Showing posts with label John Bellamy Foster. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Bellamy Foster. Show all posts

Thursday, January 1, 2026

Unequal Exchange

 Introduction to the Updated Edition of Arghiri Emmanuel's ‘Unequal Exchange’. Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, Monthly Review. January 1, 2026.

Arghiri Emmanuel’s Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade was an explosive work when it was first published in French in 1969, not simply due to the depth of its critique of neoclassical economics, but even more because of the enormous challenge that it presented for Marxist economic theory itself. This incendiary reception was immediately evident in that the book incorporated an extensive debate between Emmanuel, a Greek economist, who became director of economic studies at the University of Paris-VII, and the French Marxist economist Charles Bettelheim, under whom Emmanuel had written his doctoral thesis on unequal exchange, and whose views departed sharply from those of Emmanuel. Thus, Emmanuel’s Unequal Exchange erupted on the public scene in a storm of controversy, which was already embedded in the book and quickly extended to a wider debate that continued for years, raising the issue of the relation of the working class in the advanced capitalist economies to imperialism. The impact of Unequal Exchange was startling at the time, but it then declined as interest in imperialist theory ebbed in the Western left and as the reality that Emmanuel had pointed to was frequently denied. Meanwhile, the inquiry that he had initiated was taken up by others, such as the Egyptian-French economist Samir Amin, and transformed in other directions. In the twenty-first century, however, the reality of both unequal economic and unequal ecological exchange has come to be regarded as the very crux of the anti-imperialist world struggle, and interest in Emmanuel’s classic work has once again skyrocketed.

The issue of unequal international exchange goes back to Karl Marx’s critique of classical political economy and indeed was an important question within classical-liberal political economy. In his seminal work On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), David Ricardo assumed that capital was immobile globally, while the Malthusian iron law of wages meant that labor costs were determined by the requirements of physical subsistence. Hence, the law of value did not apply to international transactions. Although it could be assumed that the wages of workers were equalized since determined more or less by absolute subsistence, profits, due to the immobility of capital across nations, were not. Consequently, Ricardo introduced his famous theory of comparative advantage to explain international trade, as a departure from and inversion of the law of value, relying on supply and demand as the main determinant.

Ricardo’s analysis demonstrated that it was always beneficial for countries to engage in trade, by exporting the products for which they had the greatest comparative advantage, relative to other goods they might choose to exchange. Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that due to differing productivities (and labor intensities) some countries would receive more labor for less labor in international exchange, while other countries would receive less labor for more. “Even according to Ricardo’s theory,” Marx observed, “three days of labour of one country can be exchanged against one of another country.… In this case, the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by trade, as John Stuart Mill explains in his Some Unsettled Questions.” As Amin summed up the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage in international trade, “All that this theory enables us to state is that, at a given moment, the distribution of levels of productivity being what it is, it is to the interest of the two countries to effect an exchange, even if it is unequal.”

“Two nations,” Marx explained in the Grundrisse, “may exchange according to the law of profit in such a way that both gain, but one is always defrauded…. One of the nations may constantly appropriate for itself a part of the surplus labour of the other, giving nothing back for it in exchange.” In the third volume of Capital, he went on to note that “the privileged country receives more labour in exchange for less,” thereby obtaining “surplus profit,” while, inversely, the poorer country “gives more objective labour than it receives.” Related to this was the fact that “the profit rate is generally higher [in underdeveloped countries] on account of the lower degree of development, and so too is the exploitation of labour through the use of slaves and coolies, etc.” It was thus possible to see “how one nation can grow rich at the expense of another.” Although Marx never managed to write his planned volume on the world economy and crises, it is clear that—building on the reality of unequal exchange already depicted by theorists like Ricardo and Mill—he saw the problem as ultimately lying in inequalities of labor, with poor nations giving more labor for less in the exchange process.

Austrian Marxist Otto Bauer is credited with being the first to put unequal exchange on a firmer footing. Writing in 1924, Bauer dispensed with Ricardo’s assumption that profit rates between countries were unequal, replacing the notion of the immobility of capital with one of the mobility of capital and with a tendency for profits to equalize at the international level. Nevertheless, unequal exchange continued to exist, in Bauer’s terms, because of the differing organic compositions of capital and thus differing rates of productivity between the more advanced and less advanced economies, which meant that in the process of equalizing profit rates between countries there was a transfer of value from poorer to richer countries. In Marx’s modified value theory, incorporating prices of production, equalization of profit rates required a transfer of value from industries with a lower organic composition of capital (or invested capital/labor ratio) to those with higher organic composition. The same essential process, Bauer argued, occurred between countries. In the equalization of profit rates internationally, those countries with higher organic composition gained value at the expense of those with lower organic composition. In Bauer’s words, “The capitalists of the more highly developed areas not only exploit their own workers, but [they] also appropriate some of the surplus value produced in less highly developed areas. If we consider the prices of commodities, each area receives in exchange as much as it has given. But if we look at the values involved, we see that the things exchanged are not equivalent.”

German Marxist economist Henryk Grossman, writing in the 1930s, carried forward Bauer’s analysis. As he put it, “International trade is not based on an exchange of equivalents because, as on the national market, there is a tendency for the rate of profit to be equalised. The commodities of the advanced capitalist country with the higher organic composition will therefore be sold at prices of production higher than their value; those of the backward country at prices of production lower than value.”

The whole approach to unequal exchange focusing on the organic composition of capital and the related higher productivity in developed capitalist countries was designated by Emmanuel as “unequal exchange in the broad sense.” Here countries with higher productivity due to a higher organic composition of capital and thus higher rates of productivity drew on surplus value in poorer regions, merely as a product of the equalization of profit rates internationally. In this case, it was true that the richer countries gained at the expense of the poorer countries, but this was a mechanical function of the equalization of profit rates, and did not in itself constitute actual imperialist exploitation.

What Emmanuel brought to the concept of unequal exchange, and what gave it lasting importance, was a theory that focused on the international mobility of capital coupled with the international immobility of labor. His analysis did not deny the significance of the “broad basis” of unequal exchange as articulated by Bauer, Grossman, and others. But for Emmanuel, there was a second, and ultimately more significant, form of unequal exchange associated with imperialist exploitation. Namely, core economies in the center of the global capitalist system with high wages in global terms extracted surplus labor from economies in the periphery with persistently low wages, enhancing accumulation at the core at the cost of the periphery.

Although Ricardo had recognized the existence of unequal exchange, for Emmanuel the causes were reversed. For Ricardo’s unequal rates of profit and standardized subsistence wages internationally, Emmanuel substituted “unequal wages between countries” with profits “tending toward equalization.” Emmanuel did not primarily construct his analysis in terms of imperialism theory in V. I. Lenin’s sense. Rather, he assumed in this abstract model not monopoly capital but free competition. Nor did he start his examination with class-based production and accumulation, though both were part of his analysis. Instead, he treated wages as an independent variable, based on Marx’s analysis of their historically determined character.

Surplus value arises in capitalist production because the value generated by the exercise of a worker’s labor power exceeds the value of labor power or the wages paid to the worker. In core capitalist countries—including not only the old colonial powers but also, according to Emmanuel, the “white settler states” (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) that had effectively exterminated or removed the original Indigenous inhabitants from the land—wages were comparatively high globally. This promoted internal, autocentric economic development. A “super-wage,” as in the United States, according to Emmanuel, generated a positive “dialectical interaction between the movement of wages and economic development.” In contrast, all countries in the periphery had much lower wages, associated with higher rates of exploitation, generating a dialectic of underdevelopment. It was this that constituted the structural basis for unequal exchange. In trade relations between what is now called the Global North and the Global South, the former was able to obtain more labor for less, or a net transfer of value, due to the structural inequality in wages built into the international system (and enforced by immigration laws)—a fact that was concealed by the supposed equality of trade when expressed in terms of price rather than labor value.

The reason that Emmanuel’s theory of unequal exchange stirred so much controversy within Western Marxism was due less to a departure from Marx, resulting from Emmanuel’s emphasis on wages as opposed to the accumulation of capital as the determining element in capitalist development, than from the direct political implications of his analysis. Frederick Engels and Lenin, in proposing the notion of a labor aristocracy, had argued that an upper stratum of the workers had knowingly been bought off by capital from the largesse of imperialism. In contrast, Nikolai Bukharin had seen this less in terms of a labor aristocracy within the advanced capitalist states than an embourgeoisement of the entire working class in the developed economies. Thus, he referred to “the additional pennies” offered to workers in the rich countries from the proceeds of imperialism, leading to their cooperation with capital. Following Bukharin, much more than Engels and Lenin, Emmanuel expanded his critique beyond a mere labor aristocracy to a Western working class as a whole that was seen as gaining from imperialism. This pointed to what Oskar Lange had called a “people’s imperialism” dividing the workers in the Global North from the Global South. In Emmanuel’s words, “Lange’s ‘people’s imperialism’ has today become a reality in the big capitalist countries.” Emmanuel thus presented this startling view: “Once a country has got ahead, through some historical accident, even if this be merely that a harsher climate has given men additional needs, this country begins to make other countries pay for its high-wage level through unequal exchange. From this point onward, the impoverishment of one country becomes an increasing function of the enrichment of another, and vice versa.”

Although not denying that the workers in the core countries were exploited, Emmanuel argued that there was a point where the sense of gains from imperialism could altogether check national struggles, creating a capitalist-worker imperialist bloc, and that this point had been reached. He asked: “Could it be that revolutionary Marxism based on…solidarity has been inhibited by the dreadful implications of such a proposition [unequal exchange leading to a people’s imperialism] in relation to the international solidarity of working people?” Writing during the Vietnam War, he pointed to examples of U.S. workers supporting U.S. imperialism against Vietnam (as well as their support of U.S. attacks on Cuba) rather than exhibiting international solidarity. Similar developments had arisen in France (and among the white settlers in Algeria) in the French-Algerian War.

Emmanuel went so far as to suggest, against historical reason, that if one could imagine the United States reduced to an underdeveloped country, this would be disastrous for U.S. workers, who would be “hurled into an abyss,” but that such a development would hardly affect the long-term prospects of U.S. capitalists themselves. “Leaving out of account the material losses suffered during and as a result of the event itself, the American capitalist would not find himself any worse off” in such a situation. This was a view that denied the larger structure of U.S. monopoly capitalism, including the many ways, apart from unequal exchange, in which surplus was extracted from the Global South by multinational corporations. More significantly, Emmanuel’s argument suggested that it was the working class, not the capitalist class, in the Global North who benefited most from unequal exchange/imperialism.

Behind Bettelheim’s sharp criticisms of Emmanuel and the volatile debate that ensued, therefore, lay the question of a people’s imperialism, issues that challenged much of post-Second World War Marxist political economy in Europe and North America. Emmanuel’s analysis was directly confronted by Bettelheim and then modified and extended by Amin. In the half-century that has followed the publication of Emmanuel’s book, his analysis has become more, not less, relevant. With all the limitations of his analysis in Unequal Exchange, Emmanuel’s contention that Marx’s value theory was superior to all other approaches in its ability to uncover the realities of the “imperialism of trade” has been strongly confirmed in the context of the global-value chain economy of the twenty-first century.

