Climate Scientists Steffen and Knorr defend Franzen's position

Fact Checking the Climate Crisis: Franzen vs. Facebook on False New. Wolfgang Knorr and Will Steffen. Feb. 19, 2020.

Critique of Climate Feedback fact checking exercise of an article by the writer Jonathan Franzen in the New Yorker, published September 8, 2019, by leading climate scientists Wolfgang Knorr and Will Steffen. 

Fact Checking the Climate Crisis: Franzen vs. Facebook on False News

Last year, the writer Jonathan Franzen, not known for mincing his words, took up an opportunity offered by the New Yorker to bring his very own perspective to the debate about the impending climate crisis. The headline read: What If We Stopped Pretending? The climate apocalypse is coming. To prepare for it, we need to admit that we can’t prevent it.

You would think that this was just another opinion piece on the climate catastrophe, this time by a writer from whom you would not expect new insights about the climate system, but maybe some other truths related to the general human predicament. If you happened to be a social media user, however, you might be in for some surprise. On February 15th, the moderators of the Facebook group Positive Deep Adaptation received a “partly false information” warning about Franzen’s New Yorker article having been posted in their group. The warning explicitly referred to an article by the fact checking site Climate Feedback (see image 1). Following considerable political pressure, fact checkers are now routinely used by social media sites to prevent the spread of “false news”. Sanctions for repeat offenders include reducing visibility for the group or site, or removing the ability to earn income.

This gives Climate Feedback’s verdict considerable weight. In this article, we will review the fact checking exercise itself, in order to see if the matter has been handled with the necessary care and level of responsibility. According to their web site Climate Feedback is a worldwide network of scientists sorting fact from fiction in climate change media coverage. As senior climate scientists, our goal is to help readers know which news to trust.

Fact checking the fact checkers

The first thing we noticed was that from the headline and the information below it, it was not possible to tell the exact claim that was being assessed. While the headline read “2°C is not known to be a ‘point of no return’, as Jonathan Franzen claims”, the actual claim by Franzen stated further down was “The consensus among scientists and policy-makers is that we’ll pass this point of no return if the global mean temperature rises by more than two degrees Celsius.” What was left out is some text that in the original article follows immediately after and is therefore an integral part of the claim made by Franzen: “(maybe a little more, but also maybe a little less)”. The verdict: incorrect.

There is an important distinction here: is the claim being reviewed that there is a consensus – which Climate Feedback easily refute because none of the scientist reviewers seems to subscribe to this supposed consensus – or is it rather about the existence of a supposed “point of no return”? In the following, we will discuss both possibilities.

Contrary to the claim by Climate Feedback, and the entire point made by the last reviewer, Marcus Fontela, there is indeed a scientific basis for Franzen’s article, even though he vastly overrates the degree of consensus or the level of scientific understanding of such a hypothesis.

All scientist reviewers – except for one who did not provide references at all – referred to an article led by one of us: Steffen and co-workers (2018) Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene1. It appears that the reviewers correctly identified the source of Franzen’s “point of no return”. The article in question hypothesizes the existence of mutually reinforcing tipping points, or positive feedback mechanisms, in the earth’s climate system. It does not provide definite proof of the existence of such a “tipping cascade”, nor does it say they will all suddenly happen when 2°C of warming is reached, but rather sketches out a plausible scenario. It also provides estimates for the degree of warming required for tipping to be triggered. “Tipping” here means irreversible changes that a return to a lower degree of warming will not be able to stop – or “point of no return”. According to our understanding, the following tipping elements might be affected at 2°C of warming:

1. West Antarctic Ice Sheet – likely tipped (i.e. irreversibly on the pathway to eventual collapse)2
2. Coral reefs – likely tipped (wide-spread destruction from heat stress and ocean acidification)
3. Arctic sea ice cover – likely tipped (irreversible situation arises from increasing heat provided by the darker ocean surface as summer ice disappears)4
4. Amazon rainforest - likely tipped taking into account current rates of human deforestation (i.e. the loss of forest itself decreases regional precipitation rates, thus increasing the overall reduction in rainfall, further influenced by a weakening AMOC – see next point)5,6
5. Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC, the ocean current that brings warm waters to western Europe) – probably not tipped, but significantly weakened7
6. Permafrost carbon stores – probably not tipped, but significant carbon emissions.3

The Special Report on 1.5°C Warming3 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also backs up Franzen’s claim – to some degree. The IPCC assessed the probability of “large-scale singular events” at 2°C of warming and gave a rating of "moderate to high" (Summary for Policymakers, Figure 2). And a recent commentary in the journal Nature by Tim Lenton and co-workers8 shows evidence that some of those tipping elements may have already been activated.

