extreme Right,” thus de-legitimising any complaint about the situation today. This is bizarre, but is perhaps a necessary consequences of the Party’s and PMC’s policy of draining all substance from politics, and turning it into a technical struggle for power. We no longer have genuine political struggles between traditional forces of Left and Right, we have struggles for power and occasional attempts to challenge orthodoxy. These challenges are dismissed by the Party as coming from the “extreme Right” or “the hard Right” or the “ultra Right” or some other tiresome formula, not because they do, or because those terms any longer have meaning, but because it is politically effective to use such insults, as it was once politically effective to dismiss ideas you didn’t like as “Communism.”

This has led PMC-adjacent pundits and journalists into hopeless confusion. If certain ideas, or even certain subjects, are labelled “extreme Right” etc. because they displease the Party, rather than because they are part of any coherent dogma, then manifestly it’s impossible to write anything sensible about politics and politicians, even if that were the intention. So the new government in France apparently represents a “lurch to the extreme Right”, because Barnier has said that the control of immigration needs to be improved. I’ve seen journalists earnestly trying to decide whether Sahra Wagenknecht and her party are of the Left (or even “extreme Left”) or actually of the “extreme Right,” because of the priorities she has set out. Such people are incapable of understanding that any party that addresses popular concerns will inevitably trip some of the artificial snares set up by the Party to trap “extreme Right” ideas.

In the end, of course, this policy is self-defeating, because it turns the legitimate concerns of ordinary people into ideological crimes. In the case of immigration, which has unfortunately become the touchstone for seeking out the “extreme Right,” the Party seeks to prevent even mention of the issue, except in the blandest and most happy-clappy sense. To wish to talk about the problems of immigration is to identify yourself as of the “extreme Right,” and to even to suggest that it perhaps deserves discussion is to “legitimise” the “extreme Right’s” positions.

This can’t go on, because it involves rejecting the lived experience of ordinary people as though it did not exist and doesn’t matter. Thus, a female student was raped and murdered outside the prestigious Université Dauphine in Paris a week ago: the presumed murderer, a Moroccan immigrant with previous convictions for rape, had been served with an official order to leave the country, but in the interim had been freed from custody by a judge. The media, which briefly covered the issue, was mainly worried that the (understandable) protests of female students at the University might be “instrumentalised by the extreme Right.” And here comes the wicked witch of the Green Party, Sabine Rousseau, to assure us in a tweet that it’s all right really, because if the individual had been sent back to Morocco, he would have murdered someone truly innocent, like a Moroccan woman.

As I say, it can’t go on. As a matter of practical politics, you cannot label perhaps three quarters of the population, estranged from the policies and practices of successive governments, as “extreme Right” or at best “playing the game of the extreme Right” and seriously hope to stay in power. Yet this is what a whole series of French politicians have done, for example. Macron has railed for years against the”recalcitrant Gauls” of the country he represents for not getting on board with his neoliberal plans, while Mélenchon has publicly dismissed all French people except immigrants and young progressives as, wait for it, “the extreme Right” and does not seek their votes. It’s a recipe for political suicide, and we see the results now in various countries, most recently in Austria. Indeed, the more opposition is provoked by the Party, the more the dreaded “extreme Right” actually grows in size, since it is an auto-creation of the Party itself.

But what is it makes politicians act in this way, and why do pundits and the media cheer them on? What’s wrong with a little continuity? What’s wrong with policies that benefit ordinary people? Indeed, what’s wrong with listening to their concerns?

We have to bear in mind that Liberalism is a teleological belief, with a strong eschatological component. That is to say it moves ever forward towards some future goal, when the righteous shall be saved and the evil-doers punished. Liberalism is, of course, a Christian heresy, where The Market has taken the place of the Grace of God which passeth all understanding. Thus, apparent contradictions and apparent negative effects will all be put right by the magical hand of The Market, given enough time. This, more than anything else, accounts for the violence and the moral fervour with which competing ideologies are denounced, and even of dialogue or debate itself. The problem, inevitably, is that Liberalism isn’t based on any coherent set of principles or beliefs, so instead, we have a series of competing and often mutually detesting groupuscules all seeking greater freedom and power for themselves, and trying to secure their share of funding and media attention.

Any party which aims at change will inevitably produce splinter-groups and radical fringes seeking faster change here, or more emphasis there. This happened in the 60s and 70s with Marxist groups: you may remember the joke about the Marxist party that claimed “there is no-one to the Left of us,” only for a splinter-group to claim the next day “there is now!” But in fact it applies to any group that seeks change, including groups of the (actual) extreme Right. By an almost mechanical process of escalation, groups form to demand a more radical stance, only to be eclipsed by others demanding a stance even more radical. Whatever change is brought about simply provokes the demand for more of it. There are, after all, grants and jobs and media coverage to ensure. Liberalism is like a bicycle: if you stop peddling in the direction of a more perfect society, you fall off.