Bettelheim and Emmanuel

The theoretical and political complexities and divergence of views within Marxism unleashed by Emmanuel’s Unequal Exchange are best seen through the lens of the debate with Bettelheim in the five appendices to the book. Emmanuel’s book appeared in a series edited by his mentor, Bettelheim. Although Bettelheim was strongly supportive of Emmanuel’s critique of the theory of comparative advantage, and their views coincided with respect to their understanding of the “basic theory” of unequal exchange as in Bauer and Grossman, they disagreed on what was the heart of the matter for Emmanuel: unequal exchange arising from the inequality in wages between rich and poorer nations or the “imperialism of trade.” Among the criticisms that Bettelheim raised were that (1) one nation cannot exploit another (a view in which he departed from Marx and Lenin), (2) exploitation could not occur via exchange but could only arise in production, (3) no analysis of unequal exchange could disregard productivity, (4) Emmanuel’s argument reversed Marx’s causality by seeing wage levels as the independent variable determining accumulation, and (5) Emmanuel’s analysis was based on free competition rather than monopoly capitalism.

All these criticisms were meant to reinforce Bettelheim’s rejection of Emmanuel’s fundamental argument that not only did the rich nations extract surplus via unequal exchange from poor nations, but also that the workers in the developed capitalist countries, in effect, exploited workers in the underdeveloped countries. In response to Emmanuel, Bettelheim argued that even though workers in the Global South were frequently “superexploited,” in the sense that they were paid less than the value of their labor power (or the cost of its reproduction), these “workers in the underdeveloped countries were [nevertheless] even less exploited than those of the advanced, and so dominant, countries.” Emmanuel referred to this as “Bettelheim’s Paradox.”

Bettelheim’s reasoning, which was not accompanied by any empirical analysis, was that since the organic composition of capital in the rich nations was much higher, labor productivity, or output per labor hour, was also much higher, which translated into a higher rate of exploitation (the ratio of surplus labor to necessary labor) in economically advanced countries, as opposed to underdeveloped countries. Since the labor time necessary to produce a good was reduced, while surplus labor was increased proportionately, this represented a higher rate of surplus value. Emmanuel had made the mistake, Bettelheim argued, of failing to account properly for labor productivity.

Arguing based on the existence of monopoly capital, as opposed to Emmanuel’s reliance in his model on free competition, Bettelheim insisted that there was such a thing as “imperialist exploitation” via multinational corporation investment in the Third World. However, he insisted, this dynamic was enabled by the greater technology, higher productivity, and larger rate of exploitation in the center capitalist economies. Moreover, such monopolistic surplus extraction, he claimed, could not occur through exchange but was the result of international production relations. In contrast, he suggested that Emmanuel had fallen for the fantasy of mere “commercial exploitation” divorced from production. Other Marxist political economists in Europe and the United States adopted the same argument as Bettelheim with respect to the higher rate of productivity and higher rate of exploitation in developed capitalist countries, as in the case of figures like Ernest Mandel, Michael Kidron, Geoffrey Kay, and others down to the present day.

What was critical in Bettelheim’s view was that Emmanuel’s analysis denied the exploitation and class struggle at the center of the capitalist system, “making the proletarians of the rich countries appear to be the ‘exploiters’ of the poor ones. These proletarians must therefore have ceased to be exploited themselves, which means their labor is no longer a source of surplus value.” From this, Bettelheim concluded:

Emmanuel’s position seems to me to be clearly incompatible with Marxism, since in denying the existence of the class struggle in the industrialized countries (except in the economic form of that struggle, which conforms to the classic trade-unionist position, that is to say, an “economist,” and so non-Marxist, position). It amounts indeed to denying the existence of the political class struggle, and of classes themselves, when one treats the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of the industrial countries as identical, by alleging that the proletariat has “become bourgeois” and so has been integrated into the bourgeoisie.

Emmanuel’s thesis, if true, Bettelheim insisted, would point to a break in the “objective solidarity of the workers of the industrialized countries and the dominated countries, while, in truth, that objective solidarity, representing a common class struggle, was as strong as ever.” However, capitalists both in the imperialist bourgeoisie and in the national bourgeoisies in the Third World could, Bettelheim argued, use Emmanuel’s notion of a split among workers internationally due to unequal exchange to distract workers from the class struggles in their own countries. The big bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries could falsely use the struggle against imperialism to consolidate their own power.

Emmanuel’s responses in the debate with Bettelheim further complicated without decisively ending the debate. He argued that, for Marx, wage levels determined productivity (through technological innovation in response to high wages) and that Bettelheim and his other critics had simply reversed Marx’s logic: “To set up the productivity of labor as the determining element in the value of labor power, and also of wages, is an idea that is diametrically opposed to the Marxist, or even to any objectivist, conception of value.” There was no contradiction involved in the capitalists of one country obtaining surplus value from the production of workers in other countries via exchange since production and exchange were interconnected. Appropriation of surplus value, if ultimately rooted in production, did not occur solely within the production process. Ultimately, Emmanuel pointed to the need for a world value theory that transcended merely national conditions that concealed global value relations.

Amin and Emmanuel

As Amin indicated in “End of a Debate” in his Imperialism and Unequal Development (1977), Emmanuel’s approach was vulnerable to criticism since the restrictive assumptions built into his economic model made it impossible to address the most essential questions with respect to unequal exchange relations. Among the limitations of Emmanuel’s analysis were (1) his treatment of the wage as an independent variable, rather than dialectically related to the historical development of production and accumulation; (2) his resulting inability to deal adequately with the question of productivity; (3) the wider historical limitations of his analysis, which, since rooted in the assumption of free competition, was therefore not applicable either to noncapitalist economies or, more significantly, to the conditions of monopoly capitalism; (4) the related lack of a developed historical explanation for the immobility of labor; and (5) the tendency in Emmanuel’s theory to point to the direct exploitation of workers in the periphery by the workers in the core via trade relations, as if such economic transactions were not all mediated by and dominated by capital in its own interest. Nevertheless, the genius of Emmanuel’s analysis, in Amin’s view, was that it raised for the very first time the issue of world value, correctly indicating that labor, since it was engaged in producing international commodities, was itself international, subject to a world system of value.

The fundamental theoretical problem in Emmanuel’s analysis was how to deal with the differences in the development of productive forces and of productivity in different parts of the world. Here Amin introduced a historically more general and theoretically irrefutable definition of unequal exchange, no longer relying simply on wage differentials, or seeing productivity as dependent on the level of wages. As Amin put it, “The essential theory of unequal exchange” points to the reality that “the products exported by the periphery are important,” in purely economic as opposed to natural resource terms, “to the extent that the difference between the returns to labor is greater than the difference between the productivities.” This was particularly evident when the production processes and particular use values were the same. But the fact that in the international system of production a labor hour in any part of the system was comparable with a labor hour somewhere else in the system gave the analysis a universal character.

Amin departed sharply from Emmanuel’s notion that wage levels were determinant of productive forces, labor productivity, and accumulation. In Emmanuel’s framework there was a tendency to view high wages as directly related to unequal exchange. In contrast, Amin argued that the higher wages in the developed capitalist economies had arisen historically as a counterpart of economic development. Thus, they could not be assigned in the main to unequal exchange but had multiple causes. While insisting that workers in the Global North benefited from the imperialist exploitation in unequal exchange, Amin indicated that this was invariably mediated by the reigning monopoly capital, which took by far the lion’s share of the appropriated surplus, worsening its own problems of surplus absorption as a result.

Bettelheim had stressed in his criticism of Emmanuel that the comprador elements in the underdeveloped countries could take advantage of the theory of unequal exchange and the struggle against imperialism, focusing on national rather than class conflict, to consolidate their own rule. However, for Amin, this simply pointed, in line with the whole Marxist analysis of imperialism, to the dual struggle of class and nation and the need to develop a strong working-class revolutionary consciousness.

Adopting a somewhat more philosophical stance, Eurocentric Marxists sought to combat Emmanuel and other imperialism theorists with what Amin called an “epistemological argument,” charging that focusing on the extraction of surplus value from countries in the periphery via unequal exchange relied on circulation rather than production as the basis of the analysis and thus fetishized the former. In responding to such views, Amin not only emphasized the interrelationship between production and exchange, he also went on to declare forthrightly that “‘unequal’ exchange is nothing more than the mechanism of surplus-value circulation in the imperialist stage of capitalism.” Far from ignoring the importance of circulation, Marx himself, Amin pointed out, had devoted the whole third volume of Capital to it, hardly according to it a minor “epistemological” importance.

Where Amin broke most decisively with Emmanuel was in relation to historical analysis. Emmanuel’s model was entirely based on the artificial assumption of free trade, insofar as it assumed the absence of monopoly capital, even though many of the historical factors he considered, such as the international immobility of labor and the international mobility of capital, were less characteristic of the era of free trade (where Ricardo’s assumptions were more realistic) than they were of monopoly capitalism. Hence, Amin took monopoly capitalism/imperialism in the terms laid out by Lenin and subsequent theorists of imperialism as the basis of his approach. Unequal exchange in international trade and the rise of a system of world value had to be viewed through the lens of “generalized monopoly capitalism.”

It was in twentieth-century monopoly capitalism that more restrictive immigration laws, designed to control labor internationally, were instituted, enforcing the global immobility of labor and the superexploitation of peripheral labor, while also allowing for the overexploitation of migrant labor within the metropolitan countries. Likewise, it was only with the growth of the multinational corporation that the international mobility of capital—prior to that mostly confined to portfolio investment—became an established fact. Moreover, it was monopoly capitalism, Amin argued, in fundamental agreement with Ruy Mauro Marini, that made the “superexploitation” of labor in the periphery a more systematic reality.

In an attempt to take full advantage of the fact that the difference between wages was greater than the difference in productivities between the Global North and the Global South, multinational corporations increasingly—once improved communication and transportation technology made this feasible—introduced the same technology and production processes in the export zones of the Third World as existed in the center of the world economy. Thus, the transfer of value through the unequal exchange process was greatly enhanced in the age of neoliberal globalization from the 1980s on, leading to the development of global value chains as a dominant reality of global production.

The Reality of Unequal Exchange

Amin’s critical elaboration, with greater historical consideration of Emmanuel’s analysis, allowed for the empirical investigation of international trade, while considering differences in wages and productivity. Recent scholarship has clearly revealed how the difference in wages between workers in the Global North and the Global South are much greater than the differences in their productivity. Importantly, this work illuminates how imperialist exploitation plays a central role in the creation and transfer of world value, whereby the surplus is appropriated by monopoly capital in the Global North. Given the limitations of price-based categories, unequal exchange reflects the transfer of value associated with the embodied labor in production that is concealed in standard trade accounts. It thus reveals the often invisible reality of value transfers from poor to rich nations through unequal exchange, in addition to the more visible ways that surplus is transferred through direct monopolistic power relations, as captured in current accounts.