Another point of potential confusion is that the reviewers do not provide a clear definition of what they believe was meant by “point of no return”. They only suggest that Franzen was talking about a sharp boundary at 2°C warming, for example Patrick Brown: “[...] There was never a scientific consensus that 2.0°C represented some well-defined bright line where impacts suddenly became much worse or feedbacks suddenly became completely self-perpetuating.” Franzen does indeed talk about one point being crossed, but it is not clear if he means a sharp and clearly defined boundary, or rather that somewhere around 2°C a tipping cascade will be triggered. And if a tipping cascade exists, then it will be triggered at a single point, so by definition there would have to be a clearly defined point of transition. It is only questionable if it could be characterised simply by degrees of warming. We must also note that Brown’s 2.0°C “bright line” is a rhetorical ploy designed to ridicule the author’s scientific understanding, where Franzen in fact concedes that his “point” may not be reached at exactly 2°C.

A charge repeated by several reviewers is that Franzen does not understand how climate models work. In fact, Amber Kerr and Charles Koven seem to base their criticism entirely on modelling results. This must be a clear misunderstanding: neither does the New Yorker article refer anywhere to computer modelling, nor has it ever been claimed that it was possible to reliably model tipping cascades. Instead, it is the reviewers who display a remarkable lack of apprehension for the limitations of modelling. For example when Amber Kerr writes: “He says that ‘As a non-scientist, I do my own kind of modelling,’ but he seems to be unaware that scientists have already carried out many qualitative and quantitative climate risk assessments, using policy changes and human behavior as variables.” But even the supporters of such models stress their limitations, while others argue that they are entirely unsuitable for the job. 

The most serious criticism brought forwards by the reviewers is that of Franzen’s fatalism, when he claims “that additional warming over 2°C doesn’t matter” (Amber Kerr). This is a criticism we share. We note, however, that Franzen's apparent misinterpretation of the science is based on a gross overstatement of scientific certainty, which is interesting given the reviewers’ own faith in modelling results. As climate scientists having worked with and developed computer models we rather share Franzen’s pessimism about what models can achieve. For very similar reasons, other scientists who have worked specifically on the possibility of catastrophic climate change have based their conclusions mostly on evidence from past climates, using only minimal modelling9.

The most balanced and objective review, in our opinion, is the one by Alexis Berg, whose main point is the speculative nature of the tipping cascade scenario. He is also more honest and cautious when referring to modeling (italics included by the authors): “Climate model simulations, for instance, which do include some of these feedbacks, do not suggest runaway climate change beyond 2°C.” It is true that the article by Steffen and co-workers is “intended to highlight [...] the high side of the risk distribution”. Franzen seems indeed to have ignored that he has based his whole essay on a hypothesis that was just that – a hypothesis and a warning of what could happen if we continue on the current path.

One more important question that the reviewers, and possibly Climate Feedback in general, should address is whether statements that are inherently about the future can even be fact checked. It is true that the review mostly talks about our current understanding of the climate system. But the event this refers to is in the future. We have therefore no way of empirically either proving or refuting the hypothesis of a discontinuity in the climate system. Hence the repeated reference of the reviewers to model results. What they don’t seem to realise, however, is that models are themselves nothing else than codified hypotheses.

Our recommendation

We believe that this New Yorker article – classified as a “cultural commentary” – should never have been fact checked in the first place. Other authors should of course be free to criticise it, as they have done repeatedly. But at the very least Climate Feedbacks should have clearly stated that the fact checking exercise does not concern the possibility of a tipping cascade being triggered – which can be neither proven nor refuted – but only the level of scientific consensus. For such cases, Climate Feedbacks’ methods provide for a set of well-defined categories that should be stated in the details section of the overall verdict:

Overstates scientific confidence: Presents a conclusion as conclusive while the hypothesis is still being investigated and there remains genuine scientific uncertainty about it.

We would have agreed with such a verdict. Instead, the details provided characterise Franzen’s article as “Misleading: While positive feedbacks exist that amplify temperature changes, scientists have not identified a ‘point of no return’ at 2°C.” 