And this is why the traditional Left (where I number myself) has such problems with the extreme neoliberal collection of lobby-groups that the traditional parties of the Left have somehow contorted themselves into

By definition, Socialism—the Left’s ideology—is about the collective. It’s about the community, the workplace, even the family and extended family, not the interests of the individual against other individuals. It’s not about “opportunity” except in the sense of removing artificial barriers, but about actually doing things and supplying communities with what they want and need. Yet the best that parties which were once of the “Left” have been able to do is to market themselves as being slightly less nasty than the opposition: a kinder, gentler form of neoliberal exploitation. The Left has always understood that in a good and fair society individuals flourish, but that no amount of individual flourishing will make a society good and fair.

It’s therefore instructive to go back to the 60s and 70s to see how governments (including some not even of the Left) handled difficult social issues, by moving from general principles to the particular case, rather than the other way round. Thus, most western governments introduced legislation to outlaw overt racial discrimination and to make it illegal for women to be paid less than men for the same job. This was not the doing of pressure groups, but the result of a consensus that a modern society could no longer permit these things to happen. Likewise, abortion was decriminalised in a number of countries in the same era, and again this was a collective social judgement, not the result of lobbying. In Britain the decision was largely uncontroversial (though some women’s groups continued to fight it into the 1970s) because it was accepted that, with modern contraception, and with modern medical technology, abortions would inevitably be few and safe. The same argument essentially applied to the decriminalisation of homosexuality, where it was felt that a modern society really should be more tolerant of minority sexual preferences.

What these and similar changes had in common was an approach based on consensus and a willingness to look at the facts and the evidence. Of course, no changes of this sort were without controversy, or the use of controversies for political advantage, but in no case either did the controversy last long. By contrast, because much of the Liberal agenda proceeds from a priori assumptions that often contradict each other but are nonetheless held to be self-evident, and because Liberalism knows no greater good than the perfect economic and social freedom of the individual, then debate, reflection and evaluation are excluded: indeed, they are dangerous, and could be used by the extreme Right. I see that some American universities are now openly against debate, which is understandable given that few of the IdiotPol priorities of our day would survive rational examination.

Thus the agenda of the Party, insofar as it has one, is essentially random and irrational, the product of the strength and funding of various competing lobby groups. 

It is scarcely surprising that the electorates of various countries are rebelling against governments who neglect their interests, but seek to enforce an incoherent and often contradictory agenda of continual normative change, without any argument other than power and the ability to demonise any opposition. Indeed, the “extreme Right” tactic has now reached the stage of self-parody and is, I believe, even starting to unravel. If one is not allowed to mention the issues that ordinary people think are important in their lives because the very mention of them “legitimates the extreme Right” or some such nonsense, if pronouncing the words “society” or “immigration” conjures up diabolical forces, as in the theatre no-one pronounces the name of Shakespeare’s “Scottish Play,” then in effect the political system has terminally lost touch with the very people it purports to represent. People are growing wearier and wearier of this tactic, as they find a greater and greater proportion of their lives subject to an omertà. It’s now clear that we have met Their Enemy, and Their Enemy turns out to be Us. That’s a thought.

The escalation effect I mentioned above has no “off” switch, so the various interest groups within the Party are obliged to offer more and more radical proposals to get attention and secure funding, and so increase their power and influence relative to other groups. (By definition, the interests of ordinary people cannot be taken into account.) In the longer term, of course, this system is hopelessly negative and destructive, which is why it will come apart. Imagine, if you will, a sweating Outer Party functionary—a blogger, or minor journalist or parliamentarian with a fragile majority—waking up one morning to find that a better-known figure has just tweeted that schools ought to be legally obliged to have at least one transexual teacher. How to respond? How much power does this person have? Who has declared themselves in favour? How are opponents being characterised? Can I get by without making a comment? Needless to say, the merits of the idea are not the point: the point is to safeguard yourself from criticism, or even from losing your job.

In effect, an entire discourse and system of thought has been hijacked here. For a long time, the Left saw itself making incremental achievements to improve the lives of ordinary people, so it was legitimate to suggest that more modern was better. This wasn’t a transcendental truth, but a pragmatic judgement. But over the last generation or so, the concept of “modern” has morphed, or been twisted into, just “recent.” So Modernism has become just Recentism, the reflexive deference to whatever has just emerged. Conversely, the refusal to defer to ideas and behaviour that are Recent is now dismissed as a sign of, you’ve guessed it, the “extreme Right.”