Emmanuel’s and Amin’s insights regarding unequal exchange greatly enrich global commodity chain research, which studies the economic transfer of value within the numerous extraction, production, distribution, consumption, and financial linkages dominated by multinational corporations. By the twenty-first century, multinational corporations in the center of the world economy had shifted most industrial employment of workers to the Global South, practicing “arm’s length” contracting, whereby production was outsourced to independent suppliers. Here, giant corporations were able to take advantage of the low wages paid to workers, while externalizing some of their direct production costs and reducing their culpability for running sweatshops and for pollution. These conditions kept wages very low in the Global South and helped repress wages in the North. Foreign direct investment, from core nations to periphery economies, accelerated the offshoring process and arm’s length contracting, dramatically reorganizing the latter’s economies while expanding their industrial workforce.

As a result, developing country exports as a percentage of U.S. imports quadrupled in the last half of the twentieth century. By 2008, 73 percent of all industrial employment globally was located in the Global South, while, by 2013, the majority of total foreign direct investment went to the Global South. The South’s global share of manufacturing trade skyrocketed, with the primary export destination as the Global North. Industrialized manufacturing, intensive production practices, and global integration did not alleviate poverty in the South or lead to its convergence with the North. Instead, the relative health and environmental conditions of workers in developing countries worsened. Furthermore, value added, within global commodity chains, ended up being attributed primarily to economic activities within the Global North where the goods were marketed and consumed, rather than the Global South where the bulk of labor in production occurred.

In “Global Commodity Chains and the New Imperialism,” Intan Suwandi, R. Jamil Jonna, and John Bellamy Foster developed an empirical approach for studying the invisible transfer of value, whereby unequal exchange allows monopoly capital to capture the value produced by labor in the periphery. To create the basis for cross-national comparisons from 1995 to 2014, they examined unit labor costs, or the ratio of wages to labor productivity, for the eight countries with the highest participation in the global commodity chains. The Global North countries were represented in this study by the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, and the Global South countries by China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. The authors found that the difference in wages between the North and South were far greater than differences in productivity. Thus, the former were getting much more labor for less in the international exchange, allowing the surplus to be captured by multinational corporations. The average unit labor costs in manufacturing in China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico ranged between 37 percent to 62 percent of unit labor costs in the United States, indicating that higher profit margins could be obtained by producing in the periphery. This trend is only amplified when considering all the other productive linkages of the global commodity chain that include the rest of the Global South. Thus, the differential rates of exploitation between nations leads to a massive transfer of surplus within the global capitalist system.

The extent of the ongoing unequal exchange was further captured in an important 2024 study published in Nature Communications by Jason Hickel, Morena Hanbury Lemos, and Felix Barbour. They explained that following the imposition of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and ’90s on the Global South, which included devaluing currencies, cutting public funding for social welfare and environmental protection, encouraging lower wages to attract investment for manufacturing, and creating export-oriented facilities, the dynamics of unequal exchange intensified. To assess these relationships and conditions, they sought to “track flows of embodied labour between North and South, for the first time accounting directly for sectors, wages and skill levels,” which enabled them “to define the scale of labour appropriation through unequal exchange in terms of physical labour time, while also representing it in terms of wage value, in a manner that accounts for the skill level composition of labour embodied in North-South trade.” They found that 90 to 91 percent of “the labour of production in the world economy, across all skill levels and all sectors” took place within the Global South. However, the value produced was “disproportionately captured” by the North.

In 2021 alone, the Global North had a net-appropriation of “826 billion hours of embodied labour from the Global South,” which took place across all skill categories, from low to high, via the “invisible ghost workers'” within this system of generalized commodity production. This translated into the equivalent of $18.4 trillion in wages in the Global North, more than doubling the amount appropriated in 1995. The wage gaps across skill categories significantly increased between 1995 and 2021, resulting in Global South wages being 87 to 95 percent lower than their counterparts of equal skill in the North. Wages in the North over this time period increased eleven times those of workers in the South. Nevertheless, workers’ share of GDP declined by 1.3 percent in the Global North and 1.6 percent in the South, demonstrating the weakening position of labor worldwide.

The imbalance was even more dramatic when considering the difference in labor hours contributions to the global economy. In 2021, the Global South contributed 90 percent of the 9.6 trillion hours of labor. This pattern was evident at all skill levels, as the Global South represented 76 percent of high-skilled labor, 91 percent of medium-skilled labor, and 96 percent of low-skilled labor, as far as total labor hours in global production. As a result, from 1995 to 2021, the Global South steadily increased its contribution to total global production in all areas. Hickel, Lemos, and Barbour found that “the South now contributes more high-skilled labour to the world economy [in total labor hours]…than all the high-, medium-, and low-skilled labour contributions of the Global North combined.” Global South workers were as productive as their counterparts in the North, plus they confronted extreme controls to maximize output. Despite these conditions, the Global South received only 44 percent of global income, with workers in these countries receiving “only 21 percent of global income” in 2021.

Between 1995 and 2021, the Global North imported over fifteen times more embodied labor than it exported to the South. As far as embodied agricultural labor is concerned, the North imported 120 times more than it exported. “There is no sector,” Hickel, Lemos, and Barbour explained, “in which the North net-exports labour to the South.” The only thing that briefly tempered the exchange ratio during this period was China, given improvements there in wages. This invisible transfer of value increased over the period and was accompanied by the transfer of “embodied land, energy, [and] materials” as part of overall production. There is no evidence of the Global South catching up with the North; in fact, the divergence within the global capitalist economy is deepening, with a larger share of surplus being captured by monopoly capital. This point, and the trends highlighted above, are all the more important considering recent arguments that China and other BRICS countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and India, are draining wealth from the United States, reversing the overall direction of imperialism.

As Minqi Li demonstrated, in 2017 China experienced a net labor loss in foreign trade of 47 million worker years, while the United States had a net labor gain of 63 million worker years (measured in terms of total labor embodied in exported goods minus total labor embodied in imported goods), due to the production of commodities in China and other countries in the Global South, which were then consumed within the United States. The low unit labor costs in China and in other developing countries exacerbated this difference in net labor loss and gain. Additionally, as Marxist economists Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts have demonstrated, the BRICS countries are not draining surplus from other countries in the Global South or capital from the North. Instead, the imperialist bloc at the center of the global economy continues to extract surplus from BRICS countries.

To gain a better understanding of the overall drain from the Global South, it is necessary to consider not simply the invisible transfers of embodied labor in unequal exchange proper, but also the visible transfers of wealth that accompany colonial and imperialist relations associated with the net flow of capital as part of international trade, recorded in national accounts. These accounts include the balance of trade regarding imports and exports, net payments to foreign investors and banks, insurance and freight payments, and payments for royalties and patents. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in a 2020 policy brief, indicated that from 2000 to 2017, for 134 developing countries, there was a net financial transfer “from developing to developed countries.” In 2012 alone, the net resource transfers, due to a “recovery of exports,” hit $977 billion. This has generated a “debt treadmill” in which developing countries in general find themselves “financially exhausted.” The system of international debt peonage resulting from the “difference between net capital inflows and net income payments to foreign capital, including net changes to international reserves,” reproduces itself, in part, because “external resources are deemed necessary to fund development, but this in turn generates return flows of interest payments and profit remittances that have to be funded by the developing country and can outweigh any earnings flows.”

The underlying reality is one in which there is “a clear and persistent” situation, visible in the international system of accounts, where the Global South persistently experiences a net loss of capital to the Global North. According to UNCTAD, “The returns on external assets received are generally lower than the payments made on external liabilities, resulting in an ongoing net transfer of financial resources from developing to developed countries.” This constitutes a reverse flow of capital, from the periphery to the core, quite apart from unequal exchange as such, here arising simply from the monopolistic power relations of multinational capital located in the Global North.

The transfer of economic value between nations is intertwined in complex ways with material-ecological flows. As Amin pointed out, following Emmanuel in this respect, there are many “other forms of unequal exchange,” which include an array of ecological considerations, especially when associated with the extraction and control of natural resources. Within the capitalist system, this gives rise to unequal ecological exchange (the exchange of more natural-physical use values for less), whereby there is a vertical flow of value embodied in energy and matter, which is beyond the value associated with the exploitation of labor from the Global South to the Global North. Additionally, unequal ecological exchange is associated with the North externalizing many of the environmental consequences, such as pollution, of this international production to the South, exacerbating inequalities and the disproportionate using up of the ecological commons, such as the atmosphere and oceans, by the North.

Marx noted that real wealth included the contributions of both nature and labor, whereas, under capitalist accounting, value was only associated with the labor. Nature was deemed a “free gift” for capital. Thus, nature was part of the “hidden abode” of capital, as its contributions were outside the normal economic categories, constituting “profit upon expropriation.” Here, expropriation involved robbery, theft, and plunder. This appropriation without reciprocity undermined the processes that support the regeneration of ecosystems and the conditions of life itself. So-called primary accumulation involved the dissolution of previous property forms, the enclosure movement, the alienation of the human population from nature, colonialism, settler colonialism, imperialism, the plundering of resources abroad, enslavement, and genocide, all of which helped establish the polarized capitalist system, as wealth was concentrated in the core countries.

This system of robbery is integral to the everyday operations of capital. The second agricultural revolution, between the mid-seventeenth century and the late nineteenth century, involved the despoliation of soil nutrients, as intensive agricultural practices were employed to produce food and fiber for distant urban populations. The nutrients were not returned to the countryside as part of a reciprocal process to restore the land. Agricultural operations became dependent on external inputs to try to maintain production. From 1840 to 1880, guano from Peru was the most prized fertilizer in the world. The Peruvian guano islands were plundered, under de facto slavery conditions, to enrich the soils of Europe and the United States.

Colonial and imperial relations have played a central role in establishing and maintaining unequal ecological exchange. In Open Veins of Latin America, Eduardo Galeano provided an extensive account of how for centuries the Global North had robbed this region of the Global South of its natural resources, which included gold, silver, rubber, and a broad array of agricultural goods. “The plantation” system, in particular, he explained, “was structured as to make it, in effect, a sieve for the draining-off of natural wealth.” Within this global system, “the more a product is desired by the world market, the greater the misery it brings to the Latin American peoples whose sacrifice creates it.” Under the imperial conditions of unequal economic and unequal ecological exchange, Latin America was poor because it was a rich land. As Galeano described, “It continues to exist at the service of others’ needs, as a source and reserve of oil and iron, of copper and meat, of fruit and coffee, the raw materials and foods destined for rich countries which profit more from consuming them than Latin America does from producing them.” Amin argued that this process contributed to the “systematic destruction of soils,” “degradation of the environment,” and “impoverishment” of dependent countries.

Through unequal ecological exchange, the Global North was overshooting its own resource base, as it utilized “ghost acreage” abroad to supply foods and other natural resources. Additionally, the Global North disproportionately utilized the ecological commons, greatly amplifying the ecological crisis. Emmanuel indicated that the developed countries were actively using up the ecological commons by “dispos[ing] of their waste products by dumping them in the sea or expelling them into the air.” As global capitalism progressively transgresses the planetary boundaries, threatening ecological destruction of life on Earth, the importance of Emmanuel’s investigation of unequal exchange increases, as does the international movement to confront the death drive of capital.