This overall verdict is itself incorrect, or at least seriously misleading. Scientists have indeed identified the likelihood of such a point of no return, even though it is unlikely the point exists at a sharply defined temperature threshold. Identification does not imply there to be a definite, or even a strong scientific proof. And the overall presentation of the verdict is itself misleading for several reasons: it blatantly omits the final part of the sentence being criticised where the author concedes that he does not believe in a definite threshold value, the rhetorical use of “2.0°C”, the reference to climate models and the claim the author does not understand them, while creating the impression the reviewers don’t understand them either, and the lack of understanding that it is not possible to fact check assertions about the future.

In fact, if one is to “fact check” statements about the future, then the criterion for judgment should be whether there is enough credible evidence – be it from paleo studies, observational evidence, modelling results or, more appropriately, a synthesis of all such types of information – to make a well-reasoned case that the statement represents a plausible future. In other words, when dealing with future risks and events in general, the emphasis should be on whether or not the statement presents a plausible risk assessment rather than a “scientific fact”.

The elephant in the room

What most scientists commenting on his piece did not seem to have noticed is the value of Franzen’s article in naming the elephant in the room: that while emissions keep on rising inexorably, no political action even remotely strong enough to address the problem can be seen anywhere on the horizon. Let us listen to his words here:

As a non-scientist, I do my own kind of modelling. I run various future scenarios through my brain, apply the constraints of human psychology and political reality, take note of the relentless rise in global energy consumption [...], and count the scenarios in which collective action averts catastrophe. [...]

Vast sums of government money must be spent without wasting it and without lining the wrong pockets. Here it’s useful to recall the Kafkaesque joke of the European Union’s biofuel mandate, which served to accelerate the deforestation of Indonesia for palm-oil plantations, and the American subsidy of ethanol fuel, which turned out to benefit no one but corn farmers.

Anyone with even the faintest inkling of today’s political reality will agree that it is irrelevant whether we can still prevent major disruptions of the climate system in theory10, when the heads of state of the largest economy and of the country home to the largest tract of rainforest are outspoken climate change deniers. Needless to say, the so-called integrated assessment models used by the IPCC to run various scenarios contain no concept whatsoever of politics.

Fact checking and difficult truths

Our own view of the situation is somewhat different from Fanzen’s – it does not matter at precisely which level of warming tipping points will be reached, but it does matter how much planetary heating we will generate. As long as there is enough carbon11 contained in fossil-fuel reserves to triple even the current already high amounts of atmospheric CO2, and with no mechanism in sight that could guarantee us an end to fossil-fuel extraction, sooner or later the degree of global heating will reach a critical threshold that leads to major disruptions to human society. The question of whether it is already too late is not one that depends so much on the climate system, but on the ability of human society to rapidly change course. Most scientists, policy makers and even activists seem to tend towards optimism. Franzen disagrees, and we believe scientists should at least listen. 

Difficult truths are always hard to deal with, especially when they concern one’s own and all of humanity’s survival. Even if there was a sliver of truth in Franzen’s message, it would be a cause for great concern and anxiety. Since no scientist so far has said what Franzen does here, that it might not only be time to panic, but already too late, the predictable reaction of professional climate researchers has been almost universally negative. Someone known for his provocative writing style was treading on their turf!

We believe that fact checking is not a helpful approach to improve the debate about the climate crisis. It is not helpful when we need to confront a difficult truth that many, including scientists, find difficult to accept. It is also not helpful, because it supports a mistaken view of the sciences as being foremost about hard facts, and not about interpretation, debate, truth seeking and philosophical attitudes. And even more importantly – as George Marshall has amply demonstrated in his book “Don’t Even Talk about It” – opinions in the climate debate are very rarely swayed by facts. But users of social media have the right to know the position of the scientific community with respect to assertions made on matters of climate science. A much more helpful approach would be to offer this view in the form of reviews, critiques or other forms of essay, as it is done traditionally in the print media. Rather than being sent warnings with a threat of sanctions for repeat-offenders, publishers on social media could be required in certain cases to provide a suitable link so that the reader is helped to form his own opinion. In the case of the Franzen article, a simple disclaimer that his view of the climate system is seen as a low-probability but plausible scenario would surely have been appreciated. The climate crisis requires us to build bridges and not to exclude certain groups from the debate. 