Just think for a moment. Are the political or philosophical ideas of today “modern” in any sense, or are they just Recent? Indeed where are the significant political thinkers and philosophers? To the extent that there are any, they don’t work for the Party. And what about Culture? Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, considered a key Modernist work, was premiered over a century ago. Olivier Messiaen died more than thirty years ago, and most of his famous compositions belong to the thirties and forties of the last century. How is recent orchestral and chamber music more “modern” than either? Has it developed at all? Arguably not, and indeed the really interesting new recordings today are of little-known works from the past or the recovery of more music from the Middle Ages up to the Baroque era, neither of which is Recent, but some of which is distinctly Modern. Come to that, western popular music is still feeding off the modernist developments of the sixties and early seventies. And in literature, well, Ulysses and The Waste Land were published a century ago, Céline and Virginia Woolf wrote in the interwar years, the Nouveau Roman and Oulipo belong essentially to the sixties. And there’s nothing more transient and unmemorable than a “contemporary” reworking of Shakespeare. A torrent of new art appears every year, and much of it wins prizes, but it’s a long time since it looked more “modern” than whatever emerged the preceding year, or even decade. It’s a pity, since genuine innovation and modernism would be welcome, but there we are.

In the circumstances, a reaction against endless Recentism seems entirely reasonable. Once we realise that neoliberalism has hijacked the historical leftist discourse of incremental progress to help de-legititmise its critics, then things become clearer.
 It is entirely reasonable also to look back and conclude that in the past things were done better. Unless you find mass unemployment and mass poverty attractive, unless free education and free healthcare are unappealing to you, unless you find alienation and social breakdown enticing, unless you believe that it was sensible to export manufacturing industry and to build an economy based on financial services and pizza delivery, then you are bound to accept, albeit grudgingly, that things were better organised fifty years ago than they are now. Indeed, the world then was probably more “modern” than ours is, for any value of “modern” that makes sense. And of course a world further developed along the same principles would be very different from the one we have.

PMC critics have tried various tactics. At the beginning it was the Promised Land of the Market. That was abandoned in favour of Inevitable and Irresistible Change, which was falsified by glancing at other countries going in the other direction. Now, the best they can do is to encode the sense of missing positive things from the past as the influence of (sigh) the “extreme Right.” The problem is that the Party has nothing tangible to offer in opposition. For a while all the talk was of a “more tolerant” society, but that didn’t work, and it’s recently been decided that tolerance is actually not a virtue at all. So apart from hand-waving and mumbling about norms and values, all the Party can do is to demonise the past. To listen to some people who were not alive then, you would imagine that in the sixties and seventies immigrants were periodically lynched in the street, homosexuals were locked up in special camps, and women were chained to the kitchen sink rather than being allowed self-fulfilment through working shifts at a supermarket checkout. But it’s not hard to conclude that a society where a return to the mass unemployment and poverty of the ‘thirties was considered unacceptable was actually a better society than the one we have today.

Ironically, there are a number of political forces that actually are being strengthened by all this nonsense. One, probably, is the actual extreme Right. The Party desperately wants to conjure this tendency into existence, but it won’t like the consequences. Try “fighting” the genuine extreme Right, and you’ll get badly hurt. The other is the traditional moderate Right, which in many countries was pronounced dead, but is showing signs of recovery. In France, for example, there’s a clear centre-Right majority in the country and in Parliament, and we are seeing the effects in the appointment of the Barnier government and in the choice of the traditionalist Bruno Retailleau as Interior Minister. The Catholic Church and the part of the Right that identifies with it has picked up support in recent years as well. Partly this was the law on homosexual marriage, which dynamised the Catholic Right in a way that hadn’t been seen in generations, and partly the increasing tolerance of Muslim religious interference in the secular state, which has made some highly-conservative Catholics reflect that two can play at that game.

I have thought for some time now that the genuine Left is standing in front of an open goal. All it has to do is kick the ball in. A Left that showed it was receptive to the concerns of ordinary people would be poised to sweep into power, but this would require a reconsideration of thirty years or more of anticipatory cringes. Parties of the Left were so befuddled by Recentist political ideas that they thought that their occasional victories were because they had adopted these ideas, not that the electorate had rejected the neoliberal policies that resulted from them. The predicament of Starmer in the UK is absolutely emblematic: elected as a result of widespread disgust with the Tories, his own party has no idea what to do other than imitate them while trying to look a little less nasty.

Demonising the concerns of ordinary people as being “extreme Right” cannot work in the longer term, and will simply increase populist feeling to the point where it becomes unmanageable. I have said before, and I repeat, that those who make populism of the Left impossible will make populism of the Right inevitable. I doubt one in a thousand of those currently finding the “extreme Right” under every stone have any idea what that would mean.