The Imperialism of Trade

Imperialism is a complex phenomenon, which has been imposed differentially, depending on how imperialism originally penetrated the domains of peripheral nations, and by numerous other factors having to do with innumerable other features, such as forms of colonization and semicolonization, the nature of anticolonial struggles, control of natural resources, strategic position as conceived by geopolitics, the exercise of monopoly power, and the role of comprador classes. In all cases, however, imperialism under capitalism has ultimately taken an economic form, in which the drain of the surplus of developing countries is achieved by multifarious means, involving more visible and less visible forms of exploitation and expropriation. Moreover, the robbing of the Global South has extended beyond mere economic transfers to ecological ones, involving the seizure of land and resources. It is a system of open veins, demanding revolutions and delinking.

Emmanuel’s unequal exchange analysis has played an indispensable role in demonstrating that a value analysis that focuses on the role of labor in production and the exchange of labor reveals the full depth of economic imperialism, inhibiting underdeveloped countries, and holding them back. It thus represents the deepest roots of economic imperialism, traceable to the fact that while labor is relatively immobile internationally (and while migration of workers from the Global South is so structured that they carry their low wages with them), capital is mobile internationally. Any attempts by peripheral countries to delink from international capital and to place limits on capital’s mobility inevitably lead to economic sanctions and military interventions emanating from the imperial core of the system.

Referring to his analysis in Unequal Exchange, Emmanuel wrote: “If I succeed, I shall have shown that not only is international trade not, as is thought, the Achilles’ heel of the labor theory of value but that it is, on the contrary, [only] on the basis of this theory’s premises that we can understand certain features of international trade that have hitherto remained unexplained.” At bottom, this required “integrating international value in the general theory of value.” Emmanuel succeeded to such an extent that his theory of unequal exchange, though modified by later thinkers such as Amin to accord with the reality of monopoly capitalism, has become indispensable to the analysis of the transfer of value within today’s global commodity economy. This uncovered the reality of the global labor arbitrage, revealing the world value system that constitutes its basis. Hic Rhodus, Hic Salta! (Here is Rhodes, leap here!)

Saturday, December 6, 2025

John Bellamy Foster: Capitalist vs Socialist Eco-Modernism

Eco-Marxism and Prometheus Unbound: Capitalist vs Socialist Eco-Modernism. John Bellamy Foster, The Monthly Review. Nov. 1, 2025.

This article was prepared as a paper for presentation as a keynote address to the Fourth World Congress on Marxism, Beijing, October 11–12, 2025.


In the West, ecological modernization as a model for addressing environmental problems has long been the subject of critique by ecosocialists and by radical ecologists in general. In contrast, in China, ecological modernism as a way of redressing environmental problems has the strong backing of ecological Marxists. The primary reason for these differing approaches should be obvious. In the West, the notion of ecological modernization, while unobjectionable in itself as part of a comprehensive process of environmental change, has come to stand ideologically for the restrictive model of capitalist ecological modernization. Here it is suggested that environmental problems can be addressed by technological means alone within the established social relations of capitalism in a purely reformist context. Distinct from this, socialist ecological modernization, as envisioned in China and in a few other postrevolutionary states, is substantively different. It requires a break with the social relations of capital accumulation, facilitating changes in the human relation to nature that are of a revolutionary character, aimed at the creation of an ecological civilization geared to sustainable human development.

A parallel problem arises with respect to the notion of “Prometheanism,” an ambiguous term ostensibly based on the ancient Greek myth in which Prometheus, a Titan, gave fire to humanity. In the contemporary capitalist view, the Promethean myth has been transformed in such a way that it is seen as standing for technology and power, even for industrial revolutions. Yet, in the original Greek myth as presented by Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound and later adopted by Enlightenment thinkers, including Percy Bysshe Shelley and Karl Marx, Prometheus, chained to a rock by Hephaestus on the command of Zeus, stood for the revolutionary defiance of the gods, and was the source of human enlightenment and self-consciousness. Capitalist Prometheanism therefore is not the same as revolutionary humanist Prometheanism. The former is about technology and power and has little relation to the Greek myth itself; the latter is about revolutionary enlightenment, the development of social individuals, and the human accord with nature.

In the ruling capitalist ideology of the West/Global North, the issue of the impact of the capital accumulation process on the environment, including the Earth System crisis itself, is either avoided altogether or is seen as subject to pure technological solutions, with no need to alter class, property, capital, and consumption relations. Ecological modernization as a theory and a practice has thus come to stand principally for an anti-ecological stance in that it puts capitalist social relations before issues of humanity and nature, insisting that nothing needs to change but the machines, while the accumulation of capital remains the supreme object of the system. It is ecological modernization in this narrow ecotechnic sense that is meant when mention is made of the “greening of capitalism.” In its absolute rejection of ecological limits to unrestrained accumulation, capitalist ecological modernization is a manifestation of a fatal incapacity to address the needs of humanity and nature.

Within Chinese ecological Marxism, in contrast, ecological modernization is not about preserving capitalism and opposing environmentalism. Instead, it is conceived as socialist ecological modernization, part of the process of creating a new ecological civilization. This does not mean that the ecological contradictions of development and modernity magically disappear. But the task here is viewed differently, aimed at explicitly building a more environmental consciousness and reality. As Xi Jinping says, “clear waters and green mountains” are worth as much or more than “mountains of gold,” and ultimately this means that choices have to be made to sustain the former, even at the expense of the latter.

Ecosocialism and the Promethean Myth

What makes it so difficult to disentangle the ecological debate in the West is that the alienated, dualistic consciousness that has historically characterized the hegemonic ideology has penetrated the ecosocialist movement itself. This has generated all sorts of contradictions, arising not simply out of capitalism but also emanating from the legacy of the Cold War and its antisocialist ideology. Western Marxism often played an ambiguous role in the Cold War, critical of both capitalism and state socialism, while falling prey to the four retreats (from materialism, the dialectics of nature, class, and imperialism). Hence, it is not surprising that the rise of ecosocialism as a defining concept in the 1980s was closely tied to Cold War ideology. Leading ecosocialists of the period, such as Ted Benton in England and John P. Clark in the United States, took the position that Marx’s work and that of Marxism generally was “Promethean” in the hyperindustrialist sense and thus opposed to ecology. For Benton, writing in New Left Review, Marx stood accused of having a mechanistic “Promethean, ‘productivist’ view of history” that militated against an environmental perspective.

For Marx, Epicurus was “the true radical Enlightener of antiquity.” In his praise of Epicurus in his dissertation, Marx compared him to Prometheus (as depicted by Aeschylus)—the revolutionary Titan who had defied the gods of Olympus by bringing fire—standing for light and knowledge­—to humanity, and who was punished by being chained to a rock for eternity on the orders of Zeus. Here Marx replicated Lucretius’s famous eulogy to Epicurus in De rerum natura, which had formed the basis for Voltaire’s use of the term “Enlightenment” in eighteenth-century France. This, and a contemporary lithograph on the censorship of the Rheinische Zeitung, of which Marx was editor, depicting Prometheus chained to a printing press, engendered the common identification of Marx with Prometheus.

Breaking with the dominant millennia-long conception of Prometheus as a bringer of light/Enlightenment—though Joseph Pierre-Proudhon in the nineteenth century had promoted a mechanical Prometheanism and Mary Shelley had referred to “The Modern Prometheus” in the subtitle to her Frankenstein—Cold War warriors in the West, many of them disaffected leftists writing for CIA-funded publications like Encounter, began presenting Marx as an advocate of extreme Prometheanism. This was a code name for the advocacy of unlimited instrumentalism, as the chief aim of society, used to identify Marx with Russia under Joseph Stalin, with its rapid industrialization and seeming emphasis on gigantism. Biography after biography of Marx touted his reference to Prometheus in his dissertation, with no attempt to explain the context—that is, his praise of Epicurus as a Prometheus-like figure in the sense of Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound. Epicurus was known for being the leading materialist philosopher of the ancient Greek world and for his humanistic commitment to a self-conscious sustainable community, all of which led Marx to compare him to the Prometheus of myth, none of which had anything to do with instrumentalism, hyperindustrialism, or gigantism.

Notably, in his famous 1918 biography of Marx, Franz Mehring had characterized Marx as a “second Prometheus both in struggle and in suffering.” This was adopted and distorted early on by critics of Marx. In To the Finland Station (1940), Edmund Wilson presented Marx as a mechanistic Prometheus with production as his only object, behind whom stood the ominous shadow of Lucifer. One of the earliest and most influential Cold War works to portray Marx as a Promethean instrumentalist was Robert C. Tucker’s Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (1961), which saw both G. W. F. Hegel and Marx as promoting philosophies “whose very own confession was that of Prometheus.” This general view was taken over by Cold Warriors like Lewis Feuer in Marx and the Intellectuals (1969) and Daniel Bell in his The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976), with the former accusing Marx of a Promethean “mythopoeic compulsion” devoted to technological absolutism.

Cold War propagandists who attacked Marx and Marxism for its so-called mechanistic Prometheanism were mainly concerned with presenting Marxism as antihumanist, instrumentalist, and hyperindustrialist, in line with their conception of Soviet Communism. Yet, true to their capitalist vision, such critics of Marxism were neither enemies of productivism nor on the side of the environment. Thus, Bell, in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, was one of the chief critics of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth study (1972). He argued that ecological limits to growth simply did not exist and that resource scarcity was impossible in the new postindustrial world.

Although Cold War criticism of classical Marxism for its supposed mechanistic Prometheanism was thus originally aimed at claiming that Marxism was inherently antihumanistic, this was to metamorphose into the charge that historical materialism was anti-environmentalist through the work of figures like British sociologist Anthony Giddens, who contended in 1981 in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism that Marx had a “Promethean attitude” in which nature was reduced to instrumental terms. This was seconded by a number of prominent ecosocialists, who claimed that Marx was a “Promethean” productivist, and thus an anti-environmentalist, thinker. What is now commonly referred to as first-stage ecosocialism, in the 1980s and ’90s, thus came to stand mainly for a view that represented a break with classical Marxism on environmental grounds, often comparing Marx unfavorably to Thomas Malthus and modern neo-Malthusianism in this respect.

In the late 1990s, however, a second-stage ecological Marxism emerged, beginning with the work of the present author and Paul Burkett. Here the object was to uncover Marx’s own ecological critique, while countering charges that Marx had advocated a so-called hyperindustrialist “Prometheanism.” Emphasis was placed on Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism in his theory of metabolic rift and his conception of sustainable human development. This led to the rapid development of Marxian ecology or of second-stage ecosocialism, fully integrated with the critique of capitalism as a whole and with Marxian dialectics. A very substantial body of work, consisting of hundreds and hundreds of books and articles, has been published, utilizing the general metabolic rift analysis arising from Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism to address nearly every aspect of the modern planetary ecological crisis, historically and in the present.

Marx and ecological Marxism can be accurately viewed as Promethean only in the sense of the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus itself, as described, in particular, in Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound, as this had been understood for millennia. Marx depicted Epicurus via Prometheus as a protorevolutionary figure who brought Enlightenment to antiquity while defying the whole “pack of gods.” It was in this very same spirit that Rachel Carson, in the modern environmental movement, was to defy what she called “the gods of profit and production.”