Publisher's notes: 

On February 20th 2020 the "false news" warning is no longer showing on the admin panel of Positive Deep Adaptation facebook group. We will send this article to Facebook, Climate Feedback and the New Yorker for information and advice. 

An interview with the co-author of this article, climate scientist Dr Wolfgang Knorr, goes in to more detail about how climate scientists might often mislead audiences through typical modes of communication. An article by IFLAS founder explores the extent to which assumptions about social psychology underpin the motivations and arguments of scientists and activists to criticise people for publically considering the implications of worst case scenarios. 

Co-author of this article, climate scientist Dr Will Steffen recently called for more research, dialogue and action on the possibilities of societal breakdown or collapse due to climate impacts. 

Last year IFLAS released a compendium of recent research that indicates the worst case scenarios for societal disruption from climate change are now increasingly likely. This was produced by Professor Jem Bendell, the initiator of the deep adaptation framework to climate change response. To discuss the issues arising from this article and issue, consider the Narratives and Messaging group on the Deep Adaptation Forum.

References
1 Steffen, W., J. Rockström, K. Richardson, T. M. Lenton, C. Folke, D. Liverman, C. P. Summerhayes, A. D. Barnosky, S. E. Cornell, and M. Crucifix (2018), Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(33), 8252-8259. (link)
2 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (IPCC, 2019). (link)
3 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). (link)
4 Drijfhout, S., S. Bathiany, C. Beaulieu, V. Brovkin, M. Claussen, C. Huntingford, M. Scheffer, G. Sgubin, and D. Swingedouw (2015), Catalogue of abrupt shifts in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate models, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(43), E5777-E5786. (link)
5Lovejoy, T. E. A., and C. Nobre (2018), Amazon tipping point, Science Advances, 4(2), eaat2340. (link)
6 Brayshaw, D. J., T. Woollings, and M. Vellinga (2009), Tropical and extratropical responses of the North Atlantic atmospheric circulation to a sustained weakening of the MOC, J. Clim., 22(11), 3146-3155. (link)
7 Caesar, L., S. Rahmstorf, A. Robinson, G. Feulner, and V. Saba (2018), Observed fingerprint of a weakening Atlantic Ocean overturning circulation, Nature, 556(7700), 191-196. (link)
8 Lenton, T. M., J. Rockström, O. Gaffney, S. Rahmstorf, K. Richardson, W. Steffen, and H. J. Schellnhuber (2019), Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against, Nature, 575, 592-595. (link)
9 Hansen, J., M. Sato, G. Russell, and P. Kharecha (2013), Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 371, 20120294. (link)
10 Anderson, K. (2015). Duality in climate science. Nature Geoscience, 8, 898-900. (link)
11 Global Energy Assessment (2012), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. (link)

Climate Links June 2020

This is scary-ridiculous and ridiculous-scary: 45C!... in the Arctic circle!

Many air Thermometer records have recently been broken in #Siberia. On 19 June Land Surface Temperature (LST) reached 45°C at several locations in the #Arctic Circle

Why scary? As Prof Nick Cowern says: This is the land of permafrost, trapped CO2 and methane.

Observed temperature anomaly (from GISSTEMP) over June 2019 - May 2020 vs projected average temperature anomaly from 34 CMIP6 climate models over 2016-2025 using the worse scenario ssp585. Unfortunately observations confirm the worse[case] IPCC projections...

Just a reminder: CMIP-6 models have higher climate sensitivity than the previous one

Why it’s so damn hot in the Arctic right now

The Ticking Time Bomb of Arctic Permafrost

Uncertainties in Climate and Weather Extremes Increase the Cost of Carbon

Kevin Anderson et al: A factor of two: how the mitigation plans of ‘climate progressive’ nations fall far short of Paris-compliant pathways

The Paris Agreement establishes an international covenant to reduce emissions in line with holding the increase in temperature to ‘well below 2°C … and to pursue … 1.5°C.’ Global modelling studies have repeatedly concluded that such commitments can be delivered through technocratic adjustments to contemporary society, principally price mechanisms driving technical change. However, as emissions have continued to rise, so these models have come to increasingly rely on the extensive deployment of highly speculative negative emissions technologies (NETs). Moreover, in determining the mitigation challenges for industrialized nations, scant regard is paid to the language and spirit of equity enshrined in the Paris Agreement. If, instead, the mitigation agenda of ‘developed country Parties’ is determined without reliance on planetary scale NETs and with genuine regard for equity and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, the necessary rates of mitigation increase markedly. This is evident even when considering the UK and Sweden, two nations at the forefront of developing ‘progressive’ climate change legislation and with clear emissions pathways and/or quantitative carbon budgets. In both cases, the carbon budgets underpinning mitigation policy are halved, the immediate mitigation rate is increased to over 10% per annum, and the time to deliver a fully decarbonized energy system is brought forward to 2035-40. Such a challenging mitigation agenda implies profound changes to many facets of industrialized economies. This conclusion is not drawn from political ideology, but rather is a direct consequence of the international community’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and the small and rapidly dwindling global carbon budget.

Key Policy Insights

• Without a belief in the successful deployment of planetary scale negative emissions technologies, double-digit annual mitigation rates are required of developed countries, from 2020, if they are to align their policies with the Paris Agreement’s temperature commitments and principles of equity.
• Paris-compliant carbon budgets for developed countries imply full decarbonization of energy by 2035-40, necessitating a scale of change in physical infrastructure reminiscent of the post-Second World War Marshall Plan. This brings issues of values, measures of prosperity and socio-economic inequality to the fore.
• The stringency of Paris-compliant pathways severely limits the opportunity for inter-sectoral emissions trading. Consequently aviation, as with all sectors, will need to identify policies to reduce emissions to zero, directly or through the use of zero carbon fuels.

MIT: Study: Reflecting sunlight to cool the planet will cause other global changes

“This work highlights that solar geoengineering is not reversing climate change, but is substituting one unprecedented climate state for another,” Gertler says. “Reflecting sunlight isn’t a perfect counterbalance to the greenhouse effect.”

Adds O’Gorman: “There are multiple reasons to avoid doing this, and instead to favor reducing emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.”

Steve Keen video: Thermodynamics 2.0 keynote: Macroeconomics, Minsky, & fraud in Neoclassical climate change economics

The conference organizers state that Thermodynamics 2.0 is about the "bisociation of thermodynamics with other academic disciplines such as physics, biology, sociology, economics... It is about merging two cultures, not just bridging the gap."

I argue proper scientific methods should take economics over, not merge with what is currently there.  I show that macroeconomics doesn't need microeconomics, illustrate modeling both financial dynamics and pandemics using the Minsky system dynamics software, & expose the appallingly bad work of Neoclassical climate change economists.

Past production constrains current energy demands: persistent scaling in global energy consumption and implications for climate change mitigation

Climate change has become intertwined with the global economy. Here, we describe the importance of inertia to continued growth in energy consumption. Drawing from thermodynamic arguments, and using 38 years of available statistics between 1980 to 2017, we find a persistent time-independent scaling between the historical time integral W of world inflation-adjusted economic production Y, or W(t)=∫t0Y(t′)dt′, and current rates of world primary energy consumption E, such that λ=E/W=5.9±0.1 Gigawatts per trillion 2010 US dollars. This empirical result implies that population expansion is a symptom rather than a cause of the current exponential rise in E and carbon dioxide emissions C, and that it is past innovation of economic production efficiency Y/E that has been the primary driver of growth, at predicted rates that agree well with data. Options for stabilizing C are then limited to rapid decarbonization of E through sustained implementation of over one Gigawatt of renewable or nuclear power capacity per day. Alternatively, assuming continued reliance on fossil fuels, civilization could shift to a steady-state economy that devotes economic production exclusively to maintenance rather than expansion. If this were instituted immediately, continual energy consumption would still be required, so atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations would not balance natural sinks until concentrations exceeded 500 ppmv, and double pre-industrial levels if the steady-state was attained by 2030.

'Humans are not prepared to protect nature'. DW.com. June 23, 3030.
Why do we find it so hard to change our behavior? German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk explains how this is connected to the climate crisis.


Peter Sloterdijk describes change as the modern name for something that classical philosophy called becoming, because everything that is, is not given in stable, everlasting forms but has to become what it is. He says modernity is all about interfering with this process of becoming, and putting it or pushing it into a direction that fits better with human purposes.

DW: So we are always changing then?

Peter Sloterdijk: Yes. Nature as such is a self-changing entity. And all we can do is — as it were — keep riding on the wave of change.

As we look to the future and that wave gets bigger and bigger with regard to the danger of climate change, there are some big changes that we have to make as a species. And it seems at the moment we're not able to make them. Why?