Capitalist Ecological Modernization as Ideology

If numerous first-stage ecosocialists in the 1980s accused Marx and Frederick Engels of mechanistic Prometheanism or hyperindustrialism, and thus branded historical materialism as productivist and anti-ecological, the reality was that many of the most radical struggles over the environment from the 1950s on were led or inspired by socialist ecologists, including figures like Scott Nearing, Barry Commoner, Virginia Brodine, Shigeto Tsuru, K. William Kapp, Raymond Williams, Charles H. Anderson, Murray Bookchin, Allan Schnaiberg, Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, Nancy Krieger, and Rudolf Bahro. In the 1970s, socialist ecology was already a potent force at the movement level, particularly in the United States. Socialist environmentalists were particularly noteworthy for their rejection of neo-Malthusianism, or the notion that ecological problems could be traced principally to population rather than the system of production.

The broad socialist ecological critique was heavily influenced by Marx’s historical materialism and Engels’s Dialectics of Nature. It arose first in the natural sciences, beginning in the 1950s, in response to nuclear weapons testing, in the work of critical scientists like Commoner, and gained further impetus in the United States in the late 1960s and early ’70s, in response to a host of problems, manifested in Science for the People (both the publication and the organization).

Within the social sciences, radical and Marxist ecological analysis predominated in the Environmental Sociology section of the America Sociological Association (ASA), which first emerged in the early 1970s. Among the leading figures in environmental sociology were radicals William Catton, author of Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (1982), and Riley Dunlap, who, in the context of the limits to growth debate being waged then mainly by economists, introduced (together with Catton) the distinction between the human exemptionalist paradigm and the new ecological paradigm. The human exemptionalist paradigm, as critically defined by Catton and Dunlap, stood for the hegemonic perspective of capitalist modernity. It was the view that humanity was largely exempt from natural constraints, and that there were ultimately no natural or ecological limits to human advance, which was seen as reliant simply on human ingenuity and technology.

The foremost representatives of human exemptionalism in the debates over the limits to growth in the 1970s and ’80s were resource economist Julian Simon, author of The Ultimate Resource, and economic growth theorist Robert Solow, winner of the (so-called) Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Simon, denying all ecological constraints on capital accumulation, pronounced that “there is no meaningful physical limit [or limits]…to our capacity to keep growing [the economy] forever” within the earth environment. Solow wrote: “If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is in principle no ‘problem.’ The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe.” It was this dominant exemptionalist paradigm that had been challenged by Limits to Growth, which pointed to growing environmental (mainly resource) constraints as the world economy expanded and passed critical thresholds—a perspective that was later extended to address both the problem of increased natural resource constraints or the “tap” and the problem of overflowing ecological wastes or the “sink.”

The new ecological paradigm was closely linked to the limits to growth perspective, and thus represented a frontal attack on the human exemptionalist paradigm. It formed the initial common ground of the Section on Environmental Sociology of the ASA. Originally articulated by Catton and Dunlap, it was later codified in terms of five tenets: (1) limits to growth, (2) non-anthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s “balance,” (4) untenability of human exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis. While the new ecological paradigm was in many ways the starting point, this came to be integrated by the late 1970s and early ’80s in the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA, with Marxist critiques of monopoly capitalism, the treadmill of production/accumulation, and ecological waste, which joined in the critique of the human exemptionalist paradigm. Theoretically, environmental sociology in the United States prior to the second decade of the present century was dominated by the Marxian critique of capitalism and its ecological degradation. This included not only those, like Schnaiberg, who subscribed to the treadmill of production framework, but also those associated with second-stage ecosocialism, many of whom were identified with the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA.

However, the strong critique of capitalism that formed the basis of the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA began to break down in 2003. In October–November 2003, a conference was organized at the University of Wisconsin in honor of Schnaiberg and the treadmill of production perspective, constituting a neo-Marxist tradition central to U.S. environmental sociology that depicted the conflict between capitalism’s accumulation tendencies and the environment. Yet, the conference as it turned out had a dual agenda, since Dutch ecomodernists Arthur P. J. Mol and Gert Spaargaren were also invited. These thinkers set about criticizing neo-Marxist approaches to the environment and defending capitalism’s ability to solve environmental problems simply by technological means—in effect offering a new, more nuanced human exemptionalism, which had emerged out of the environmental reform movement in Europe. The debate persisted for years. Ecological modernization—though widely recognized as theoretically and empirically weak compared to radical ecological and ecosocialist analyses—eventually gained considerable prominence due to its greater conformity to the system, with the official prestige and support that this provided. For Mol and Spaargaren, it was necessary to move away from “the ecologically inspired strand of environmental sociology.” The new ecological paradigm was accused of “coquetting with ecology,” representing an unacceptable “hybrid of sociology and ecology.” Mol and Spaargaren contended that there was no “key obstruction” to environmental reform under capitalist relations of production.

At their best, capitalist ecological modernists advanced the notion that technology and markets could meet environmental challenges within the capitalist system through mild, light-green reforms without changes in social relations; at their worst, they denied all need for radical ecological strategies and movements. In 2010, Mol, the leading representative of ecological modernization theory, was given the Distinguished Contribution (or lifetime) Award from the Environmental Sociology Section of the ASA, indicating that ecological modernization theory, despite its opposition to the radical ecological critique, and its general anti-environmentalist stance, was now considered within the proper purview of the discipline. This reflected a general growth of anti-environmentalism, with the percentage of Americans who considered themselves environmentalists dropping from 76 percent in 1989 to 41 percent in 2021.

Academic ecological modernization theory had its roots in Cold War modernization theory. In attacking the red-green theories of thinkers like Bahro and Commoner, Spaargaren argued that they were wrongly opposed to the “industrial society theory” developed by “Daniel Bell and others,” celebrating capitalist modernization and industrialization. Modernization, in this sense, was associated with conservative sociologist Talcott Parsons’s structural functionalism, and even more with a conception that identified modernity with the West, which was characterized as constituting the “universal” culture in the Weberian sense. As leading Cold War sociologist and anti-Marxist Edward Shils argued, modernization meant the West. In his own words, “‘Modern’ means being western without the onus of following the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus.” Naturally, “the West” in this sense also stood for capitalism, which was seen as uniquely Western.

Western ecological modernization theory is thus procapitalist and Eurocentric. Nevertheless, a key proposition of both Spaargaren and Mol was that ecological modernization is entirely independent of social and economic relations. As Mol put it, “the ideology of ecological modernisation” consisted of the view that “an environmentally sound society” could be created without reference to “a variety of other social criteria and goals such as the scale of production, the capitalistic mode of production, workers’ influence, equal allocation of economic goods, gender criteria, and so on. Including the latter set of criteria might result in a more radical programme (in the sense of moving further away from the present social order), but not necessarily a more ecological radical programme.” The implication was that the advent of socialism would not materially improve matters ecologically. Or, as he wrote elsewhere, “ecological modernisation theorists believe…that the environment can be protected within the logic and rationality of capitalism….’Green’ capitalism is seen as possible, and in some respects even desirable.” This means “redirecting and transforming ‘free market Capitalism’ in such a way that it less and less obstructs, and increasingly contributes, to the preservation of society’s sustenance base.” More broadly, he stated, ecological modernization means “the incorporation of nature as a third force of production [after labor and capital] in the capitalist economic process.” For the ecological modernist Maarten Hajer, it was possible to see “ecological modernisation as the perception of nature as a new and essential subsystem” of industrial capitalism. How the entire Earth System could become a “subsystem” of industrial society in spatial and temporal terms was not explained.

Capitalist Ecological Modernization and the Western Left

In 2007, ecomodernists Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, who in 2004 published the essay “The Death of Environmentalism,” brought out their book Breakthrough: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, launching at the same time the Breakthrough Institute, a procorporate, procapitalist, ecomodernist, and anti-environmentalist think tank. Constituting an attempt to bring ecomodernism into the limelight, the Breakthrough Institute stands for a program of supposedly solving ecological problems via market-based technology, subsidized by the capitalist state, while keeping existing social relations intact. This approach is anti-environmentalist in the sense of rejecting the environmental movement and promoting the myth of the greening of capitalism. In 2015, the Breakthrough Institute initiated An Ecomodernist Manifesto: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Birth of Ecomodernism, which argued that the only solution to environmental challenges was “accelerated decoupling” of the economy from the environment by more intensive forms of production requiring “accelerated technological progress.” Although arguing that their approach could not be reduced to the system of capital accumulation or free market conservatism, it went against any changes in existing social relations. The best answer to climate change, the Ecomodernist Manifesto affirmed, was nuclear power, billed as “the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy.”

In its many accounts of ecomodernism, the Breakthrough Institute presents capitalism as the only pathway to a green solution. In his book Green Delusions (1992), attacking radical environmentalism and ecosocialism, Breakthrough senior fellow Martin Lewis advocated a mechanistic “Promethean environmentalism,” which he identified with the human-exemptionalist, “technocratic” approach of Simon in The Ultimate Resource. Breakthrough senior fellow Patrick Brown has argued against all logic and evidence that “climate adaptation has been a resounding success in the modern era of rapid capitalistic economic growth.” According to Brown there is “no coherent trend in global floods” or global droughts or global wildfires. The “carbon budget” has not been “breached.” He flatly denies the criticism that capitalism is changing the climate “much faster than we are adapting to it.” Breakthrough Institute senior fellows Nordhaus and Alex Smith, writing for the “democratic socialist” journal Jacobin, argue that corporate-style agribusiness is the most efficient way in which to address agriculture ecologically, and is the model for a decoupling ecomodernism.

Ecomodernist strategy is often presented as “progressive” and has increasingly been openly celebrated by liberal and social democratic thinkers as “Promethean” in the hyperindustrialist sense. Here “Prometheanism” as a propagandistic Cold War term introduced to characterize Marxism as a form of instrumentalism and extreme productivism, and, thus, antihumanist—and then later adopted by first-stage ecosocialists to criticize Marx as anti-environmentalist—has been turned into a badge of honor in social democratic circles. Thus, so-called “democratic socialist” ecomodernists Matt Huber and Leigh Phillips, writing for Jacobin, proudly present themselves as belonging to a long tradition of mechanistic “‘Promethean’ Marxists.” Consistent with the hegemonic notion that the ecological problem is manageable without fundamental changes in social relations, they reject Marx’s metabolic rift theory. Following Simon’s human exemptionalism, Huber and Phillips insist that the only truly “insuperable limits” to economic expansion are “the laws of logic and physics.” In Phillip’s words, mimicking Simon’s anti-environmental human exemptionalism, which he praises, “you can have infinite [economic] growth in a finite planet.” He goes on: “The Socialist…must defend economic growth, productivism, [hyperindustrial] Prometheanism.” The planet we are told has a carrying capacity that can support “282 billion” people—or more. “Energy is freedom. Growth is freedom.” The goal of society is “more stuff.”

Economic expansion, in this view, comes first, humanity and the planet last. The ecological program of such thinkers, ostensibly on the left, does not differ materially from that of the neoliberals of the Breakthrough Institute, with whom they are closely aligned.

Huber and Phillips do not entirely ignore social relations. Yet, they refrain from challenging unlimited capital accumulation or infinite exponential economic growth. All that is needed to address climate change, we are told, is “socialist” (that is, social democratic) planning based on organized labor, particularly electrical workers. Huber strongly opposes what he calls the “anti-system environmental radical” and offers as his solution an “anti-carbon democracy.” In line with erstwhile leftist Christian Parenti, he argues that an ecosocialist “revolutionary overthrow of capitalism” is not a viable option on a reasonable timescale. Hence, the strategy adopted must conform to the internal logic of the capitalist system itself. If capitalism were “decarbonized” and the fossil fuel industry were “euthanized” as part of a capitalist Green New Deal, Huber contends, anthropogenic climate change would simply cease to exist and there would be no need for “aggregate reductions in energy consumption” or reductions in capital accumulation, even in the developed capitalist countries. Accumulation of capital could presumably go on as before, reaching ever greater heights, but on a decarbonized basis.

The argument that conceives endless economic growth/accumulation as the driving force in a Green capitalist solution to climate change is tied to the reduction of the Earth System emergency to climate change alone. This is backed up by Huber and Phillips’s remarkable assertion, in defiance of all contemporary Earth System science, that the other eight planetary boundaries represent no obstacle to human advancement. Such planetary boundaries as the loss of biological integrity (including mass species extinction), the rift in the biogeochemical flows (disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles), land-system change (including deforestation), freshwater loss, novel entities (chemical, radionuclide, and plastic pollution), and ocean acidification—all of which natural scientists say have now been crossed—are simply wished out of existence. Democratic socialist (or social democratic) ecomodernism, conceived in this way, “attains adequate expression when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech,” belying any rational relation to ecology.

What is clear in all of this is that a socialist approach to the planetary ecological emergency is either revolutionary in scope, or it is a contradiction in terms: at best a strategy of making the current accumulative society work better, while denying the dialectical totality of the Earth System crisis.

It is worth emphasizing that there are virtually no ecological thinkers on the left who actually oppose a process of ecological modernization altogether when conceived as part of a comprehensive strategy of promoting ecological sustainability, including changes in both social relations and productive forces. Ecosocialist opposition rather is directed at capitalist ecological modernization as a theory and practice that includes such regressive views as: (1) the refusal to recognize that the fundamental ecological problem is related to capitalism and requires revolutionary changes in social relations; (2) the irrational human-exemptionalist postulate that technology—in accord with the so-called “free market” and the “environmental state”—constitutes the total solution to environmental contradictions, irrespective of prevailing social relations; (3) the belief that exclusive reliance on machine technology makes a purely reformist approach to ecological crises possible; and (4) the denial of critical planetary boundaries and critical ecological limits, the crossing of which creates rifts in the biogeochemical cycles of the planet, endangering humanity and innumerable other species.

China and Socialist Ecological Modernization

The concept of modernity in bourgeois ideology in the West has always stood for the broad economic, political, and cultural developments of capitalism and the West, often equated with one another. The roots of modernity, for Max Weber, lay in the formal rationality that established “Western civilization and…Western civilization only” as the “universal” culture, represented by its science, technology, religion, historical method, music, art, architecture, law, politics, and above all capitalism. In David Landes’s The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (1969), Western capitalism and the Industrial Revolution were simply seen as products of a larger process of modernization in which the West had excelled. Modernization, in the Eurocentric conception, ultimately has no meaning other than the domination of nature and of the global periphery via institutions, particularly of a technological and economic nature, supposedly originating (and culminating) in the West. As Latin American thinker Enrique Dussel wrote, “‘Modernity’ [or at least the European conception of modernity] appears when Europe affirms itself as the ‘center’ of a World History that it inaugurates; ‘the periphery’ that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition.” Ecological modernization is viewed in the Western imperial core of the world system, as simply a further addition to this conception, a technocapitalist, modernist, reformist solution to environmental problems, seen as reflecting another stage of the Western imperial core’s rich maturity. It denies what Marx saw as the metabolic rift inherent in the capitalist accumulation process.

But if in Western ideology it is held that there is only one modernity, based in European culture and capitalism, the actual historical origins of modernity, as a break with more traditional views of the human relation to the world, it can be argued, went much further back, arising in the recognition that humanity was homo faber. The view that human beings were capable of changing the world and thus makers of their own history, independently of the “pack of gods,” was never—as Marxist critics of Eurocentrism such as Joseph Needham and Samir Amin declared—a unique innovation of the Western Enlightenment. Rather it was a product of worldwide cultural development arising during the long Axial Age, in which a similar centering of human self-development could be seen as emerging in many different civilizations. This was evident in Epicurus’s materialist philosophy in the Hellenistic world, and in the emergence of Daoism (and Confucianism) in the Warring States period in China. Modernity, viewed in this deeper historical sense, becomes a product of universal civilization tendencies operating globally with the emergence of human self-consciousness in the Hegelian sense. Socialist, as opposed to capitalist, conceptions of modernity are a product of this more worldwide conception, extending back over millennia, where the object, as in Marx’s analysis, is sustainable human development and the full realization of elemental human needs.

It is here that socialist modernization, and specifically socialist ecological modernism, has to be considered, particularly in relation to its development in China. China is a 5,000-year-old civilization, with a strong traditional ecological heritage stemming from Daoism and Confucianism, but that now, under “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” is introducing a revolutionary ecological modernism tied to its concept of ecological civilization that transcends anything envisioned in the West. Socialist ecological modernization, despite the familiarity of some of its basic forms—for example, the attempt to develop green technology and its concern with economic welfare—is best conceived as the inverse of capitalist ecological modernization in its underlying logic. As Chen Yiwen wrote in “The Dialectics of Ecology and Ecological Civilization“:

Modernization in harmony with nature is part of the overall conception of Chinese modernization, which means that it requires: (1) prioritizing the coordination of the population with the resources and carrying capacity of the environment; (2) ensuring public ownership of natural resources and social sharing of ecological welfare in the process of advancing common prosperity; (3) producing ecological products and cultivating ecological culture in the context of pursuing coordination between material and cultural-ethical advancement; (4) opposing any form of ecological imperialism and extractivism; and (5) promoting the creation of a clean and beautiful world while adhering to the path of peaceful development.

Nothing could be more opposed to the conception of capitalist ecological modernization in the West, which has its roots in the expropriation of nature. Ecological modernization is generally seen in Europe and the United States as an extension of the technological domination of nature aimed at ensuring human exemptionalism. It envisions a world of unlimited capitalist accumulation that by virtue of technology is free from environmental constraints, with the economy simply decoupled from the biogeochemical processes and elemental conditions of the Earth System. In contrast, as Xi explains regarding China’s ecological civilization, “Nature provides the basic conditions for human survival and development. Respecting, adapting to, and protecting nature is essential for building China into a modern socialist country in all respects,” one synonymous with ecological civilization. He writes: “To fundamentally improve our ecosystems, we must abandon the model based on an increase in material resource consumption, extensive development, high energy consumption, and high emissions.”

Socialist ecological modernization, which avoids the delusions of “green capitalism,” makes the building of an ecological civilization a direct object. This is counterposed to capitalist ecomodernism, which is intended to maintain the dominant social relations and the anti-ecological logic of the unrestrained capital-accumulation system, while simply attempting to ameliorate some of its worst effects—in the midst of a planetary ecological emergency!—via second-order regulations and new technology. In U.S. monopoly capitalism, for example, the development of solar technology has always been hindered by the threat it poses to the dominant fossil fuel system, and therefore is intended, at best, to supplement the latter. Here ecological modernization means the continued subordination of environmental to economic goals.

Under its socialist ecological modernization China has surpassed the West in nearly every category of renewable energy development. In 2023, China accounted for 83 percent of world solar panel production, while the United States accounted for only 2 percent. China’s high-speed rail system is larger, faster, and more efficient than that of Europe, and China also accounts for 90 percent of the world bus market. Electric vehicles sales in China now exceed those of internal combustion engines. Within the next three years, according to the Financial Times, China will be obtaining more than half its energy from low-carbon sources, and “is on its way to becoming the world’s first ‘electrostate,'” with a growing portion of its economy supported by electricity and clean energy. As a result, China’s carbon emissions have begun to fall, even with strong economic growth and its continuing heavy, if diminishing, reliance on coal-fired plants. China is the leader in increase in forests globally, with forest coverage nearly doubling since the 1980s.

Yet, it would be a mistake, based on such achievements, to see Chinese ecological modernization as simply entailing a kind of green productivism, which is the meaning of capitalist ecological modernization in the West. Rather, socialist ecological modernization aimed at building an ecological civilization is, in Xi’s words, “the modernization of harmony between humanity and nature.”

Crucial to the Sinicization of Marxism is the goal of the formation of a “community of life” in all of its dimensions, from ecosystems to human-nature relations to the human metabolism with the Earth System itself. “It is essential to differentiate,” Chen has written, socialist ecological modernization in China “from the notion of ‘ecological modernization’ that emerged in Europe in the mid- to late 1980s…prevalent in developed capitalist nations, [which] seeks to enhance gradually environmental quality through economic and technological improvements and public administration adjustments (including the increasing application of market instruments) often without challenging the fundamental tenets of capitalism.” Instead, the emphasis of socialist ecological modernization is on “the socialist reconstruction of social relations alongside a fundamental ecological transformation of humanity’s existing methods of production.” In this, “the ultimate goal is the realization of communism, which entails the liberation of both humanity and nature.”

Unbound Nature and Humanity

We only have fragments from Aeschylus’s lost play Prometheus Unbound on Prometheus’s liberation from his chains. Percy Bysshe Shelley, in his own work, Prometheus Unbound, written in the early nineteenth century, ends his epic poem with the reunification of Prometheus with nature. Mary Shelley observed in her notes on his poem: “When the benefactor of man is liberated, Nature resumes the beauty of her prime.” As ecosocialist Walt Sheasby wrote, “There could scarcely be a more dynamic image of the romantic [revolutionary] celebration of nature and freedom as intertwined.”

The Cold War manipulation of the ancient Greek Promethean myth, appropriating out of context Marx’s quotation from Aeschylus in the foreword of his dissertation, was a device used to disparage Marxism, characterizing it as a philosophy of instrumentalism, extreme productivism, and anti-humanism. What has been called “first-stage ecosocialism” turned the Cold War myth of an instrumentalist, mechanistic Prometheanism supposedly embedded in classical historical materialism, into a charge of anti-environmentalism, while ignoring or downplaying Marx’s own ecological critique. Second-stage ecosocialism demonstrated that this characterization of classical Marxism as a instrumentalist, mechanistic Prometheanism was false in every respect—both with regard to the ancient Greek Promethean myth, and the classical historical-materialist relation to the environment. Meanwhile, capitalist ecological modernization theory, in its polemic against radical environmentalism and ecological Marxism, was itself openly to embrace an instrumentalist/mechanistic Prometheanism as a symbol of its own outlook. The full irony was evident in the reemergence in social-democratic circles of a supposedly left ecomodernism under the false flag of Promethean Marxism, wrongly claiming that for classical Marxism, the object was simply economic growth, rather than sustainable human development.