Human beings are not prepared to protect nature in any sense. Because in all our history as a species, our deepest conviction always was that we are the ones who have to be protected by the powers of nature. And we are not really prepared for this inversion. Just as a baby cannot carry his or her mother, human beings are not prepared — or not able — to carry nature. They must learn to deal with this immensity. This is a huge challenge because there is no longer the classical excuse that we are too little or too small in order to deal with such immensities.

Not prepared, or not willing to protect nature?

Is it a narcissism that is preventing it? What is the problem?

I sense the problem is one of scale. We are almost physiologically unable to add up the results of our own behavior — to cosmic consequences. We are deeply convinced that all we do could and should be forgiven. From an ecological point of view, we are living in a period of time of lost innocence.

Read more: Am I a narcissist?

Have I understood you correctly that on a planetary scale, we're all looking for a sense of forgiveness? That we want to purge ourselves of what we've done?

And there will be lots of sins to be forgiven. And the more we understand that the higher the likelihood that one day we will develop patterns of behavior to cope with the new situation.

One of the questions we've been thinking about in this interview series is the idea of comparing the two crises. Our response to the pandemic was immediate, almost unbelievably fast and unified. And then our response to the climate crisis seems to be stymied or stalled. Is there any way to look at these two forms of crisis in a similar light?

What our response to the coronavirus is proving is that the globalization through media is an almost accomplished project. The world as a whole is more or less synchronized and pulls together into one hothouse for contagious news. The infection by information is as strong, even stronger, than the infection by the virus. And so we have two pandemics at the same time: one, a pandemic of fear, and the other of real contagion.


Coronavirus has dominated headlines for months

You say that modernity has stopped us from becoming who we are. Can we change who we are?

Yeah. So I do not think that we can change our DNA simply by changing our thoughts. But we can change the grammar of our behavior. And that is what the 21st century will teach to the global community…

What does that mean to change the grammar of our being?

Not of our being, but behavior. The grammar of our behavior.

What is that?

Everything we do adheres to a structure — similar to a language. And acting is something that is ruled by hidden structures, such as every sentence we produce is ruled by grammar and lexicon. And I think that we are still uneasy on the level of lexical change. So we are now learning new terms, a new vocabulary, but, by and by, we shall also learn a new grammar.

Read more: Disinformation and propaganda during the coronavirus pandemic

So we're in the process of putting the building blocks of language together. Do you think we'll be able to speak before the destruction written on the wall comes true?

What I have found especially impressive in the behavior of the masses during this crisis is the incredible docility with which vast parts of the population in the West — as in the East — were ready to obey the new rules of precaution and distance. These are already new elements of a different social grammar.

Read more: Rutger Bregman: 'The virus is contagious, and so is our behavior'

But that can also be quite scary, right? That we in a matter of weeks were able to give up very basic freedoms…

Oh yes. At the same time, it shows that we must not underestimate the plasticity of the human element. But who knows how long this patient behavior will last. I think we should continue our reflections in one year or so. I would be surprised if you are not a little bit more intelligent.

According to Sloterdijk, we are already witnessing elements of a new social grammar

Thinking about the human element, has our response to the coronavirus — something none of us has really encountered before — changed your outlook on humanity in any way?

Yes and no. Certainly, I'm as surprised as many contemporaries are. But at the same time, it also confirms something I have been developing for decades on a theoretical level. What I mean is that it confirms my assumption that the human race has reached a situation of synchronicity on the basis of a stream of information. We really are globally connected and are living more and more in the same time dimension. There's something like the eternal presence of globalization, and this has been an important feature of this crisis. Everything happens more or less at the same time. And the only differences we see are delays between different foci of events. But, on the whole, there is one big chain of events and connectedness.

Read more: 'The time has come for humanity to go through its next evolution'

On a personal level, Peter, can you remember the last time you felt a change within yourself?

Yeah, I experienced a deep change in my existential mood at the age of about 33. I went to India and spent approximately four months there. That was a disruptive event in my own life. But the most similar event and the most comparable to now, even if it sounds quite unlikely, were those sublime days when the Berlin Wall fell down. For a span of time of approximately two months, I was not able to hear or see anything else but news from the political front.

And this was the sublime — as it were — music of reunification. And when that was over, I understood that it was over only when I was able to watch an ordinary movie for the first time afterwards. And right now I am still waiting for the moment when I will be able to listen to the music and to watch movies as I could before.