The inverted, alienated world of capitalist ecomodernism with its mechanistic “Prometheanism” is a flight from the possibility of socialist ecomodernism and a revolutionary humanist-ecological Prometheanism. Capitalist ecological modernism, with its distorted, mechanistic version of the Prometheus myth, vainly seeks to change the productive forces while keeping existing social relations of accumulation and expropriation of nature intact. In contrast, socialist ecomodernism, or humanist-ecological Prometheanism, as developed in Chinese ecological Marxism today, in line with China’s own humanist-environmental traditions, represents a revolutionary stance. Here the object is to change social, productive, and environmental relations in such a way that acquisitive society is abandoned and both nature and humanity are unbound and in mutual accord—as envisioned, in different ways, by such humanistic thinkers as Laozi, Aeschylus, Epicurus, Shelley, and Marx. As Marx states in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, communism is at one and the same time “the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.”

Saturday, December 3, 2022

John Bellamy Foster on Extractivism

Extractivism in the Anthropocene. John Bellamy Foster, Monthly Review. Nov 22, 2022.


Over the last decade and a half, the concept of extractivism has emerged as a key element in our understanding of the planetary ecological crisis. Although the development of extractive industries on a global scale has been integral to capitalist mode of production since its onset, commencing with the colonial expansion of the long sixteenth century, this took on a much larger worldwide significance with the advent of the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, marking the beginning of the age of fossil capital. Nevertheless, it was only with the Great Acceleration, beginning in the mid-twentieth century and extending to the present, that the quantitative expansion of global production and of resource extraction in particular led to a qualitative transformation in the human relation to the Earth System as a whole. This has given rise to the Anthropocene Epoch in geological history, in which anthropogenic (as opposed to nonanthropogenic) factors for the first time in Earth history constitute the major force in Earth System change. In the Anthropocene, extractivism has become a core symptom of the planetary disease of late capitalism/imperialism, threatening humanity and the inhabitants of the earth in general.

The Great Acceleration is dramatically depicted by the Anthropocene Working Group of the International Commission on Stratigraphy in the form of a series of twenty-four charts, each showing a hockey-stick-shaped curve of economic expansion, resource depletion, and overloading planetary sinks, representing a sudden speeding-up and scaling-up of the human impact on the earth, similar to the famous hockey stick chart on increases in global average temperature associated with climate change. Viewed in this way, the Great Acceleration is seen as having brought the Holocene Epoch of the last 11,700 years of geological history to a sudden end, ushering in the Anthropocene Epoch and the current planetary crisis.

Recent research has shown two separate periods where global resource use (including all biomass, minerals, fossil fuel energy, and cement production) has increased much more rapidly than global carbon emissions; which can be characterized as the first (1950—1970) and second (2000—2015) accelerations in resource use within the Great Acceleration as a whole. The first resource acceleration is associated with the rapid economic expansion of North America, Western Europe, and Japan after the Second World War; the second resource acceleration coincided with the rapid growth of China, India, and other emerging economies beginning around 2000. In the case of the wealthy capitalist countries or “developed economies,” resource use per capita has tended to level off in recent years, while remaining at levels far beyond overall sustainability from a limits to growth perspective. Yet, much of this apparent decline in natural resource use has been due to the outsourcing of world industrial production to the Global South, while consumption remains highly concentrated in the Global North, driving an “imperial mode of living.” In 2016, the Global Material Flows and Resource Productivity Report of the United Nations Environmental Programme indicated that “since 1990 there has been little improvement in global material efficiency [i.e. efficiency in the extraction of primary materials]. In fact, efficiency started to decline around 2000.” Global extraction of materials tripled in the four decades prior to the 2016 report. These conditions have resulted in an acceleration of extractivist pressures in key regions throughout the earth, particularly in the Global South.

In many countries in the Global South, particularly Latin America and Africa, primary commodities, including both agriculture and fossil fuels/minerals dominate the export economy, reminiscent of an earlier age, with percentages of primary commodities in merchandise trade exports in 2019 as high as 67 percent in Brazil and 82 percent in both Chile and Uruguay. In Algeria, export dependence on fossil fuels is almost complete, now accounting for 94 percent of the value of its merchandise trade exports. In Latin America, in particular, the import-substitution industrialization era of the early post-Second World War years, which promoted manufacturing, has been succeeded in the new era of accelerated resource extraction and by a new dependence on primary commodities, including both agricultural goods and fuels/minerals. In 2017, natural resource rents (including mineral, oil, natural gas, and forestry rents) accounted for 43 percent of GDP in the Republic of Congo. In Africa, the drive for resources and new agricultural lands has fueled vast land grabs throughout the continent, made possible by the failure of the decolonization process in securing the rights to the land for Indigenous populations. In island nations around the globe, fishing and resource rights over vast ocean territories have been ceded to multinational corporations as the ocean commons are being intensively exploited. New technologies have led to a race for new rare minerals, as in the case of lithium mining. A vast financialization of the earth, in which international finance based in the Global North is taking over the commodification and management of ecosystem services, primarily in the Global South, is now underway.

Nor is this acceleration of resource extraction and extractive infrastructure confined simply to the periphery of the capitalist world economy. The United States is now the world’s largest oil producer as well as the world’s largest oil consumer. There are 730,000 miles of oil and gas pipelines worldwide, equal to thirty times the circumference of the earth. The United States and Canada alone account for about 260,000 miles of fossil fuel pipelines, or over a third of the world’s total. In Canada, primary commodities in 2019 accounted for 43 percent of export value in merchandise trade, while in Australia it was 81 percent.

The ecological consequences of all of these trends are catastrophic, extending all the way from the devastation of the land and communities up to climate change and the destruction of a human-habitable planet. Fifty years after The Limits to Growth report was published by the Club of Rome, resource depletion is following what it referred to as its threatening “standard scenario,” with the result that the very existence of planet Earth as a home for humanity and innumerable other species is threatened.

In Latin America, in particular, these conditions and their effects on the ground have led to the development of extractivism as a critical concept, which in recent theoretical discussions has often taken on an expansive meaning, encompassing wide aspects of capitalism and forms of exploitation. Numerous academic analyses have sought to stretch the notion to account for the entire set of economic, political, cultural, and ecological problems of modern times, largely displacing capitalism itself, encompassing questions as varied as modernity, violence, production, exploitation, environmental destruction, digitalization, and new “ontological assemblages.” For such thinkers, extractivism is viewed as the insatiable source of capitalist modernity’s destructive and non-reproductive drive to commodify and consume all life and all existence, what some theorists refer to “total extractivism” or the “world eater.” Such views end up displacing the critical concept of capital accumulation itself, as well as removing attention from the very concrete popular struggles occurring at the ground level against extractive capitals.

For this reason, Eduardo Gudynas, a leading Latin American analyst of extractivism, has insisted that the concept be approached in relation to modes of production/appropriation, giving extractivism a very definite meaning directed at the development of a broad political-economic-ecological critique. Gudynas specifically objects to what he sees as the loose academic approach that now proposes vague and ambiguous “labels for extractivism such as ‘financial,’ ‘cultural,’ ‘musical,’ and ‘epistemological,’” creating endless sources of confusion, and removing the concept from its basis in political economy and ecological critique. “Extractivism,” he writes, “cannot be used as a synonym for development or even for an exporting primary economy. There is no such thing as extractivist development. … Extractivisms … do not account for the structure and function of an entire national economy, which includes many other sectors, activities and institutions.”

Gudynas’s own theory of extractivisms, which will be a central focus of what follows, can be seen as having arisen out of the broad historical materialist tradition. Thus, in order to understand the significance of his work, it is necessary to situate it within a larger historical materialist tradition, going back to the classical analysis of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, related to issues of the appropriation/expropriation of nature, extractive industries, and the metabolic rift. In this way it is possible to provide the foundations for a critique of extractivism in the Anthropocene.


Marx and the Expropriation of Nature

The notion of “extractive industry” dates back to Marx in the mid-nineteenth century. Marx divided production into four spheres: extractive industry, agriculture, manufacturing, and transport. Extractive industry was seen by him as constituting the sector of production in which “the material for labour is provided directly by Nature, such as mining, hunting, fishing (and agriculture, but only in so far as it starts by breaking up virgin soil).” In general, Marx drew a line between extractive industry and agriculture, insofar as the latter was not dependent on raw materials from outside agriculture itself, but was capable of building up from within, given agriculture’s reproductive, as opposed to nonreproductive characteristics. This, however, did not prevent him, in his theory of metabolic rift, from seeing capitalist industrial agriculture as expropriative, and in ways that we now call extractivist.

Some of Marx’s most critical comments with regard to the capitalist mode of production are directed at mining as the quintessential extractive industry. In his discussion of coal mining in Capital, vol. 3, he treats the absolute neglect of the conditions of the coal miners, resulting in an average loss of life of fifteen people a day in England. This led him to comment that capital “squanders human beings, living labour, more readily than does any other mode of production, squandering not only flesh and blood but nerves and brains as well.” But the destructive effects of extractive industry and of capital in general, for Marx, were not restricted to the squandering of flesh and blood, but also extended to the squandering of raw materials. Moreover, Engels, in writing to Marx, famously discussed the “squandering” of fossil fuels resources, and coal in particular.

In interviews that he gave responding to radical and Indigenous movements against extractivism, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa rhetorically asked: “Let’s see, Señores marxistas, was Marx opposed to the exploitation of natural resources?” The implication was that Marx would not have opposed contemporary extractivism. In response, ecological economist Joan Martinez-Alier pointed to Marx’s famous analysis indicating that “capitalism leads to a ‘metabolic rift.’ Capitalism is not capable of renewing its own conditions of production; it does not replace the nutrients, it erodes the soils, it exhausts or destroys renewable resources (such as fisheries and forests) and non-renewable ones (such as fossil fuels and minerals).” On this basis, Martinez-Alier contends that Marx, though he did not live to see global climate change “would have sided with Climate Justice.” Indeed, the extraordinary growth of the Marxian ecological critique, building on Marx’s analysis in Capital of the “negative, i.e. destructive side” of capitalist production in his theory of metabolic rift, has provided the world with penetrating insights into every aspect of the contemporary planetary crisis.

Key to a historical materialist analysis of extractivism is Marx’s analysis of what he called “Original Expropriation,” a term that he preferred to what the classical-liberal political economists called “Previous, or Original Accumulation” (often misleadingly translated as “primitive accumulation).” For Marx, “so-called primitive [previous] accumulation,” as he repeatedly emphasized, was not accumulation at all, but rather expropriation or appropriation without equivalent. Taking a cue from Karl Polanyi—and in line with Marx’s argument—we can also refer to expropriation as appropriation without reciprocity. Expropriation was evident in the violent seizure of the common lands in Britain. But “the chief moments of [so-called] primitive accumulation” in the mercantilist era, providing the conditions for “the genesis of the industrial capitalist,” lay in the expropriation of lands and bodies through the colonial “conquest and plunder” of the entire external area/periphery of the emerging capitalist world economy. This was associated, Marx wrote, with “the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the Indigenous population” in the Americas, the whole trans-Atlantic slave trade, the brutal colonization of India, and a massive drain of resources/surplus from the colonized areas that fed European development.

Crucial to this analysis was Marx’s very careful distinction between appropriation, understood in its most general sense, as the basis of all property forms and all modes of production, and particular forms of appropriation, such as expropriation and exploitation under the regime of capital. Marx conceived appropriation as rooted in the free appropriation from nature, and thus as a material prerequisite of human existence, leading to the formation thereby of various forms of property, with private property constituting only one such form, which became dominant only under capitalism. This general historical theoretical approach gave rise to Marx’s concept of the “mode of appropriation” underlying mode of production. These distinctions were to play an important role in Marx’s later ethnological writings, and his identification with the active resistance to the expropriation of their lands by Indigenous communities in Algeria and elsewhere.

Not only was the expropriation of land and bodies recognized in Marx’s analysis, but the earth itself could be expropriated in the sense that the conditions of its reproduction were not maintained, and natural resources were “robbed” or “squandered.” This was particularly the case with capitalism, in which the appropriation of nature generally took a clear, expropriative form. In Marx’s analysis, the free appropriation of nature by human communities, constituting the basis of all production was seen as having metamorphosed under capitalism into the more destructive form of “a free gift of Nature to capital,” no longer geared primarily to the reproduction of life, the earth, and community as one largely indivisible whole, but rather dedicated solely to the valorization of capital. The “robbery” of the earth and the metabolic rift—or the “irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism” between humanity and nature—were thus closely interwoven. Although some contemporary theorists have attempted to define extractivism as meaning the non-reproduction of nature, it is much more theoretically meaningful to view this in line with Marxian ecology in terms of what Marx called the robbery or expropriation of nature, of which extractivism is simply a particularly extreme and crucial form.


Gudynas and the Extractivist Surplus


These conceptual foundations arising out of Marx’s classical ecological critique allow us to appreciate more fully the pathbreaking insights into extractivism provided by Gudynas in his Extractivisms. A crucial point of departure in his analysis is the concept of modes of appropriation. In his pioneering work, Underdeveloping the Amazon of the mid-1980s, environmental sociologist Stephen G. Bunker introduced the concept of “modes of extraction” to address the issue of extractive industry and its nonreproductive character, contrasting this to Marx’s larger concept of “modes of production.” Gudynas claims that Bunker was generally on the right track. However, in contrast to Bunker, Gudynas does not adopt the notion of modes of extraction. Nor does he retain Marx’s notion of modes of production, arguing unaccountably that Marx’s concept has been “abandoned,” citing anthropologist David Graeber. Rather, Gudynas turns to the concept of “modes of appropriation,” while seemingly unaware of the theoretical connection between appropriation and production and between modes of appropriation and modes of production that Marx had constructed in the Grundrisse, and how this is related to current Marxian research into these categories. Still, Gudynas’s modes of appropriation approach allows him to distinguish between human appropriation from the natural environment in general and what he refers to as “extractivist modes of appropriation,” which violate conditions of natural and social reproduction.

Gudynas defines extractivism itself in terms of processes that are excessive as measured by the three characteristics of: (1) physical indicators (volume and weight); (2) environmental intensity; and (3) destination, with extractivism seen as inherently related to colonialism and imperialism, requiring that the product be exported in the form of primary commodities. Not all appropriation of nature carried out by extractive industries is extractivist. This is perhaps clearest in his short piece, “Would Marx Be an Extractivist?” Writing, as in Martinez-Alier’s case, in response to Correa, Gudynas states:
Marx did not reject mining. Most of the social movements do not reject it, and if their claims are heard carefully, it will be found that they are focused on a particular kind of enterprise: large scale, with huge volumes removed, intensive and open-pit. In other words, don’t confuse mining with extractivism….Marx, in Latin America today, would not be an extractivist, because that would mean abandoning the goal of transforming the modes of production, becoming a bourgeois economist. On the contrary, he would be promoting alternatives to production, and that means, in our present context, moving toward post-extractivism.
Today’s global extractivism, what Martin Arboleda has called The Planetary Mine, is identified with “generalized-monopoly capital” and conditions of “late imperialism.” A central concern of Gudynas’s work is a critique of the renewed imperial dependency in the Global South resulting from neo-extractivism, raising the question of “delinking from globalization” as perhaps the only radical alternative. A similar view was powerfully developed by James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer in their Extractive Imperialism, which described the new extractivism as a new imperialist model, forcing countries into a new dependency, the ground for which had been prepared by neoliberal restructuring, which had virtually annihilated many of the earlier forces of production in agriculture and industry.

Gudynas’s signal contribution, however, lies in his attempt to connect extractivism to the concept of surplus, in order to explain the economic and ecological losses associated with the reliance on extractivist modes of appropriation. Here he relies on the concept of economic surplus developed by Paul A. Baran in The Political Economy of Growth in the 1950s, which was designed to operationalize Marx’s surplus value calculus in line with a critique that had rational economic planning as its yardstick. Gudynas notes that in Baran’s surplus concept, in conformity with Marx’s surplus value, “ground rent and interest on money capital” are components of total surplus rather than production costs. In introducing the concept of economic surplus, Baran sought to reveal forms of surplus value that were, in capitalist accounting, as Gudynas puts it, disguised forms of “what is essentially an appropriation of the surplus.”

Employing this idea, Gudynas seeks to add to the economic or social dimension of surplus, based on the exploitation of labor, two environmental dimensions of the surplus in the context of extractivist modes of appropriation. The first of these, the environmental-renewable surplus is seen as related to the classic Ricardian-Marxian theory of agricultural ground rent focused primarily on renewable industry. It is meant to capture surplus not only associated with monopoly rents and thus integrated directly into the economic calculus, but also, according to Gudynas, to grapple with how ecosystem services, such as pollination, are extractively appropriated/expropriated. Gudynas indicates that a larger “monetized surplus” is created for corporations by neglecting such crucial environmental aspects as soil and water conservation, thus generating an artificially large surplus based on the extractivist appropriation of renewable resources. This is related to what Marx called the “robbing” or expropriation of the earth, part of his theory of metabolic rift.

The third dimension of the surplus (the second environmental dimension), according to Gudynas, is the environmental-nonrenewable surplus related to non-renewable resources, such as minerals and fossil fuels. “The key distinction here,” he writes, “is that the resource will be exhausted sooner or later, and therefore the surplus captured by the capitalist will always be proportional to the loss of natural heritage that cannot be recovered. Similarly, the space occupied by a mining enclave will be impossible to use for another purpose, such as agriculture.” Whatever extractivist surplus is obtained has to be set against the loss of natural wealth associated with resource depletion, something that is disguised by the common employment of the concept of “natural capital,” conceived today not, as in classical political economy, in terms of use value, but rather, in accord with neoclassical economics, in terms of exchange value and substitutability.

In Marx and Engels’s classical historical materialism, a very similar analytical approach was adopted with respect to the expropriation of nonrenewable resources to that presented by Gudynas in his analysis of the environmental-nonrenewable surplus. For Marx and Engels, the destructive expropriation of nonrenewable resources could not be treated as a straightforward case of robbing, as in the case of the soil, forests, fishing, etc. Hence, they approached extractivism with respect to nonrenewable resources under the rubric of the squandering of such resources, a concept that was especially used in relation to the avaricious expropriation of minerals and fossil fuels, particularly coal, but also applied to the extreme “human sacrifices” in extractivist industries, related to what is nowadays sometimes called the “corporeal rift.” Capitalism’s relation to both renewable and non-renewable resources was thus seen in the classical historical materialist perspective as pointing to the destructive expropriation of the earth, either as the “robbing” or the “squandering” of nature—an approach that closely corresponds to Gudynas’s two forms of extractivist surplus appropriation/expropriation.

Gudynas’s approach to what he calls the “extractivist surplus” associated with his two environmental dimensions of surplus is meant to encompass externalities, highlighting the fact that the “actual surplus” appropriated—to use Baran’s terms—is, in some cases, artificially high, in relation to a more rational “planned surplus,” as it does not account for depletion of fossil fuels and other natural resources. This basic approach is employed in the remainder of Gudynas’s analysis to engage with struggles on the ground over this bleeding of the extractivist economies, and the relation of this to late imperialism, which carries out such bleeding on ever-larger scales to the long-term detriment of the relatively dependent peripheral (or semi-peripheral, that is, emerging) economies. As he argues in Extractivisms, this ultimately becomes a question of “extractivism and justice.”


Extractivism and the Crisis of the Anthropocene

Given that the Anthropocene, though still not official, has been defined as that epoch in which anthropogenic rather than nonanthropogenic factors, for the first time in geological history, are the primary forces determining Earth System change, it is clear that the Anthropocene will continue as long as global industrial civilization survives. The current Anthropocene crisis, defined as an “anthropogenic rift” in the biogeochemical cycles of the Earth System, is closely associated with the system of capital accumulation and is pointing society toward an Anthropocene-extinction event. To avoid this, humanity will need to transcend the dominant “accumulative society” imposed by capitalism. But there will be no progressive escaping from the Anthropocene itself in the conceivable future, since humanity, even in an ecologically sustainable socialist mode of production will remain on a razor’s edge, given the current planetary-scale stage of economic and technological development, and the fact that the limits of growth will need to be accounted for in the determination of all future paths of sustainable human development.

It was the recognition of these conditions that led Spanish geologist Carles Soriano, writing in Geologica Acta, to propose the Capitalian as the name of the first geological age of the Anthropocene Epoch. According to this outlook, the current planetary ecological crisis has to be seen in terms of the generation of a destructive expropriation of nature, which needs to be transcended in the process of going beyond capitalism and the Capitalian Age. Others independently have proposed the name Capitalinian Age for this new geological age, while also pointing to the notion of a Communian Age—standing for communal, community, commons—as the future geological age of the Anthropocene that needs to be created in coevolution with nature—with a “great climacteric” in this respect necessarily occurring by the mid-twenty-first century.

In the present century, combatting the capitalist expropriation of nature, and in particular the extractivism that is more and more dominating our time—along with combatting the present accumulative system itself—has to take priority at all levels and in all forms of social struggle. In the classical historical materialist perspective, production as a whole, not simply extractive industry, but also agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation, need to be confronted, in order to transcend the contradictions of class-based capital accumulation. In this regard, the insights of the broad historical materialist tradition are crucial. As Marx observed,
Since actual labour is the appropriation of nature for the satisfaction of human needs, the activity through which the metabolism between man and nature is mediated, to denude labour capacity of the means of labour, the objective conditions for the appropriation of nature through labour, is to denude it, also, of the means of life. Labour capacity denuded of the means of labour and the means of life is therefore absolute poverty as such.
Today we are faced with an even bigger problem, arising out of this one, since the denuding of labor of its role as the direct mediator of the metabolism between humanity and nature, and the substitution of capital in this role through its control of the objective conditions of the appropriation of nature, has meant, with the growth of accumulation, that the means of life on the planet as a whole are being destroyed. The only answer is the creation of a higher form of society in which the associated producers directly and rationally regulate the metabolism between humanity and nature, in accord with the requirements of their own human development in coevolution with the earth as a whole.